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"STREET ENCOUNTERS" AND THE 
CONSTITUTION: TERRY, SIBRON, 
PETERS, AND BEYONDt 
Wayne R. LaFave* 
Street encounters between citizens and police officers are incredibly 
rich in diversity. They range from wholly friendly exchanges of 
pleasantries or mutually useful information to hostile confrontations 
of armed men involving arrests, or injuries, or loss of life. Moreover, 
hostile confrontations are not all of a piece. Some of them begin in a 
friendly enough manner, only to take a different turn upon the in-
jection of some unexpected element into the conversation. En-
counters are initiated by the police for a wide variety of purposes, 
some of which are wholly unrelated to a desire to prosecute for crime.1 
l. STOP AND FRISK COMES OF AGE 
IT has been only eight years since a leading criminal law scholar noted with dismay that the issue of "whether the police have the 
right to stop and question a suspect, without his consent, in the ab-
sence of grounds for an arrest" had been "largely ignored by com-
mentators and dealt with ambiguously by most courts."2 How times 
have changed! In the past few years, the police practice commonly 
and euphemistically referred to as "stop and £risk"3 has been a most 
popular topic in the law reviews,4 and has been dealt with by a 
t Portions of this article are based upon a paper presented at Ann Arbor, Michigan, 
for the Institute of Continuing Legal Education program on "Criminal Law and the 
Constitution: The Expanding Revolution," on July 19, 1968. 
• Professor of Law, University of Illinois. B.S. 1957, LL.B. 1959, S.J.D. 1965, 
University of Wisconsin.-Ed. 
I. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. I, 13 (1968) (Chief Justice Warren). 
2. Remington, The Law Relating to "On the Street'' Detention, Questioning and 
Frisking of Suspected Persons and Police Arrest Privileges in General, 51 J. CRIM. 
L.C. 8: P.S. 386, 390 (1960). 
3. The terms "stop" and "frisk" are used in this Article as convenient ways of 
referring to distinct police practices, and their use is not intended to suggest that the 
words themselves aid in resolving the difficult constitutional issues concerning these 
practices. See text accompanying note 66 infra. 
4. See Abrams, Constitutional Limitations on Detention for Investigation, 52 IowA 
L. R.Ev. 1093 (1967); Bator 8: Vorenberg, Arrest, Detention, Interrogation and the 
Right to Counsel: Basic Problems and Possible Legislative Solutions, 66 COLUM. L. 
R.Ev. 62 (1966); Kuh, In-Field Interrogation: Stop, Question, Detention and Frisk, 3 
CRIM. L. BULL. 597 (1967); Kuh, Reflections on New York's "Stop-and-Frisk" Law and 
Its Claimed Unconstitutionality, 56 J. CRIM. L.C. 8: P.S. 32 (1965); LaFave, Improving 
Police Performance Through the Exclusionary Rule-Part I: Current Police and 
Local Court Practices, 30 Mo. L. R.Ev. 391, 427-55 (1965); LaFave, Detention for In-
vestigation by the Police: An Analysis of Current Practices, 1962 WASH. U. L.Q. 331; 
Leagre, The Fourth Amendment and the Law of Arrest, 54 J. CRIM. L.C. 8: P.S. 393, 
406-16 (1963); Oberman 8: Finkel, Constitutional Arguments Against "Stop and Frisk", 
3 CRIM. L. BuLL. 441 (1967); Pilcher, The Law and Practice of Field Interrogation, 58 
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number of courts in a more forthright manner.5 This development 
reached its zenith last term when the Supreme Court for the first 
J. CRIM. L.C. &: P.S. 465 (1967); Reich, Police Questioning of Law Abiding Citizens, 75 
YALE L.J, 1161 (1966); Reiss &: Black, Interrogation and the Criminal Process, 374 
ANNALS 47 (1967); Ronayne, The Right To Investigate and New York's "Stop and 
Frisk" Law, 33 FORDHAM L. REY. 211 (1964); Schoenfeld, The "Stop and Frisk" Law Is 
Unconstitutional, 17 SYRACUSE L. REv. 627 (1966); Schwartz, Stop and Frisk (A Case 
Study in Judicial Control of the Police), 58 J. CRIM. L.C. &: P.S. 433 (1967); Siegel, The 
New York "Frisk" and "Knock-Not" Statutes: Are They Constitutional?, 30 BROOKLYN 
L. REY. 274 (1964); Souris, Stop and Frisk or Arrest and Search-The Use and Misuse 
of Euphemisms, 57 J. CRIM. L.C. &: P.S. 251 (1966); Stern, Stop and Frisk: An Historical 
Answer to a Modern Problem, 58 J. CRIM. L.C. &: P.S. 532 (1967); Tiffany, Field 
Interrogation: Administrative, Judicial and Legislative Approaches, 43 DENVER L.J. 
389 (1966); Younger, Stop and Frisk: "Say It Like It Is", 58 J. CRIM. L.C. &: P.S. 293 
(1967); Wolbrette, Detention for Questioning In Louisiana, 39 TuL. L. REY. 69 (1964). 
See also the student commentary appearing in Recent Decision, Search and Seizure-
Police Officer May Stop, Question and Frisk a Person on Reasonable Suspicion-
Section 180-a of New York Code of Criminal Procedure Is Constitutional, 31 ALBANY 
L. REY. 177 (1967); Recent Decision, Right of Police Officer To Stop and Frisk a 
Suspect Held Constitutional-Evidence Obtained Thereby ls Admissible, 33 BROOKLYN 
L. REv. 138 (1966); Recent Decision, Common Law "Frisk"-Right Extended, 31 
BROOKLYN L. REY. 397 (1964); Recent Decision, Frisk Distinguished From a Constitu-
tional Search, 31 BROOKLYN L. REY. 174 (1964); Recent Case, Inclusion of Briefcase in 
"Frisk" Does Not Create a Constitutionally Protected Search, 14 BUFFALO L. REY. 545 
(1965); Comment, Police Power To Stop, Frisk, and Question Suspicious Persons, 65 
COLUM. L. REv. 848 (1965); Note, Stop and Frisk: A Perspective, 53 CORNELL L.Q. 899 
(1968); Note, Stopping and Frisking a Suspect Without Grounds for Arrest: People 
v. Rivera, 50 CORNELL L.Q. 529 (1965); Case Note, New York "Stop and Frisk" Law-
Seizure of Burglar's Tools and Narcotics Without Probable Cause for Arrest or Search 
Held Valid, 35 FORDHAM L. REY. 355 (1966); Recent Statute, New York Authorizes 
Police To "Stop-and-Frisk" on Reasonable Suspicion, 78 HARV. L. REY. 473 (1964); Note, 
Stop and Frisk in California, 18 HAsrINGS L.J. 623 (1967); Decision, Right of Police To 
"Stop and Frisk", IO N.Y.L.F. 410 (1964); Note, Stop and Frisk: Police Protection or Police 
State, 21 N.Y.U. INTRA. L. REY. 180 (1966); Comment, Probable Cause Held Not Requisite 
for Stop and Frisk, 39 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1093 (1964); Comment, The Law of Arrest: Con-
stitutionality of Detention and Frisk Acts, 59 Nw. U. L. REv. 641 (1964); Note, Police 
Officers Have the Right To Stop and Question Individuals in the Absence of Probable 
Cause and, as an Incident to the Stopping, May Frisk or Search the Suspect as a 
Precautionary Measure, 4 HOUSTON L. REY. 589 (1966); Note, Stop and Frisk: Dilemma 
for the Courts, 41 S. CAL. L. REv. 161 (1967); Recent Decision, New York's "Stop and 
Frisk" Law Held Not Violative of the Fourth Amendment Despite Lack of "Probable 
Cause" Requirement, 41 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 610 (1967); Legislation, The "No-Knock" 
and "Stop and Frisk" Provisions of the New York Code of Criminal Procedure, 38 ST. 
JOHN'S L. REY. 392 (1964); Recent Decision, Briefcase Within Limits of Permissible 
Personal Frisk, 16 SYRACUSE L. REv. 685 (1965); Note, Selective Detention and the 
Exclusionary Rule, 34 U. CHI. L. REv. 158 (1966); Comment, Constitutional Limitations 
on Pre-Arrest Investigations, 15 UCLA L. REv. 1031 (1968); Recent Decision, The 
Power To Stop and Frisk, 1965 U. ILL. L.F. 119; Note, "Stop and Frisk" and Its Ap-
plication in the Law of Pennsylvania, 28 U. PITT. L. REv. 488 (1967); Note, Detention, 
Arrest, and Salt Lake City Police Practices, 9 UTAH L. REv. 593 (1965); Recent Decision, 
Unreasonable Searches and Seizures-Stop-and-Frisk Statutes, 18 W. REs. L. REv. 1031 
(1967); Note, Stop and Frisk-Reasonable Suspicion: An Exception to Probable Cause, 
13 WAYNE L. REY. 449 (1967). 
The subject has also received attention in several recent books; see, e.g., W. LAFAVE, 
ARREST! THE DECISION To TAKE A SUSPECT INTO CUSTODY 344-47 (1965); W. SCHAEFER, 
THE SUSPECT AND SOCIETY 23-26, 40-43 (1967); L. TIFFANY, D. McINTYRE, &: D. ROTEN-
BERG, DETECTION OF CRIME 5-94 (1967) [hereinafter DETECTION OF CRIME]. 
5. E.g., People v. Mickelson, 59 Cal. 2d 448, 380 P .2d 658, 30 Cal. Rptr. 18 (1963); 
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time directly confronted6 this issue in Terry v. Ohio,7 Sibron v. New 
York,8 and Peters v. New York.9 
The practice of stop and frisk, of course, is by no means new. It 
is a time-honored police procedure for officers to stop suspicious 
persons for questioning and, occasionally, to search these persons 
for dangerous weapons. This is a distinct law enforcement tech-
nique which has characteristics quite different from other police 
practices such as arrest or search incident to arrest, and has long 
been viewed by the police in this way.10 It is curious, but perhaps 
understandable, that it has taken so long for the law and lawyers to 
respond to a practice which quite obviously presents "serious ques-
tions concerning the role of the Fourth Amendment in the confron-
tation on the street between the citizen and the policeman investi-
gating suspicious circumstances."11 
In part, this long-standing disregard may be attributable to 
the fact that stop and frisk is what some commentators would call 
a "low-visibility" police procedure.12 Although it has long been a 
matter of routine in every major police department in the country, 
Commonwealth v. Lehan, 347 Mass. 197, 196 N.E.2d 840 (1964); State v. Dilley, 49 
N.J. 460, 231 A.2d 353 (1967); People v. Rivera, 14 N.Y.2d 441, 201 N.E.2d 32, 252 
N.Y.S.2d 458 (1964); State v. Terry, 5 Ohio App. 2d 122, 214 N.E.2d 114 (1966); 
Commonwealth v. Hicks, 209 Pa. Super. 1, 223 A.2d 873 (1966). 
6. The Court avoided this issue on two prior occasions. In Henry v. United States, 
361 U.S. 98 (1959), where F.B.I. agents stopped a vehicle in which suspects under 
surveillance were riding, the Government conceded that the legality of the stopping 
depended upon whether there were then grounds for arrest. The majority accepted 
this concession although the Chief Justice and Justice Clark took the position that 
there were adequate grounds for stopping the vehicle for investigation even if grounds 
for arrest were lacking. In Rios v. United States, 364 U.S. 253 (1960), police found 
the defendant in possession of narcotics after approaching the taxicab in which he was 
riding while it was stopped at a red light. The Court returned the case to the trial 
court for a determination of when the arrest was made, without passing on the Govern-
ment's contention that the question was whether there were reasonable grounds for 
inquiry. 
7. 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
8. 392 U.S. 40 (1968). 
9. 392 U.S. 40 (1968). The Court disposed of Peters and Sibron together, although 
it did not attempt to deal with the two cases as a unit except with regard to its 
refusal to consider the question of prima facie constitutionality of the New York 
statute. Reference will be made herein to the Peters and Sibron cases as if they were 
decided in separate opinions, for the two cases have little in common and required 
separate analysis by all members of the Court. 
10. See, e.g., 2 Los Angeles Police Dept., Daily Training Bull. 126 (1950). See also 
NATIONAL CENTER ON POUCE AND COMMUNITY RELATIONS, FlELD SURVEYS V: A R.El'OR.T 
OF A REsEARCH STUDY SUBMITTED TO THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT 
AND ADMINISTRATION OF JumCE 327-36 (1967). 
11. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 4 (1968). 
12. It was so characterized by the Court in Sibron (392 U.S. at 52), and has been 
frequently referred to in this way by the commentators, e.g., Schwartz, Stop and 
Frisk (A. Case Study in Judicial Control of the Police), 58 J. CR.IM. L.C. 8c P.S. 433, 463 
(1967). 
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until recently the police appeared contented with the fact that their 
authority to employ the stop-and-frisk tactic was undefined. Few 
courts or legislatures had said that the police could stop and frisk; 
but neither had they said that the practice was improper, and the 
resulting uncertainty did not strike the police as disadvantageous: 
Why go looking for trouble? But when the Supreme Court imposed 
a fourth amendment exclusionary rule on the states in 1961,13 and 
then imposed a fifth amendment exclusionary rule to bar admissions 
obtained without certain warnings in 1966,14 it became increasingly 
apparent that the police would not much longer benefit from the 
law's silence on street encounters. Notwithstanding the common use 
of such delightful euphemisms as "stop," "frisk," and "field interro-
gation," it was clear that sooner or later courts would have to deter-
mine whether these practices could be squared with the Constitu-
tion. 
The fact that this assessment took place later and not sooner does 
not mean that these police practices were a dark secret. Perhaps stop 
and frisk was a low-visibility procedure in one sense, but striking il-
lustrations of the practice did reach trial and appellate courts with 
some frequency. Indeed, they arose in almost every context except 
that which would require a direct answer to the question of whether 
stop and frisk was constitutional. This is because what the police 
viewed as a distinct procedure simply did not fit comfortably within 
any extant legal pigeonhole.15 As a result, instances of what in fact 
13. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643. 
14. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436. 
15. It is true, however, that the Uniform Arrest Act had been in exisence since 1942, 
and contained the following provisions governing street encounters: 
Section 2. Questioning and Detaining Suspects. 
(I) A peace officer may stop any person abroad who he has reasonable ground 
to suspect is committing, has committed or is about to commit a crime, and may 
demand of him his name, address, business abroad and whither he is going. 
(2) Any person so questioned who fails to identify himself or explain his 
actions to the satisfaction of the officer may be detained and further questioned 
and investigated. 
(3) The total period of detention provided for by this section shall not exceed 
two hours. The detention is not an arrest and shall not be recorded as an arrest in 
any official record. At the end of the detention the person so detained shall be 
released or be arrested and charged with a crime. 
Section 3. Searching for Weapons. Persons Who Have Not Been Arrested. 
A peace officer may search for a dangerous weapon any person whom he has 
stopped or detained to question as provided in section 2, whenever he has reason-
able ground to believe that he is in danger if the person possesses a dangerous 
weapon. If the officer finds a weapon, he may take and keep it until the completion 
of the questioning, when he shall either return it or arrest the person. The arrest 
may be for the illegal possession of the weapon. 
INTERSTATE CoMMN. ON CRIME, INTERSTATE CRIME CONTROL 86-89 (1942); Warner, The 
Uniform A.rrest A.ct, 28 VA. L. REv. 315, 343-47 (1942). The Act had drifted into 
obscurity by the beginning of this decade, however, and was in force in only three 
states in slightly modified form. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 1901-12 (1953); N.H. 
REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 594:1-25 (1955); R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. §§ 12-7-1 through 13 (1956). 
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were stops and frisks were usually disposed of by a rather mechani-
cal process of determining whether an "arrest" had taken place.16 
In other cases, the matter was dealt with solely in terms of substan-
tive law because the suspect was prosecuted for "being suspicious" 
under a vagrancy statute or similar provision.17 
In 1964, the state of New York adopted a statute entitled "Tem-
porary questioning of persons in public places; search for weap-
ons,"18 which immediately was dubbed the "stop and frisk" law. 
While this statute contributed little toward resolution of the diffi-
cult constitutional issues involved-it was all but ignored by the 
Supreme Court in Sibron and Peters19-it did serve to focus the at-
tention of the legal world upon this particular police practice. A 
flurry of articles criticizing and defending the statute appeared;20 in 
short order the New York courts were confronted with cases in 
which the practices authorized by the statute were challenged. 21 
Two years later, the American Law Institute published the first 
tentative draft of A Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure, 
dealing in part with the stopping of suspects for investigation,22 
16. E.g., People v. Esposito, 118 Misc. 867, 194 N.Y.S. 326 (Ct. Spec. Sess. 1922). 
17. See Foote, Vagrancy-Type Law and Its Administration, 104 U. PA. L. R.Ev. 603 
(1956). 
18. N.Y. CODE CRIM. PRoc. § 180a (McKinney Supp. 1967), which provides in part: 
I. A police officer may stop any person abroad in a public place whom he 
reasonably suspects is committing, has committed or is about to commit a felony 
or any of the crimes specified in section five hundred fifty-two of this chapter, and 
may demand of him his name, address and an explanation of his actions. 
2. When a police officer has stopped a person for questioning pursuant to this 
section and reasonably suspects that he is in danger of life or limb, he may search 
such person for a dangerous weapon. If the police officer finds such a weapon or 
any other thing the possession of which may constitute a crime, he may take 
and keep it until the completion of the questioning, at which time he shall either 
return it, if lawfully possessed, or arrest such person. 
19. The majority dismissed the statute by saying: 
We decline ••• to be drawn into what we view as the abstract and unproductive 
exercise of laying the extraordinarily elastic categories of § 180-a next to the 
categories of the Fourth Amendment in an effort to determine whether the two 
are in some sense compatible •••• The operative categories of § 180-a are not the 
categories of the Fourth Amendment, and they are susceptible of a wide variety 
of interpretations. 
392 U.S. at 59-60. See also 392 U.S. at 60 n.20. 
20. See note 4 supra. The New York statute also received considerable attention in 
the public media. See DETECTION OF CRIME 7 n.3. 
21. The statute took effect on July 1, 1964, and, in a sense, was upheld on July 
IO in People v. Rivera, 14 N.Y.2d 441, 201 N.E.2d 32, 252 N.Y.S.2d 458 (1964). Although 
Rivera concerned a 1962 incident and did not involve the statute, the court recognized 
a common-law power essentially the same as that granted by the statute. For a discus-
sion of the subsequent New York decisions, see Schwartz, supra note 12. 
22. MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § 2.02 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1966): 
(I) Stopping of Persons Having Knowledge of Crime. A law enforcement officer 
lawfully present in any place may, if he has reasonable cause to believe that a felony 
or misdemeanor has been committed and that any person has knowledge which 
may be of material aid to the investigation thereof, order such person to remain 
in or near such place in the officer's presence for a period of not more than twenty 
minutes. 
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which also stimulated the debate.23 
Another significant development was the fact that in recent years 
we began to learn more about this particular aspect of police work 
and its impact. Empirical studies on the subject were published, 
the most noteworthy of which appeared as part of the American Bar 
Foundation's (ABF) Survey of the Administration of Criminal ]us-
(2) Stopping of Persons in Suspicious Circumstances. A law enforcement officer 
lawfully present in any place may, if a person is observed in circumstances which 
suggest that he has committed or is about to commit a felony or misdemeanor, and 
such action is reasonably necessary to enable the officer to determine the lawfulness 
of that person's conduct, order that person to remain in or near such place in the 
officer's presence for a period of not more than twenty minutes. 
(3) Action to Be Taken During Period of Stop. A law enforcement officer may 
require a person to remain in his presence pursuant to subsection (I) or (2) of this 
section only insofar as such action is reasonably necessary to 
(a) obtain the identification of such person; 
(b) verify by readily available information an identification of such person; 
(c) request cooperation pursuant to and subject to the limitations of Section 
2.01; or 
(d) verify by readily available information any account of his presence or 
conduct or other information given by such person. 
(4) Use of Force. In order to exercise the authority conferred in subsections 
(I) and (2) of this section, a law enforcement officer may use such force, other 
than deadly force, as is reasonably necessary to stop any person or vehicle or to 
cause any person to remain in the officer's presence. 
(5) Search for Dangerous Weapons. A law enforcement officer who has stopped 
or ordered any person to remain in his presence pursuant to this section may, if 
he reasonably believes that his safety so requires, search such person and his im-
mediate surroundings, but only to the extent necessary to discover any dangerous 
weapons which may on that occasion be used against the officer. 
(6) Action to Be Taken After Period of Stop. Unless an officer acting hereunder 
arrests a person during the time he is authorized by subsections (I) and (2) of this 
section to require such person to remain in his presence, he shall, at the end of 
such time, inform such person that he is free to go. 
(7) Records Relating to Persons Stopped. A law enforcement officer, who has 
ordered any person to remain in his presence pursuant to this section, shall with 
reasonable promptness thereafter prepare and sign a report setting forth the 
name and address of such person; the place, time and purpose of the stop; the 
names of additional officers and other persons present; whether the person stopped 
objected thereto; whether force was used and, if so, the degree and circumstances 
thereof; and whether the person stopped was searched and, if so, a description of 
all items seized and their disposition. 
(8) Limitations to Prevent Abuse. The authority to stop persons granted in 
subsections (I) and (2) of this section may not be used solely to aid in the investiga-
tion or prevention of the following crimes: 
(a) any misdemeanor the maximum penalty for which docs not include a 
sentence of imprisonment of more than thirty days; 
(b) loitering; 
(c) vagrancy; 
(d) ••• [Note: There should be added to this list those felonies and misde-
meanors, in connection with which the stop authority is unnecessary, or creates 
an undue risk of abuse or harassment, such as ordinances requiring permits 
for public parades or gatherings.] 
As a general matter, the members of the ALI were not opposed to allowing the 
police to frisk for weapons in order to protect themselves. However, some members 
were afraid that the police would abuse this power and conduct a general search for 
narcotics and other contraband. E.g., 43 ALI PROCEEDINGS 114-17 (1966). 
23. Compare w. SCHAEFER, THE SUSPECT AND SOCIETY 23-26, 40-43 (1967), with Souris, 
Stop and Frisk or Arrest and Search-The Use and Misuse of Euphemisms, 57 J. CRIM. 
L.C. 8c P.S. 251 (1966). 
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tice.24 Stop and frisk was also investigated by the President's Com-
mission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, which 
recommended that state legislatures enact statutory provisions pre-
scribing the authority of law enforcement officers to stop persons 
for brief questioning.25 The National Advisory Commission on Civil 
Disorders agreed that guidelines for "field interrogation" and its 
incidents were needed, and that it was imperative for police and 
others to distinguish legitimate investigative procedures from some-
what similar actions of dubious legality and efficacy (often called 
"aggressive preventive patrol").26 
It was against this backdrop that the United States Supreme 
Court, on June IO, 1968, decided the Terry, Sibron, and Peters 
cases,27 the Court's first word-but certainly not its last-on the 
subject of stop and frisk. The several opinions in these cases cover 
a total of seventy-six pages in the official reports, and a close read-
ing of them might well lead one to wish that the Court had written 
less and said more. Given the oft-stated need for guidelines, one is 
struck with the fact that very few specific guidelines can be distilled 
from these cases. However, this point should not be pushed too far; 
this was the Court's first foray into this particular thicket, and it is 
thus understandable that it made a conscious effort to leave sufficient 
room for later movement in almost any direction.28 One could 
hardly expect the Court to pass upon the full range of constitutional 
issues which lurk in the area of stop and frisk, if for no other reason 
24. DETECTION OF CRIME 5-94. Other helpful studies, based at least in part upon 
empirical data, include: POLICE AND THE COMMUNITY, FIELD SURVEYS IV: A REPORT OF A 
REsEJ\RCH STUDY SUBMITIED TO THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND 
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE (1966); NATIONAL CENTER ON POLICE AND COMMUNITY 
RELATIONS, FIEU> SURVEYS V: A REPORT OF A R.EsEARCH STUDY SUBMITTED TO THE 
PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE (1967); 
Pilcher, The Law and Practice of Field Investigation, 58 J. CRIM. L.C. &: P.S. 465 (1967); 
. Reiss &: Black, Interrogation and the Criminal Process, 374 ANNALS 47 (1967); Note, 
Detention, Arrest, and Salt Lake City Police Practices, 9 UTAH L. REv. 593 (1965). 
25. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON I.Aw ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, 
THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 95 (1967). 
26. REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON ClVIL DISORDERS 159-61, 164-65 
(Bantam ed. 1968). 
27. A fourth case before the Court also involved a stopping for investigation, but 
the writ of certiorari was dismissed as improvidently granted. Wainwright v. New 
Orleans, 392 U.S. 598 (1968). However, the concurring and dissenting opinions contain 
some interesting discussion. 392 U.S. at 598, 600, 610. 
28. This is what Karl Llewellyn called "the essence of good appellate judging." 
First, he said, "a court ought always to be slow in uncharted territory, and, in such 
territory, ought to be narrow, again and again, in any ground for decision." Second, 
"once there is a clearish light, a court should make effort to state an ever broader line 
for guidance." Finally, it is important that "each line is promptly and overtly checked 
up and checked on and at need rephrased on each subsequent occasion of new 
illumination •••• " K. LLEwELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADmoN, DECIDING APl'EALS 
389 (1960) (emphasis in original). 
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than the fact that many of these issues-such as those concerning 
the fifth amendment limits on questioning during street encounters 
-were not before the Court. This was no occasion, then, for a Mi-
randa-style decision, but rather a time for a few tentative steps. But 
if one compares the Court's previous tentative steps with their prog-
eny-Betts v. Brady29 with Gideon v. Wainwright,80 or Brown v. Mis-
sissippi81 with Miranda v. Arizona,82 for example-it seems clear that 
more precise and far-reaching constitutional limitations can be ex-
pected. 83 
In light of the surfeit of law review commentary on the subject 
of stop and frisk, a word about what follows is in order. This Article 
is not intended to be a restatement or summary of the recent debate 
on stop and frisk. Terry and its companions have put some of the is-
sues to rest and pushed others to the forefront, and with the result-
ing change in the battle lines the time is ripe for a reassessment. 
The concern here is with the approach taken by the Supreme Court 
in Terry, Sibron, and Peters, and the emphasis is upon what the 
Court has and has not done, and upon what is likely to happen in 
future cases. 
II. THE RECENT CASES 
A. Terry v. Ohio 
One afternoon, a Cleveland police officer became suspicious of 
two men standing on a street corner in the downtmrn area. One of 
the suspects walked up the street, peered into a store, walked on, 
started back, looked into the same store, and then joined and con-
ferred with his companion. The other suspect repeated this ritual, 
and between them the two men went through this performance 
about a dozen times. They also talked with a third man, and then 
followed him up the street about ten minutes after his departure. 
The officer, thinking that the suspects were "casing" a stickup and 
might be armed, followed and confronted the three men as they 
were again conversing. He identified himself and asked the suspects 
for their names. The men only mumbled something, and the officer 
spun Terry around and patted his breast pocket. The policeman felt 
a pistol, which he removed. A frisk of Terry's companion also un~ 
29. 316 U.S. 455 (1942). 
30. 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
31. 297 U.S. 278 (1936). 
32. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
33. For a discussion of the movement toward increasingly generalized statements in 
Supreme Court decisions concerning criminal procedure, see Friendly, The Bill of 
Rights as a Code of Criminal Procedure, 53 CALIF. L. REv. 929 (1965); Packer, The 
Courts, the Police, and the Rest of Us, 57 J. CroM:. L.C. &: P.S. 238 (1966). 
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covered a pistol; a frisk of the third man did not disclose that he was 
armed, and he was not searched further. Terry was charged with the 
crime of carrying a concealed weapon, and he moved to suppress the 
weapon as evidence. The motion was denied by the trial judge, who 
upheld the officer's actions on a stop-and-frisk theory. The Ohio court 
of appeals affirmed,34 and the state supreme court dismissed Terry's 
appeal.35 
The United States Supreme Court affirmed in an opinion by the 
Chief Justice, stating the issue in the narrowest possible terms: 
"whether it is always unreasonable for a policeman to seize a person 
and subject him to a limited search for weapons unless there is 
probable cause for an arrest."36 Stops and frisks, said the Court, are 
governed by the fourth amendment, but the officer's actions had 
been reasonable. Justice Black concurred in one sentence;37 Justice 
Harlan concurred but thought that more attention should be given 
to the right to stop as the real basis for the right to frisk, 38 and the 
concurrence of Justice White added a few words on the right to ask 
questions during a stop.39 Only Justice Douglas dissented. He took 
the position that probable cause is required by the fourth amend-
ment but was not present on the given facts.40 
B. Sibron v. New York 
A Brooklyn officer, while patrolling his beat in uniform, ob-
served Sibron in an area from four p.m. until midnight. Sibron con-
versed with six or eight known narcotics addicts during this time, 
and later entered a restaurant and talked with three more known 
addicts. The officer then approached Sibron, told him to come out-
side, and said, "You know what I am after." Sibron mumbled some-
thing and reached into his pocket; the officer simultaneously reached 
into the pocket and pulled out several glassine envelopes of heroin. 
The officer's sworn complaint alleged that Sibron had thrown the 
envelopes away, but his testimony on the defendant's motion to 
suppress the evidence was to the contrary. The trial court ruled 
that the officer had had probable cause for arrest, but clearly erred 
in basing this determination upon Sibron's in-court admission that 
34. State v. Terry, 5 Ohio App. 2d 122, 214 N.E.2d 114 (1966). 
35. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 8 (1968). 
36. 392 U.S. at 15. 
37. 392 U.S. at 31. 
38. 392 U.S. at 31. 
39. 392 U.S. at 34. 
40. 392 U.S. at 35. 
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he had been talking to the addicts about narcotics.41 Sibron was con-
victed on his plea of guilty for the unlawful possession of heroin, 
the appellate division affirmed without opinion,42 and the New 
York Court of Appeals affirmed on the basis of the New York stop-
and-frisk law but wrote no opinion.43 It is hard to imagine a less ap-
pealing set of circumstances upon which to justify a stop and frisk 
before the United States Supreme Court, and the prosecutor under-
standably confessed error. 
The Chief Justice declined the confession of error and refused 
to find that the case was now moot because Sibron had completed 
his six-month sentence. He also declined to pass upon whether the 
New York statute was or was not constitutional on its face, as ar-
gued by the parties on both sides of this and the Peters case. The 
search in this case was found to be unlawful because the officer was 
seeking narcotics rather than acting from fear for his own safety, 
and because, in any event, the officer had not followed the necessary 
procedures for a frisk for weapons. Justice White joined this part of 
the opinion in his concurrence;44 Justice Fortas said he would ac-
cept the confession of error;45 Justice Harlan preferred to dispose of 
the case on the basis that there were not grounds for a stop;46 and 
Justice Douglas also concurred, stressing the right of privacy for 
sick people.47 Justice Black dissented, claiming that the officer had 
grounds to frisk and also grounds to arrest.48 
C. Peters v. New York 
A New York City officer, home one afternoon in his sixth-floor 
apartment, heard a noise outside his door49 and went to the peep-
41. See Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 47 (1968). 
42. See 392 U.S. at 47. 
43. People v. Sibron, 18 N.Y.2d 603, 219 N.E.2d 196, 272 N.Y.S.2d 374 (1966). 
44. 392 U.S. at 69. 
45. 392 U.S. at 70. 
46. 392 U.S. at 70. 
47. 392 U.S. at 68. 
48. Although Justice Black said that the seizure was not unreasonable for "both 
these reasons" (392 U.S. at 79), he later made the curious observation that "there was 
sufficient evidence here on which to base findings that after recovery of the heroin, 
in particular, an officer could reasonably believe there was probable cause to charge 
Sibron with violating New York's narcotics laws." 392 U.S. at 82 (emphasis added). What 
bearing that has on the admissibility of the heroin is far from clear. 
49. Actually, the statement of the facts says that the officer "heard a noise at his 
door" (392 U.S. at 48), which the Chief Justice assumed "led him to believe that 
someone sought to force entry." 392 U.S. at 66. Justice Harlan responded that the officer 
had not testified as to such a belief and no state court had concluded that he had held 
such a belief. 392 U.S. at 75. This is the critical fact in the case. On the basis of one 
interpretation of what a noise "at" the door is, the Chief Justice concluded that the 
officer had reasonable grounds to believe the suspects had attempted a burglary; on 
50 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 67:!19 
hole to see what was happening. He observed two strangers50 tiptoe-
ing out of the alcove toward the stairway. He then called the police, 
put on civilian clothes, grabbed his service revolver, and looked out 
again. The two men were now headed toward the stairway. Believ-
ing that the suspects were in the building to commit a burglary, the 
officer entered the hallway and slammed the door behind him, at 
which point the two men quickly started down the stairs. The offi-
cer gave chase and collared Peters, who claimed to be in the build-
ing visiting his girl friend, but refused to identify her because she 
was a married woman. The officer patted him down and felt what 
might have been a knife in his pocket. He then removed the object, 
which was an opaque plastic envelope containing burglar's tools. 
After Peters was charged with possession of burglary tools with in-
tent to employ them in commission of a crime, the trial court up-
held the officer's actions on the basis of the New York stop-and-frisk 
statute.51 Peters was convicted, and the appellate division52 and 
Court of Appeals53 affirmed. 
For the Chief Justice, this case was easy; there was no need to 
worry about the right to stop and frisk, since the officer had made an 
arrest on probable cause and thus could search the suspect in order 
to find weapons and prevent the destruction of evidence. 54 The 
opinions of Justices Fottas55 and Black56 agreed as to this defendant; 
Justice Douglas concurred because this fact situation presented 
what to him is the only constitutionally permissible kind of stop 
and frisk-that in which there is probable cause for belief that the 
suspect is about to commit a crime;51 Justices White and Harlan 
objected that the officer's actions should instead be upheld on the 
ground that a lawful stop and frisk (rather than an arrest and 
search) had occurred. 58 
the basis of a quite different interpretation, Justice Harlan said there were grounds to 
suspect only that the men were in the building for the purpose of committing a 
burglary. 
50. The offiecer testified that he had lived in the 120-unit building for twelve 
years and did not recognize either of the men as tenants. 392 U.S. at 48. 
51. People v. Peters, 44 Misc. 2d 470, 254 N.Y.S.2d 10 (1964). 
52. People v. Peters, 24 App. Div. 2d 989, 265 N.Y.S.2d 612 (1965). 
53. People v. Peters, 18 N.Y.2d 238, 219 N.E.2d 595, 273 N.Y.S.2d 217 (1966). 
54. See note 49 supra for the interpretation of the facts needed to reach such a 
conclusion. 
55. 392 U.S. at 70. 
56. 392 U.S. at 79. 
57. 392 U.S. at 68. 
58. 392 U.S, at 69, 70. 
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III. STOP AND FRISK AND FOURTH .AMENDMENT THEORY 
Before looking in more detail at precisely what the Court has or 
has not done in these opinions, it is important to consider a more 
fundamental question: To what extent does existing fourth amend-
ment theory support the proposition that what is commonly referred 
to as a stop and frisk is constitutionally permissible in circumstances 
where it would be a violation of the amendment to make an arrest 
and search? Or, to put it another way, is Justice Douglas correct in 
saying that the Terry decision amounts to a rewriting of the fourth 
amendment?59 To answer these questions, it is necessary to consider 
whether stops and frisks fall within the fourth amendment, and, if 
they do, to determine what requirements of the amendment are 
applicable. 
A. In or out of the Fourth Amendment 
In the Terry case, the Chief Justice criticizes "the distinctions of 
classical 'stop-and-frisk' theory" on the ground that they serve to di-
vert attention from the basic question of whether the officer's con-
duct was reasonable. 60 The distinctions to which he referred, of 
course, are between a stopping on the street and a to-the-station ar-
rest, and also between a frisk for weapons and the more extensive 
search that is commonly made incident to an arrest. Abjuring such 
labels, the Chief Justice concludes that they do not mark the bound-
aries of the fourth amendment; restraining a person on the street is 
certainly a "seizure," and an exploration of the outer surfaces of his 
clothing is beyond question a "search." The Court therefore rejects 
"the notions that the fourth amendment does not come into play at 
all as a limitation upon police conduct if the officers stop short of 
something called a 'technical arrest' or a 'full-blown search.' " 61 
It is hard to see how anyone could quarrel with that conclusion. 
Indeed, it is somewhat surprising that the Court labors so hard to 
reach it, except for the fact that it assumed that "classical 'stop-and-
frisk' theory" somehow supports a contrary position. This is not the 
case. Notwithstanding an occasional unfortunate choice of words in 
a few decisions,62 it has never been seriously contended that merely 
59. ll92 U.S. at ll8·ll9. 
60. ll92 U.S. at 19. 
61. ll92 U.S. at 19. 
62, The Court refers (ll92 U.S. at 16 n.12) to the Ohio court of appeals' statement 
that "we must be careful to distinguish that the 'frisk' authorized herein includes only 
a 'frisk' for a dangerous weapon. It by no means authorizes a search for contraband, 
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characterizing certain police activity as a ''stop" or a "frisk" removes 
that conduct from the limitations of the fourth amendment. Rather, 
the traditional argument has been that the words "stop" and "frisk" 
are convenient ways of describing certain limited intrusions63 which, 
because of their scope, should be permitted in circumstances which 
would not justify the more serious intrusions of a to-the-station ar-
rest accompanied by a search for weapons and evidence.64 The Su-
preme Court does not reject that argument, but embraces it.65 
This is not to suggest, however, that the Court's failure to attach 
importance to the "stop" and "frisk" labels is not of major signifi-
cance. As one commentator has correctly observed, a most important 
feature of these cases "is that the Supreme Court of the United 
States has dissipated the notion that the search and seizure provi-
sions of the Fourth Amendment are subject to verbal manipula-
tion."66 It is the reasonableness of the officer's conduct, not what the 
state chooses to call it, which is in issue. If courts adhere to this prin, 
ciple, then "the importance of another verbalism-the term 'arrest' 
-which for a long time has tended to dominate legal thinking in 
this area,"67 may wane.68 
evidentiary material, or anything else in the absence of reasonable grounds to arrest. 
Such a search is controlled by the Fourth Amendment and probable cause is essential." 
Although the Ohio court might have stated the point more clearly, this language 
essentially seems to be an attempt to distinguish two kinds of searches which are quite 
different in terms of their degree of imposition, rather than a "suggestion . • • that 
such police conduct is outside the purview of the Fourth Amendment." 392 U.S. at 16. 
63. Indeed, there may be some merit in the continued use of these labels as a 
convenient way to single out what the police consider to be unique and distinct en• 
forcement techniques. The police, if they are to have a clear understanding of their 
authority (which is necessary if the exclusionary rule is to have any deterrent effect), 
must be instructed in terms of how much evidence is needed for certain actions, and 
not merely told that they must somehow "balance" all the factors. See text accompany• 
ing notes 87-96 infra. 
64. This argument is discussed in greater detail in the text accompanying notes 
74-76 infra. For other statements of the "classical 'stop-and-frisk' theory," see sources 
cited in note 74 infra. 
65. 392 U.S. at 18 n.15: 
In our view the sounder course is to recognize that the Fourth Amendment governs 
all intrusions by agents of the public upon personal security, and to make the 
scope of the particular intrusion, in light of all the exigencies of the case, a 
central element in the analysis of reasonableness. 
66. Remarks of Justice Walter V. Schaefer of the Supreme Court of Illinois, Institute 
of Continuing Legal Education program on "Criminal Law and the Constitution: The 
Expanding Revolution," July 19, 1968. 
67. Id. 
68. It has often been assumed that whether an officer has made an "arrest" is critical 
in passing upon the validity of a search without warrant. If an arrest has been made, 
the tendency of courts is to uphold the subsequent search without serious consideration 
of whether it can otherwise be justified. See LaFave, Search and Seizure: "The Course 
of True Law •.. Has Not ... Run Smooth," 1966 U. ILL. L.F. 255, 277-98. On the other 
hand, if the officer has not first gone through the formalities of an arrest, it is common 
for courts to assume that it is improper to search. Id. at 302-03. Cf. In re Boykin, 39 
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B. Is Probable Cause Required'! 
If these more limited intrusions arising out of street encounters 
-whatever they may be called-are governed by the fourth amend-
ment, then it is appropriate to look to the language of that amend-
ment to determine precisely what constitutional requirements must 
be met: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall 
not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable 
cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing 
the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.69 
This language, which students of constitutional history tell us was 
in part a result of an oversight in the redrafting process,70 has been 
a source of confusion since its adoption.71 The basic difficulty con-
cerns the proper relationship between the reasonableness clause and 
the warrant clause. Can a search or seizure with a warrant on prob-
able cause still be unreasonable? Or, perhaps more important, can 
a search or seizure without a warrant be reasonable even in the ab-
sence of probable cause? 
It is this latter question that divides the Chief Justice and Justice 
Douglas in Terry. Says the Chief Justice: 
If this case involved police conduct subject to the Warrant Clause 
of the Fourth Amendment, we would have to ascertain whether 
"probable cause" existed to justify the search and seizure which took 
place. However, that is not the case .... Instead, the conduct involved 
in this case must be tested by the Fourth Amendment's general pro-
scription against unreasonable searches and seizures.72 
This approach seems to assume that a lesser quantum of evidence 
may suffice when an officer is acting without a warrant because he is 
so acting and thus has escaped the reach of the probable cause half 
of the amendment. 
To this analysis, Justice Douglas replies: "We hold today that 
Ill. 2d 617, 237 N.E.2d 460 (1968) (reasonable for officer to search high school student 
for gun on information from assistant principal that he had anonymous tip that student 
had a gun, without regard to whether there was probable cause to make an arrest). 
69. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
70. Abrams, Constitutional Limitations on Detention for Investigation, 52 IowA 
L. REv. 1093, 1101 (1967); Leagre, The Fourth Amendment and the Law of Arrest, 54 
J. CRIM. L.C. &: P.S. 393, 397-98 (1963); Comment, Search and Seizure in the Supreme 
Court: Shadows on the Fourth Amendment, 28 U. CHI. L. R.Ev. 664, 679 (1961). 
71. For a critical examination of many of these problems, see Comment, supra note 
70, at 678-92. 
72. 392 U.S. at 20. 
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the police have greater authority to make a 'seizure' and conduct a 
'search' than a judge has to authorize such action. We have said pre-
cisely the opposite over and over again."73 I would award this round 
to Justice Douglas, as it is unmistakably clear that the Court has re-
peatedly held that police may not act upon less evidence merely by 
avoiding the magistrate. Thus, it may be said that the officer's ac-
tions in Terry should be upheld only if they would have been 
equally permissible had there been a magistrate at his elbow who 
supplied a warrant. Of course, the nature of stop and frisk is such 
that a magistrate is unlikely to be involved, but this hardly justifies 
a departure from the long-standing premise that the absence of a 
warrant does not of itself confer greater authority upon the police. 
It is at this point, however, that I part company with Justice 
Douglas, for he then seems to assume that this constitutional re-
quirement of probable cause is an inflexible standard which de-
mands precisely the same amount of evidence no matter what kind 
of police action is involved. This, of course, amounts to a rejection 
of what I have come to believe is the best-reasoned analysis in sup-
port of stop and frisk.74 In brief, this analysis proceeds as follows: 
the requirement of probable cause is a compromise for accommo-
dating the opposing interests of the public in crime prevention and 
detection, and of individuals in privacy and security.75 The same 
compromise is not called for in all situations, and thus this balanc-
ing process should take account of precisely what lies in the balance 
in a given case. Because one variable is the degree of imposition on 
the individual, it may be postulated that less evidence is needed to 
meet the probable cause test when the consequences for the individ-
ual are less serious. Thus, it may be said that a brief on-the-street 
seizure does not require as much evidence of probable cause as one 
which involves taking the individual to the station, since the former 
is relatively short, less conspicuous, less humiliating to the person, 
and offers less chance for police coercion than the latter. Similarly, 
it could be concluded that patting down for weapons, although it is 
a search, is a lesser imposition than a complete search of the person 
73. 392 U.S. at 36. 
74. For other statements of this or very similar analysis, see Leagre, supra note 70, 
at 411-16; Pilcher, The Law and Practice of Field Interrogation, 58 J. CRIM. L.C. &: P.S. 
465, 468-71 (1967); Stem, Stop and Frisk: An Historical Answer to a Modern Problem, 
58 J, CRIM. L.C. &: P.S. 532, 536-37 (1967); Younger, Stop and Frisk: "Say It Like It Is", 
58 J. CRIM. L.C. &: P.S. 293, 298 (1967); Recent Statute, New York Authorizes Police 
To "Stop and Frisk" on Reasonable Suspicion, 78 HARv. L. R.Ev 473 (1964); Note, Stop 
and Frisk: Dilemma for the Courts, 41 S. CAL. L. R.Ev. 161 (1967); Note, Selective Deten-
tion and the Exclusionary Rule, 34 U. CHI. L. R.Ev. 158, 162-66 (1966). 
75. See Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176 (1949). 
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and his "immediate presence"-and consider how broadly those 
words have been construed76-for weapons and for the fruits, instru-
mentalities, or evidence of crime. 
But does this analysis square with pre-Terry theories of the 
fourth amendment? I think so, although I would have been more 
hesitant with my answer about a year ago. Then, notwithstanding 
the urgings of some writers,77 the Court had not expressly recog-
nized a variable probable cause test, although some Justices seemed 
to support such a position. There is, for example, the oft-quoted 
dissent of Justice Jackson in Brinegar v. United States to the effect 
that he would strive to uphold a roadblock if it was thrown up 
to terminate a kidnapping but not if it was used "to salvage a few 
bottles of bourbon and catch a bootlegger."78 
Then in 1967 came the Camara79 and See80 decisions, concerning 
health and safety inspections of residential and business premises. 
The Court held that the inspector, if turned away, must obtain a 
warrant; but this was of minor importance compared to what the 
Court had to say about what evidence was needed to secure the war-
rant. Although the warrant clause was clearly in issue, the Court 
called for a "balancing [ of] the need to search against the invasion 
which the search entails.''81 The Court then adopted a lower stan-
dard of probable cause for inspection warrants, in part because these 
inspections "involve a relatively limited invasion of the urban cit-
izen's privacy.''82 Thus, a new fourth amendment calculus was 
76. See LaFave, supra note 68, at 285-87. Although the Supreme Court has said 
that "the rule allowing contemporaneous searches is justified • • • by the need to 
prevent the destruction of evidence of the crime" [Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 
364, 367 (1964)], the Court has not so limited the scope of search incident to arrest in 
prior cases. See, e.g., United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950) (search of defen-
dant's desk, safe, and filing cabinet after he was in custody of officers); Harris v. 
United States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947) (search of defendant's four-room apartment after he 
was arrested and handcuffed). 
77. Barrett, Personal Rights, Property Rights and the Fourth Amendment, 1960 
SuP. CT. R.Ev. 46, 63; Leagre, supra note 70, at 413-16; Comment, supra note 70, at 
704-06. 
78. 338 U.S. 160, 183 (1949). 
79. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967). 
80. See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967). 
81. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 537 (1967). 
82. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 537 (1967). This was one of three 
"persuasive factors" listed by the Court. The other two, a long history of acceptance of 
such programs and the theory that the public interest demands that all dangerous 
conditions be prevented, are less than convincing. See LaFave, Administrative Searches 
and the Fourth Amendment: The Camara and See Cases, 1967 SUP. CT. REv. I, 13-17. 
It would seem to follow that a higher standard of probable cause than ordinarily 
required would be called for when the intrusion is particularly severe. Thus, Justice 
Stewart, concurring in Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 68-69 (1967), said: 
The standard of reasonableness embodied in the Fourth Amendment demands 
that the showing of justification match the degree of intrusion. By its very nature 
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brought into being-one which was immediately recognized as 
pointing the way toward the Court's acceptance of the rationale 
supporting stop and frisk.83 The balancing test of Camara was 
quoted and relied upon in Terry v. Ohio.84 
For one who subscribes to the stop-and-frisk analysis summarized 
above, the most significant part of Terry is the Court's response to 
the petitioner's contention that if there was not sufficient evidence 
for arrest then there was not sufficient evidence for any other form 
of intrusion. The majority rejects this argument, saying: "It assumes 
that the interests sought to be vindicated and the invasions of per-
sonal security may be equated in the two cases, and thereby ignores 
a vital aspect of the analysis of the reasonableness of particular types 
of conduct under the Fourth Amendment."85 Although it would 
make no difference in terms of results,86 it is unfortunate that the 
Court did not say that this is so even though probable cause is re-
quired, instead of saying that the argument fails because probable 
cause is irrelevant. Then the dissent of Justice Douglas could not 
have been written the way it is, and he would have had to confront 
directly the issue of how the variable probable-cause test should be 
applied to the police conduct in question. That, of course, is an is-
sue which not all men would resolve in the same way, but it seems 
much more sensible to acknowledge that this is the issue than to ac-
cept the unjustified assumption that stopping and frisking must be 
unconstitutional because these practices are indistinguishable from 
arrest and search incident to arrest. 
C. The Utility of the Balancing Test 
Several commentators have raised the question of whether the 
balancing test is not too subtle and sophisticated a device to be 
workable in day-to-day practice.87 This certainly would be a valid 
electronic eavesdropping for a 60-day period, even of a specified office, involves a 
broad invasion of a constitutionally protected area. Only the most precise and 
rigorous standard of probable cause should justify an intrusion of this sort. 
83. LaFave, supra note 82, at 13 n.39. 
84. 392 U.S. at 21, 27. 
85. 392 U.S. at 27. 
86. If the balancing technique is used, it would seem to make no difference in terms 
of outcome whether the balancing is done merely to determine what is reasonable or 
to determine what level of probable cause is required. 
87. See, e.g., Schwartz, Stop and Frisk (A Case Study in Judicial Control of the 
Police), 58 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 433, 448 (1967): 
Are all of these subtle considerations to be balanced by the policeman on the spot, 
in a matter of seconds or minutes, subject to second guessing by the courts? If 
the policeman's "balancing" turns out to produce evidence of crime, how many 
courts will be ready to find that he balanced wrongly, that there was not enough 
suspicion for the crime suspected? 
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objection if balancing were used to the extent that there was no sin-
gle test of probable cause for arrest or for stopping, and instead the 
police and the courts were expected to make slide-rule computa-
tions based upon all the facts and circumstances of each individual 
case. While this might well be a stimulating exercise in the rarefied 
atmosphere of an appellate court or a law school classroom, it is 
clearly asking too much to expect policemen to make on-the-spot 
judgments in this way or, indeed, to require trial judges to review 
police conduct in this fashion. 
The balancing test makes more sense if it is viewed not so much 
as a matter for case-by-case application, but rather as a technique 
for establishing the quantum of evidence needed for certain distinct 
kinds of official action. That is, it is one thing to say that each in-
stance of arrest or of stop and frisk requires a somewhat different 
measure of probable cause, depending upon all sorts of variables; it 
is quite another to say that through a process of balancing we can 
conclude that a brief stopping for investigation requires a different 
amount of evidence than a taking to the station. It is the latter kind 
of balancing which was involved in Camara; the Court resorted to 
a balancing process to decide that a lesser amount of evidence was 
needed to procure health and fire inspection warrants than to pro-
cure search warrants in criminal cases, and there was no suggestion 
that the magistrate is expected to perform a balancing act in each 
case to determine whether somewhat more or less evidence than was 
presented in Camara is necessary.88 
In the criminal law, however, there is one case-by-case variable-
the seriousness of the offense-which cannot be ignored by police 
and courts.80 Taking into account the seriousness of the offense does 
not require the use of some fine-spun theory whereby each offense 
in the criminal code has its own probable-cause standard; rather, it 
involves only the common-sense notion that murder, rape, armed 
robbery, and the like call for a somewhat different police response 
than, say, gambling, prostitution, or possession of narcotics. After 
88. Terry does not appear to be inconsistent with this approach. Although the 
Court abjures the "stop" and "frisk" labels and limits its holding to the facts of the 
case, there is no suggestion that the quantum-of-evidence test which the Court begins 
shaping there is inapplicable to other instances of stop and frisk, except for the 
intimation that serious violent crimes may warrant different consideration than minor 
offenses. See text accompanying note 95 infra. 
89. See, e.g., ·w. LAFA\'E, ARREST: THE DECISION To TA.KE A SUSPECT INTO CUSTODY 
246-48 (1965) [hereinafter ARREST]; DETECTION OF CRIME 36-38. See also RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND} OF TORTS § II9, comment j (1965), which lists "the nature of the crime com-
mitted or feared" as an important factor in determining whether the actor's suspicion 
was reasonable. 
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all, "[t]here is no war between the Constitution and common 
sense,"90 and it is this pragmatic approach which prompts judges to 
say that the conduct of an officer is proper when a failure so to act 
would be "poor police work"91 or a justifiable basis for discipline92 
or discharge93 of the officer. The view one would take of police in-
action under the circumstances is bound to be affected to some 
degree by the nature of the criminal conduct involved. 
The nature of the offense takes on additional importance when 
the police are acting, as in Terry, for the purpose of preventing 
crime. While one might well argue that the need to detect past 
crimes is of considerable importance for all forms of criminal ac-
tivity, the need to prevent crimes from occurring is most compelling 
as to offenses risking violence, and is least compelling as to offenses 
without victims or with willing victims.94 Indeed, a comparison of 
Terry and Sibron reveals that the Court was undoubtedly influenced 
by the nature of crimes involved in these two cases. In Terry, the 
officer observed the suspects for no more than twelve minutes, and 
saw equivocal conduct; the suspects might have been casing the 
store for a robbery, or they might have been window-shopping or 
impatiently waiting for a friend in the store.95 Yet the Court con-
cluded, quite properly, that "it would have been poor police work 
indeed" for the officer "to have failed to investigate this behavior"86 
or to have waited until the suspects actually took the dangerous step 
of attempting the robbery. In Sibron, the suspect was continuously 
observed for eight hours in a vicinity frequented by narcotics addicts 
90. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 657 (1961). 
91. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. I, 23 (1968). 
92. E.g., People v. Moore, 35 Ill. 2d 399, 403, 220 N.E.2d 443, 445 (1966). 
93. Cf. W. SCHAEFER, THE SUSPEcr AND SOCIETY 41-42 (1967): 
When writing opinions I have often been tempted to state the test of the reason-
ableness of a police officer's conduct in terms of what the reaction would be if he 
had not done what he is charged with having done wrongfully. "If you would 
fire the officer for not doing what he did, then what he did was reasonable." ••• 
I agree that it isn't a very stylish way of expressing the concept of reasonableness, 
and that somewhat circular reasoning is involved. But to me there is value in 
restating the question so that the whole problem may be seen. 
94. The point is also reflected in Justice Jackson's statement, text accompanying 
note 78 supra. Although he was discussing crimes which have already occurred, Justice 
Jackson did not merely distinguish between kidnapping and bootlegging, but rather 
referred to a hypothetical incident in which a child was still being held and there 
was a need not only to "detect a vicious crime" but also to "save a threatened life." 
95. On the motion to suppress, the officer acknowledged that his thirty-nine years 
of police experience did not give him some special insight into the conduct of suspects, 
since he had been assigned to watch for shoplifters and pickpockets for thirty years 
and had not had occasion to witness the planning or execution of a robbery. Remarks 
of Louis Stokes, counsel for the petitioner in Terry, Institute of Continuing Legal 
Education program on "Criminal Law and the Constitution: The Expanding Revolu, 
tion, July 19, 1968. 
96. 392 U.S. at 23. 
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and was seen conversing with as many as eleven known addicts 
during this time; these facts would seem to make the possibility 
that Sibron was attempting to sell narcotics at least as strong as the 
possibility that Terry and his cohorts were planning a robbery.97 
Yet there is understandably no suggestion from the Court that it 
would have been "poor police work" not to step in and prevent some 
addict from obtaining a new supply from this particular source. 
IV. STOP AND FRISK AND THE HARD REALITIES 
To many of those who have honestly opposed Supreme Court 
recognition of the power of police to stop and frisk, all of this talk 
about variable probable cause and the like would appear to be the 
irrelevant musings of a nai:ve academician. For them, the central 
point is that police often have utilized street encounters for im-
proper purposes such as the wholesale harassment of certain ele-
ments of the community, usually minority groups and Negroes in 
particular.98 These practices, it is contended, should not be sanc-
tioned or even given indirect support by a holding that the fourth 
amendment allows some on-the-street interference with persons who 
could not lawfully be arrested. Argument along these lines was force-
fully presented to the Supreme Court,99 and it is apparent from the 
opinion in Terry that this was a matter of great concern to the Court. 
The Chief Justice responds to this argument by talking about the 
limitations of the exclusionary rule, which "in some contexts ... is 
ineffective as a deterrent."100 He notes: 
Doubtless some police "field interrogation" conduct violates the 
Fourth Amendment. But a stern refusal by this Court to condone 
97. Justice Harlan, who felt that the Court should have spoken more directly to 
the circumstances in which a stop can be made, concluded that the suspicion in Sibron 
was not equal to that in Terry because during the eight-hour period the officer did not 
overhear any incriminating conversation or see any suspicious actions, such as the 
passing of packages. But, it is not too surprising that Sibron did not incriminate him-
self while in earshot of a uniformed officer; more convincing is Justice Harlan's later 
observation, that here, unlike Terry, there was no "need for immediate action." 392 
U.S. at 73. 
98. See Schwartz, supra note 87, at 444, 452 (1967); Souris, Stop and Frisk or A.rrest 
and Search-The Use and Misuse of Euphemisms, 57 J. CRIM, L.C. & P.S. 251, 251-53 
(1966). For detailed descriptions of these practices and the hostility engendered by 
them, see THE PouCE AND THE COMMUNITY, FIELD SURVEYS IV: A REPORT OF A REsEARCH 
STUDY StmMlTTED TO THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMIN-
ISTRATION OF JUSTICE (1966); NATIONAL CENTER ON PoUCE AND COMMUNITY RELATIONS, 
FllW> SURVEYS V, A REPORT OF A R.EsEARCH STUDY StmMlTTED TO THE PRESIDENT'S COM· 
MISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND .ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE (1967). 
99. See Oberman & Finkel, Constitutional A.rguments A.gainst "Stop and Frisk", 3 
CRIM. L. BULL. 441, 470-75 (1967), which contains excerpts from the appelant's brief in 
Sibron. 
100. 392 U.S. at I!!. 
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such activity does not necessarily render it responsive to the exclu-
sionary rule. Regardless of how effective the rule may be where 
obtaining convictions is an important objective of the police, it is 
powerless to deter invasions of constitutionally guaranteed rights 
where the police either have no interest in prosecuting or are willing 
to forego successful prosecution in the interest of serving some other 
goal .... [A] rigid and unthinking application of the exclusionary 
rule, in futile protest against practices which it can never be used 
effectively to control, may exact a high toll in human injury and 
frustration of efforts to prevent crime.101 
This language, I have been surprised to learn, has been the focus of 
a good deal of criticism of the Terry decision. As I understand the 
criticism, it rests on the hypothesis that the Court had no business 
allowing the police, in effect, to set the limits of the exclusionary 
rule by ignoring it under some circumstances. Or, to put the matter 
another way, the Court is charged with incorrectly deciding that be-
cause deterrence of the police is the primary objective of the exclu-
sionary rule, the rule is to be applied only in those contexts where 
it in fact deters. It is said that this is wrong because the exclusionary 
rule, though intended primarily as a "deterrent safeguard,"102 also 
serves to "preserve the judicial process from contamination,"103 to 
ensure that the government does not profit from its own wrong-
doing, 104 and even to provide some measure of vindication for 
the individual whose constitutional right of privacy has been 
infringed.105 
Such criticism would be wholly justified if the Supreme Court 
had said something quite different-if, for example, the Court had 
adopted one part of the Ohio court of appeals' reasoning in Terry: 
If we keep in mind this raison d'etre of the exclusionary rule [ deter-
rence], we can guard against confusion in the attendant rules that are 
developed. A judicial rule rendering evidence produced as the result 
of a "frisk" inadmissible would fail to deter the police from "frisk-
ing" suspects believed to be armed, as police "frisk" for their own 
protection rather than for the purpose of looking for evidence. A 
101. 392 U.S. at 13•15. 
102. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 648 (1961). Cf. Allen, Federalism and the Fourth 
Amendment: A Requiem for Wolf, 1961 SUP. CT. R.Ev. 1, 37 ("It is clear that assump-
tions as to the efficacy of the rule in this respect are of the first importance in the 
Court's view of the mater."). 
103. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 484 (1928) (dissenting opinion of Jus-
tice Brandeis). See also Atz v. Andrews, 84 Fla. 43, 94 S. 329 (1922); Fraenkel, Recent 
Developments in the Federal Law of Searches and Seizures, 33 IowA L. REv. 472, 498 
(1948). 
104. Allen, supra note 102, at 34; People v. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d 434, 449, 282 P .2d 
905, 912 (1955). 
105. Allen, supra note 102, at 35 refers to a "privilege against conviction by unlaw-
fully obtained evidence." See also Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 64!1, 656 (1961). 
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rule of inadmissibility in such cases could only result in allowing 
the armed criminal to go free although failing to any meaningful 
extent to protect individual liberty.10 6 
This, of course, is an extremely simplistic approach to the problem, 
and the criticism stated above would be fully justified if the Supreme 
Court had adopted such a view. 
Fortunately, the Court did not subscribe to a strict deterrence 
rationale. Instead, it made somewhat different observations about 
the exclusionary rule to underscore another, most fundamental 
point: "The exclusionary rule ... cannot properly be invoked to 
exclude the products of legitimate police investigative techniques 
on the ground that much conduct which is closely similar involves 
unwarranted intrusions upon constitutional protections."101 It is this 
sentence which the critics of Terry seem to have missed, for it reveals 
the reason underlying the observation that the exclusionary rule 
does not always deter. The Court's thinking was essentially this: If 
we really thought that exclusion of the fruits of all street encounters 
would somehow put a stop to those which are in violation of the 
fourth amendment, we might consider paying that price; but it is 
clear that this result would not follow because the illegal encounters 
are usually motivated by objectives other than conviction. 
In considering the question of whether the Supreme Court 
reached the proper conclusion in Terry, then, it is essential to keep 
in mind that street encounters "are initiated by the police for a wide 
variety of purposes, some of which are wholly unrelated to a desire 
to prosecute for crime."108 In support of this observation, the Court 
cites the ABF study, which helpfully catalogs the various other on-
the-street police practices which "raise issues substantially dif-
ferent from those likely to arise from field interrogation, where 
the questioning will be followed by arrest and prosecution if 
sufficient reason is found to believe the suspect guilty of a crime."100 
These other practices, which are commonly subsumed under 
the euphemism "aggressive preventive patrol,"110 include: (I) vice 
control practices, an attempt to restrict criminal activity which is 
difficult to detect by ordinary procedures and which is viewed am-
bivalently by many individuals in the community; (2) weapons 
confiscation, an attempt to remove weapons from circulation; 
106. State v. Terry, 5 Ohio App. 2d 122, 131-32, 214 N.E.2d 114, 121 (1966). 
107. 392 U.S. at 13 (emphasis added). 
108. 392 U.S. at 13. 
109, DETEcrION OF CRIME 15, 
110. Id. at IO. 
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(3) control of gangs and juveniles, an attempt to get teenagers 
off the streets; (4) disturbance control, an attempt to prevent and 
terminate instances of mutual combat; (5) control of public drink-
ing and drunks, an attempt to safeguard those who are or might 
become incapacitated from drinking; and (6) traffic control, an at-
tempt to find dangerous drivers and to render assistance to motorists 
generally.111 
Although it is true that the police have often failed to assess the 
wisdom of these practices112 or even to distinguish them carefully 
from good-faith, reasonable investigative stops,118 it would be harsh 
medicine indeed to declare the latter unconstitutional in order to 
administer an indirect and ineffective slap at the former. Many 
arrests are also made for purposes other than the sole legitimate 
objective-prosecution114-but it has not been seriously suggested 
that the answer is to abolish the right to make an arrest on probable 
cause. It is equally clear that many searches are not prosecution-
oriented, 115 but this hardly calls for the conclusion that the police 
should never be permitted to conduct a search. All of these practices 
ought to be a matter of serious concern, but this concern would be 
better expressed by attempting to find new remedies to curtail po-
tential abuses than by trying to use the exclusionary rule as a 
blunderbuss. 
V. TEMPORARY SEIZURE FOR INVESTIGATION 
The concern of the Supreme Court in the recent stop-and-frisk 
cases, therefore, was most directly focused upon what might be 
called "temporary seizure for investigation." This practice is a seizure 
and thus falls within the ambit of the fourth amendment; it is tem-
porary and thus distinguishable from what is usually understood by 
the term "arrest"; and it is for investigation rather than for one of 
111. Id. at 10-17. 
112. Id. at xix: "It is probable that an aggressive program of preventive patrol does 
reduce the amount of crime on the street, though it is a significant comment on police 
attitude toward policy-making responsibility that there has been no noticeable effort 
to measure the effectiveness of this technique ••• whether, even solely from a law 
enforcement point of view, the gain_ in enforcement outweighs the cost in community 
alienation." See also REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS 
159-61 (Bantam ed. 1968); PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAw ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINIS-
TRATION OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 95 (1967). 
113. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT .AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, 
TASK FORCE REPORT: THE POUCE 23 (1967). 
114. ARREST 436-82. For a discussion of what the police perceive as the gains from 
an arrest even when a conviction is not forthcoming, see LaFave, Improving Police 
Performance Through the Exclusionary Rule-Part I: Current Police and Local Court 
Practices, 30 Mo. L. REv. 391, 447-55 (1965). 
115. DETECTION OF CRIME 183-99. 
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the other purposes mentioned earlier. When is such a stop per-
missible? 
A. Possible Limitations 
It is unfortunate that a majority of the Court avoids the issue of 
limitations upon investigative stops in all three cases. In Terry we 
are told that "[t]he crux of this case . . . is not the propriety of 
Officer McFadden's taking steps to iµvestigate petitioner's suspicious 
behavior, but rather, whether there was justification for McFadden's 
invasion of Terry's personal security by searching him for weapons 
in the course of that investigation."116 The Court acknowledges that 
there was a seizure of Terry at some point prior to the search of his 
person,117 but clearly does not want to talk about it: "[w]e ... 
decide nothing today concerning the constitutional propriety of an 
investigative 'seizure' upon less than probable cause .... "118 Simi-
larly, in Sibron the Court proceeds directly to the frisk issue without 
a word about the propriety of the officer's previous action in directing 
the suspect to leave the restaurant. And in Peters, of course, the prob-
lem is avoided entirely by characterizing the officer's conduct as a 
lawful arrest. 
Justice Harlan, on the other hand, correctly concludes that the 
issue of the officer's right to stop should be resolved before any 
other questions q.Te reached: 
[I]£ the frisk is justified in order to protect the officer during an en-
counter with a citizen, the officer must first have constitutional 
grounds to insist on an encounter, to make a forcible stop. Any per-
116. 392 U.S. at 23. 
117. The Court asserts that it must determine when the seizure occurred (392 U.S. 
at 16) but then-though seizure is defined as an instance in which "a police officer 
accosts an individual and restrains his freedom to walk away"---determines only that 
the seizure occurred at least when the officer took hold of Terry. 
Whether in a given case it is to be concluded that the suspect was actually seized 
or only consented to remain and be questioned may prove to be a sticky problem, 
much like the question of whether an arrest was made, in light of the courts' insistence 
that arrest must precede search, and the question of whether a suspect had been 
"deprived of his freedom in any significant way" so as to be entitled to the Miranda 
warnings before questioning. In all three situations, it may be asked, for example, 
which of the following tests apply: "(I) whether the officer's conduct indicates he has 
restrained the individual, (2) whether the individual understands that he is restrained, 
and (3) whether a reasonable man under the circumstances would believe he was 
restrained." Abrams, supra note 70, at 1103. Perhaps, as has been suggested, it is not 
meaningful to attempt to distinguish between field interrogations undertaken with 
consent and those performed without consent, and thus the real question is when may 
police stop a suspect regardless of his consent. DETECTION OF CRIME 17. Thus, as in the 
better view of arrest and search, the admissibility of evidence found in a frisk would 
not rest upon whether or not the officer bad first actµally seized the suspect, but 
rather upon whether the officer had grounds to seize him. 
118. 392 U.S. at 19 n.16. If the Court had followed the analysis suggested in section 
Ill supra, this phrase would be "less probable cause than is needed for an arrest," 
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son, including a policeman, is at liberty to avoid a person he con-
siders dangerous. If and when a policeman has a right instead to 
disarm such a person for his own protection he must first have a 
right not to avoid him but to be in his presence. That right must be 
more than the liberty (again, possessed by every citizen) to address 
questions to other persons, for ordinarily the person addressed has 
an equal right to ignore his interrogator and walk away; he cer-
tainly need not submit to a frisk for the questioner's protection. I 
would make it perfectly clear that the right to frisk in this case de-
pends upon the reasonableness of a forcible stop to investigate a 
suspected crime.119 
The failure of the majority to heed this advice, it would seem, was 
unwise, for the Court has thereby detoured around the threshold 
issue about stop and frisk, one on which courts, lawyers, and police 
deserve guidance. 
There is, to be sure, some dictum in Terry which lends support 
to the proposition that stops for investigation are permissible on 
evidence insufficient for arrest, but the language affords few hints 
as to what the proper standards are. It is said, for example, that the 
officer's conduct should be judged by this "objective standard: would 
the facts available to the officer at the moment of the seizure or the 
search 'warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief' that the 
action taken was appropriate?"120 It would be hard to quarrel with 
this generality, although it is unclear what help it offers in the devel-
opment of police guidelines. More promising, perhaps, is the refer-
ence made in the holding (which, again, does not give separate con-
sideration to the grounds for the seizure) to the situation "where a 
police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably 
to conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be 
afoot."121 But Justice Harlan objects that this is not as precise as the 
formula provided in the New York statute, which requires that the 
officer must "reasonably suspect" that the person he stops "is com-
miting, has committed, or is about to commit" an offense;122 and the 
Court refuses to pass judgment upon the New York standard.123 
119. 392 U.S. at 32-33 (emphasis in original). 
120. 392 U.S. at 21-22. 
121. 392 U.S. at 30. 
122. N.Y. CODE CRIM. PROC. § 180a (McKinney Supp. 1967). 
123. The Court's refusal to pass upon the facial constitutionality of the New York 
statute is understandable, particularly in view of the unrestrained interpretation which 
it has received in the New York courts. Yet, as Justice Harlan noted: 
This does not mean .•. that the statute should be ignored here. The State of New 
York has made a deliberate effort to deal with the complex problem of on-the-
street police work. Without giving carte blanche to any particu1ar verbal formula-
tion, we should, I think, where relevant, indicate the extent to which that effort 
has been constitutionally successful. 
392 U.S. at 71. 
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I do not mean to underestimate the difficulty of the task which 
the Court has not yet even begun. Articulating meaningful standards 
for arrest has proved difficult enough, and the prospect of now having 
to give content to a different kind of probable cause for investigative 
stops is a chilling one. There is no ready solution, although it may 
be that something might be gained if an attempt were made to de-
velop the standards for a permissible forcible stop in terms of evi-
dence which falls short of grounds for arrest in some identifiable way. 
Before considering that possibility in greater detail, note should 
be taken of the fact that the stop-and-frisk decisions leave ample 
room for the development of other kinds of limitations on the power 
of police to make temporary seizures for investigation. For example, 
one might ask whether the nature of the suspected crime should 
make any difference. not merely in terms of variable probable cause, 
but also in determining whether a stopping should ever be per-
mitted. In Terry the anticipated crime was armed robbery, while 
in Peters it was burglary; both are serious offenses and not infre-
quently are attended by violence. Sibron, on the other hand, involved 
possession of narcotics. As noted earlier, this may have contributed 
in some measure to the Court's refusal to permit inferences in that 
case as generous as in the other two-the failure to consider, for 
example, if it was not unusual for a person to spend eight consecu-
tive hours loitering in an area frequented by narcotics addicts. 
Justice Harlan's analysis of Sibron is also revealing, for he says that 
the real question is whether there was a need for immediate action, 
and adds that he would apply as a general formula the New York 
statutory requirement that the officer must reasonably suspect a 
felony.124 His failure to quote the balance of the statute, which also 
permits stop and frisk where the officer reasonably suspects the mis-
demeanor of narcotics possession, 125 might well have been deliberate. 
There would be considerable merit in barring the police from 
employing stop and frisk for minor crimes like possession of narcotics 
in order to remove the temptation for the police to go on fishing 
expeditions for contraband.126 This may be the kind of limitation 
124. 392 U.S. at 104. 
125. N.Y. CODE CRIM. PROC. § 18Oa (McKinney Supp. 1967) also covers suspicion of 
"any of the crimes specified in section five hundred fifty-two of this chapter." Section 
552, by reference, incorporates the crime of narcotics possession and various other 
narcotics offenses. 
126. Cf. 43 ALI PROCEEDINGS 117 (1966) (remarks of Harris Steinberg). If an officer 
were permitted to stop persons suspected of carrying, say, narcotics or gambling para-
phernalia, there would be a lingering temptation for the officer to look for the 
contraband rather than for dangerous weapons. Even if the Supreme Court's two-
step frisk process would bar admission of the contraband on the theory that the 
66 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 67:!!9 
which cannot easily be drawn as a matter of fourth amendment inter-
pretation, 127 but it could readily be imposed by state legislation de-
signed to prevent stop and frisk from becoming "stop and fish."128 
Similarly, it may be desirable to draw some distinction, in terms 
of the quantum of public interest, between detection of crime and 
prevention of crime. Terry expressly deals only with the latter, for 
the officer feared that a crime was about to be committed; thus, there 
is nothing in that case which forecloses the contention that the only 
new police authority for which a genuine need can be shown is the 
power to take preventive action in such circumstances.129 It is in 
this situation that the police have heretofore lacked any clear au-
thority to act, even with the most compelling evidence; and it is 
hep:! that all members of the Court agree that some new authority, 
in the interest of cri:rp.e prevention, is imperative.130 
It is not at all clear that the line should be drawn at preventive 
action, but the case for additional police authority is certainly most 
convincing in this situation.131 As one state court judge recently ob-
officer could search only for a weapon, the officer might stretch the truth in order 
to establish some other apparent justification for coming onto the contraband. Such 
"minor 'surgery' upon the facts" is not unhe~d of, and it is acknowledged by those 
with extensive experience in prosecution offices that it happens too often. E.g., Kuh, 
In-Field Interrogation: Stop, Question, Detention and Frisk, !l CRIM. L. BuLL. 597, 
604 (1967). 
If such stops were permitted, a police officer could employ several tactics to justify 
what was in fact an illegal search: (1) He might, as did the officer in Sibron, claim that 
the suspect threw the contraband away. (2) He might claim that the suspect consented 
tq the search, in which case the admissibility of the evidence will turn upon whether 
the magistrate believes the officer or the offender. (3) He might claim that the suspect 
admitted in response to questioning that he was carrying the contraband and that on 
¢.is basis an arrest and search was made. It is interesting to note that, although sus-
pects generally do not make direct admissions of guilt during a stopping for investiga-
tion, in a substantial number of the reported cases the officer testified that the 
defendaµt voluntarily admitted po~session of contraband. DETEcrION OF CRIME at 65. 
127. Cf. the similar difficulties in interpreting other constitutional provisions. The 
kinds pf 'offenses for which the sixth amendment does not require provision of counsel 
for the indigent [Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963)] or jury trial [Duncan v. 
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968)] remain unclear. 
128. THE MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § 2.02(8) (Tent. Draft No. I, 
1966) might serve as a model, although it does not appear to go far enough. 
129. The Court did, however, characterize the governmental interests involved as 
"effective crime prevention and detection," 392 U.S. at 22 (emphasis added), although 
the officer in Terry acted only because he believed the men "were contemplating a day-
lfght robbery." 392 U.S. at 28. 
130. Even Justice Douglas acknowledges that the traditional grounds for arrest-
when an offense has been or is being committed-are not adequate for the "equally if 
not more important function [of] crime prevention." 392 U.S. at 35 n.l. 
131. It could be argued that the need to establish police authority for preventive 
measures is not great, ~ince the suspect presumably has not committed a crime and 
thus will not be subject to a prosecution in which the propriety of the officer's conduct 
will be put in issue. But, the tail should not wag the dog; it is in the interest of both 
the poli1:e and the public to :qave the limits on police authority clearly delineated, 
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served: 
Prevention within the area of the criminal law is greatly underde-
veloped. The doctrine is widely practiced and constantly undergoing 
development in business and medicine, but unfortunately not within 
the law .... It is important, if constitutionally permissible, to sanc-
tion a statute whereby crime can be prevented.132 
I would only add that if the police are to be given the right to step 
in before a crime has occurred, it is certainly preferable to recognize 
that power openly rather than to confer it indirectly by the use of 
broad vagrancy provisions133 or by pushing the law of attempts back 
into the preparation stage.134 
B. The Required Amount of Evidence 
Whatever may be the fate of these nvo possible limitations ( or, 
perhaps, a combination of the two),135 it is clear that in the years 
ahead one of the major tasks of the courts will be to flesh out the 
evidentiary standards for temporary investigative seizures. Whether 
regardless of whether or not the matter of exclusion of evidence will arise. In any 
event, fourth and fifth amendment exclusionary questions can arise in this context, as 
a person stopped for the purpose of preventing a crime may make damaging admis-
sion concerning another crime, or be frisked for a weapon. 
132. Parker v. Municipal Judge, 427 P.2d 642, 645 (Nev. 1967) (dissenting). 
133. There is considerable evidence that such substantive provisions have often 
been adopted for this purpose. See LaFave, Penal Code Revision: Considering the 
Problems and Practices of the Police, 45 TEXAS L. R.Ev. 434, 451-52 n.77 (1967). This 
use of vagrancy statutes has often been criticized. See, e.g., Foote, Vagrancy-Type Law 
and Its Administration, 104 U. PA. L. R.Ev. 603, 649, (1956); Note, Use of Vagrancy-
Type Laws For Arrest and Detention of Suspicious Persons, 59 YALE L.J. 1351 (1950). 
For further discussion of problems in this area, see Douglas, Vagrancy and Arrest 
on Suspicion, 70 YALE L.J. 1 (1960); Lacey, Vagrancy and Other Crimes of Personal 
Condition, 66 HARV. L. R.Ev. 1203 (1953); Perkins, The Vagrancy Concept, 9 HASTINGS 
L.J. 237 (1958); Sherry, Vagrants, Rogues and Vagabonds-Old Concepts in Need of 
Revision, 48 CALIF. L. R.Ev. 557 (1960); Note, The Vagrancy Concept Reconsidered: 
Problems and Abuses of Status Criminality, 37 N.Y.U. L. R.Ev. 102 (1962). 
134. The draftsmen of the Model Penal Code acknowledged that it would be diffi-
cult to justify legislation dealing with inchoate offense on grounds of deterrence, but 
noted that other functions of the criminal law are served by such statutes. Model Penal 
Code art. 5, Comment at 24 (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1960). They stated the first of these 
as follows: 
When a person is seriously dedicated to commission of a crime, there is ob-
viously need for a firm legal basis for the intervention of the agencies of law en-
forcement to prevent its consummation. In determining that basis, there must be 
attention to the danger of abuse; equivocal behavior may be misconstrued by an 
unfriendly eye as preparation to commit a crime. It is no less important, on the 
other side, that lines should not be drawn so rigidly that the police confront in-
soluble dilemmas in deciding when to intervene, facing the risk that if they wait 
the crime may be committed while if they act they may not yet have any valid 
charge. 
Id. at 25. However, it may well be that the question of when the police should be per-
mitted to intervene and the question of when conviction should be permitted for 
coming close to the commission of a cohate offense will sometimes call for separate 
answers, in which case the former is best dealt with in terms of stop and frisk. Con-
sider, for example, the facts of the Terry case. 
135. See text accompanying note 282 infra. 
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one resorts to the reasonableness approach or to the variable prob-
able cause test, it is nonetheless necessary for this process to occur 
if police are to have reasonably clear guidelines as to what they 
may do, and if trial judges are to have adequate guidelines for re-
viewing police action. For many opponents of stop and frisk, how-
ever, this is a most unlikely prospect; to them, any evidentiary stan-
dard which falls below that required for arrest is bound to be vague 
and subjective. 
I. Of Vagueness and Subjectivity 
The critics of stop and frisk "deplore the abandonment of prob-
able cause, the traditional constitutional standard necessary to de-
prive a person of his liberty, in favor of reasonable suspicion, which 
they find too vague."138 Most of this criticism has centered upon the 
New York statutory test of whether the officer "reasonably suspects 
a ... crime";137 it is claimed, for example, that it is impossible to 
draw a distinction between "mere" suspicion and "reasonable" sus-
picion138 (in contrast, I take it, to drawing a distinction between 
"mere" belief and "reasonable" belief for arrest). These critics, I am 
sure, are just as unhappy with the standard-such as it is-that is 
given in Terry, for it is no more specifi.c.139 
The vagueness argument, of course, is a convenient means for 
contesting any statement of the limitations on police power with 
which one disagrees, and one might wonder whether the critics of 
stop and frisk were equally concerned, for example, with the uncer-
tainty engendered by Escobedo v. Illinois.140 But even apart from 
this, it is not at all clear what characteristics of the unique police 
practice of stopping for investigation render it less susceptible to 
clearly stated limitations than arrest, search, or in-custody interro-
gation. 
Reasonable suspicion of crime or any comparable test will, of 
course, seem rather vague when unadorned by judicial interpretation 
based upon specific fact situations, as would the "reasonable grounds 
to believe" test for arrest, or, for that matter, the "probable cause" 
136. Schwartz, supra note 98, at 434. 
137. See Schwartz, supra note 98, at 444; Oberman 8e Finkel, Constitutional Argu-
ments Against "Stop and Frisk," !l CRIM. L. BULL. 441, 451·60 (1967); Recent Statute, 
Criminal Law-New York Authorizes Police to "Stop-and-Frisk" on Resasanable 
Suspicion, 78 HARV. L. REv. 473, 477 (1964); Comment, The "No-Knack" and "Stop and 
Frisk" Provisions of the New Yark Cade of Criminal Procedure, 38 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 
392, 403-04 (1964). 
138. Schwartz, supra note 98, at 445. 
139. See text accompanying note 121 supra. 
140. 378 U.S. 478 (1964). 
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requirement of the fourth amendment. It is certainly asking too 
much to expect that the basic standard which is to serve as the 
starting point for analysis should from its inception provide a 
ready answer for every conceivable fact situation.141 Indeed, those 
who demand such a self-defining standard have a short memory, for 
only a few years ago it could be said that the law of arrest was largely 
undefined in at least half of the states. True, the Supreme Court had 
provided some helpful benchmarks, but there was "an exceedingly 
small number of cases in [that] Court indicating what suffices for 
probable cause."142 The law of arrest remained vague, in the sense 
that the police could not be instructed in concrete terms,143 until 
state courts had occasion to decide a substantial number of cases, and 
in twenty-five jurisdictions this process began only after Mapp v. 
Ohio144 in 1961.145 
Some of the criticism about vagueness, however, has been di-
rected both to the New York statute and the interpretations it has 
received in the appellate courts of that state.146 If this means that 
some of the decisions of these courts are troublesome and not too 
helpful in clarifying the statute, I would agree. But here again past 
experience in the development of the grounds for arrest is instruc-
tive. Some state courts, when left entirely to their own devices, failed 
to develop precise and reasonable limitations on the authority to 
arrest, but this problem has been largely overcome by a few sig-
141. This is equally true whether the starting point is a statute, which obviously 
cannot spell out fact constellations for all of the various kinds of cases which might 
arise, or a court decision. See note 28 supra. 
142. Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 74 (1968). 
143. In Illinois the exclusionary rule was adopted in 1923, and as a result the 
appellate courts of the state have decided a substantial number of cases over the years 
on what are and are not grounds for arrest, It is possible, therefore, to be quite specific 
in instructing Illinois police on the evidence needed to arrest. See 2 Chicago Police 
Dept. Law Training Bulletin Series, Nos. 1, 2, 3, 5, &: 6 (1967). 
144. 367 U.S. 643. 
145. See LaFave, Improving Police Performance Through the Exclusionary Rule-
Part II: Defining the Norms and Training the Police, 30 Mo. L. REv. 566, 579-86 (1965). 
One of the principal virtues of the exclusionary rule, then, is that it "assures a great 
deal of judicial attention" to police practices. Paulsen, The Exclusionary Rule and Mis-
conduct by the Police, 52 J. CRIM. L.C. &: P.S. 255, 260 (1961). In states which did not 
have the exclusionary rule before Mapp, only a dribble of tort actions against police 
reached the appellate courts, and the civil suit context often diverted the courts from 
the question of whether the police action was proper, to the problem of whether the 
errant officer should be subject to personal liability. See, e.g., Odinetz v. Budds, 315 
Mich. 512, 517-18, 24 N.W.2d 193, 195 (1946). Moreover, if a court receives only a few 
cases, "the bits or slices or splinters which are cast up may be too fragmentary to yield 
a proper picture or to allow the shaping and joining of complementary hubs and 
spokes and rims to form a doctrinal wheel." K. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADI-
TION-DECIDING APPEAIS 263 (1960). 
146. E.g., Oberman&: Finkel, supra note 137, at 456-60. 
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nificant Supreme Court decisions.147 Now that the Court has gotten 
its eighteen feet wet in the murky waters of stop and frisk, there is 
ample reason to anticipate further clarification of the grounds for 
stopping. 
In many instances, of course, the vagueness criticism comes down 
to a concern that temporary seizures for investigation will be under-
taken upon the subjective judgment of police officers and that courts 
will be reluctant to second-guess them.148 Again, it is not clear why 
this must be so. Surely, everyone by now has grasped the simple point 
that the "reasonable belief" required for arrest is not to be deter-
mined by what the arresting officer did or did not believe, but rather 
by whether the available facts would "warrant a man of reasonable 
caution in the belief" that the person arrested had committed an 
offense.149 This being so, how can it seriously be contended that the 
require:rµent of "reasonable suspicion" grants police carte blanche 
to detain "on a purely subjective reaction"?150 If the difficulty ema-
nates from the word "suspicion,"151 then it should be dropped from 
stop-and-frisk vocabulary as the Court suggests in Terry. There is 
no 4isadvantage in saying that an officer may stop an individual for 
investigation when he reasonably believes that the person may be 
guilty of a crime,152 instead of saying that he can act when he reason-
ably suspects that the person is guilty of a crime.153 
The notion that subjective judgments will prevail is sometimes 
rested on the ground that police, in determining whether to stop an 
individual for investigation, will reach judgments based upon their 
experience and expertise.154 It is certainly true that they will do so, 
but they have long done precisely this in deciding whether an arrest 
or search is called for, and courts have long accepted the fact that the 
training and experience of police may equip them to reach conclu-
. 147. Compare, e.g., State v. Beck, 175 Ohio St. 73, 191 N.E.2d 825 (1963), with Beck 
v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89 (1964). 
148. Oberman &: Finkel, supra note 137, at 456-60; Schwartz, supra note 98, at 445; 
Comment, Police Power To Stop, Frisk, and Question Suspicious Persons, 65 COLUM. 
L. REv. 848, 859 (1965). 
149. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925). 
150. DETECTION OF CRIME 6, quoting NEW YORK STATE BAR AssocIATION, REPORT OF 
THE COMMITTEE ON PENAL LAw AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (Feb. 25, 1964). 
151. See Schwartz, supra note 98, at 445-46. 
152. The holding in Terry uses essentially this language by embracing the situation 
"where a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to con-
clude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot." 392 U.S. at 30. 
153. The former standard also possesses the advantage of avoiding the use of a 
troublesome word which is sometimes defined as "to imagine [one] to be guilty or 
culpable on slight evidence or without proof.'.' WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL 
DICTIONARY 2303 (1968 ed.) (emphasis added). 
154. See, e.g., Schwartz, Stop and Frisk (A Case Study in Judicial Control of the 
Police), 58 J. CRIM. L.C. &: P.S. 433, 445 (1967). 
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sions different from those of a layman.1515 This fact, of course, cuts 
two ways: an officer because of his training and experience may be 
held to have probable cause when a layman confronted with the same 
facts would not;156 or he may for this reason not be entitled to mis-
takes which would be reasonable for a layman, and thus not have 
probable cause.157 In any event, a standard does not become subjec-
tive rather than objective merely because it takes into account the 
special skills and knowledge of the actor.158 
Once again, the New York Court of Appeals may be the villain 
in creating confusion and conflict. More than one commentator159 has 
pointed with alarm to the Court of Appeals' statement that the New 
York reasonable-suspicion requirement "incorporates the police 
officer's intuitive knowledge and appraisal of the appearance of crim-
inal activity."160 The word "intuitive" clearly should not have been 
used, at least if one defines intuition as "immediate cognizance or 
conviction without rational thought,"161 and fortunately the United 
States Supreme Court has in effect removed it. In Terry, the Court 
emphasized that "the police officer must be able to point to specific 
and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences 
from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion."162 
Thus, the Court has made clear its belief that there is no clash 
between the precept that the right of privacy is "too precious to en-
trust to the discretion of those whose job is the detection of crime,''163 
and the notion that the police are expected to rely upon their train-
155. E.g., Bell v. United States, 254 F.2d 82 (D.C. Cir. 1958); People v. Langley, 182 
Cal. App. 2d 89, 5 Cal Rptr. 826 (1960); People v. Bartoletta, 248 Mich. 499, 227 N.W. 
763 (1929); People v. Valentine, 17 N.Y.2d 128, 216 N.E.2d 321, 269 N.Y.S.2d 111 (1966). 
156. See cases cited in note 155 supra. 
157. In Jewell v. Hempleman, 210 Wis. 265, 246 N.W. 441 (1933), a jury apparently 
imposed liability on an officer for his failure to use his special skills. A conservation 
warden made an arrest for possession of part of a deer carcass during closed season. 
The warden "testified that he had had a rather extended experience as a conservation 
warden, had seen lots of venison and deer bones, and was familiar with and knew the 
difference in texture, color, size of bones, etc., between venison and beef [which the 
meat turned out to be]; that after looking at the meat in the milkhouse and without 
cutting it up or particularly examining it he had considered it venison." 210 Wis. at 
268, 246 N.W. at 442. The appellate court held that "the jury might well have con-
cluded that [the warden's] examination of the meat was, to say the least, cursory and 
careless, that his conclusion was a hasty one, and that as an experienced warden he 
did not act prudently." 210 Wis. at 270, 246 N.W. at 443. 
158. This has never been questioned in the law of torts; see, e.g., 2 F. HARPER 8: 
F. JAMES, TORTS 919 (1956). 
159. E.g., Oberman 8: Finkel, supra note 148, at 457; Schwartz, supra note 154, at 
455. 
160. People v. Peters, 18 N.Y.2d 238, 245, 219 N.E.2d 595, 599, 273 N.Y.S.2d 217, 
222 (1966). 
161. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW lNTERNAnONAL DICTIONARY 1187 (1961). 
162. 392 U.S. at 21. 
163. McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 455 (1948). 
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ing and experience in reaching search and seizure decisions. It is for 
the courts to determine when an officer's conduct squares with the 
fourth amendment, giving "due weight ... to the specific reasonable 
inferences which he is entitled to draw from the facts in light of his 
experience."164 And, it is for the police to articulate the facts and 
what their experience reveals as to those facts. Such general-
ities as "he didn't look right" will not suffice; like Officer McFadden 
in Terry, the officer must relate what he has observed, and, when 
appropriate, indicate why his knowledge of the crime problem and 
the habits of the residents on his beat or of the practices of those 
planning or engaging in certain forms of criminal conduct gives 
special significance to what he observed.165 There are limits, of 
course, on what may be expected from the police in terms of verbal-
izing their observations and impressions,166 but a reasonably specific 
statement by an officer of the circumstances underlying his action-
when considered together with how he in fact reacted to the situation 
which confronted him167-should afford an adequate basis for judi-
cial review. 
164. 392 U.S. at 27 (emphasis added). See also the language of the Court quoted in 
note 152 supra. 
165. Such knowledge is also important with respect to grounds for arrest, but 
officers have often failed to communicate it to the judge at the hearing on a motion 
to suppress. Frequently, the result is that what in fact was a lawful arrest is declared 
unlawful. See LaFave, Improving Police Performance Through the Exclusionary Rule 
-Part I: Current Police and Local Court Practices, 30 Mo. L. R.Ev. 391, 398-401, 417-18 
(1965). Some police departments are making efforts to remedy this situation. Id. at 
417-18 n.82. 
166. There is no more reason to take a "grudging or negative attitude" toward such 
oral communication than there is to do so with respect to search warrant affidavits, 
which "are normally drafted by nonlawyers in the midst and haste of a criminal in-
vestigation." United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 108 (1965). Both situations have 
their unique difficulties. In the stop-and-frisk situation, very little time passes between 
observation and decision, but considerable time intervenes between the officer's deci-
sion and his articulation in court. In the search warrant situation, by contrast, there 
is at least some time for reflection and review between the time the evidence is re-
ceived and a decision is made, but articulation-preparation of the affidavit-comes 
hard on the heels of the decision. 
167. It has been suggested, and I think wisely, that in some cases where it appears 
that the officer has had some difficulty in trying to articulate the grounds of his sus-
picion, it would be appropriate to take into account how he reacted on the spur of 
the moment to the situation. For example, in the Peters case the fact that Officer Lasky 
called the police before venturing into the hallway is entitled to weight, as is the fact 
in Terry that Officer McFadden interposed the body of one of the suspects between 
himself and the other two suspects. Remarks of Justice Walter V. Schaefer of the 
Supreme Court of Illinois, at Institute of Continuing Legal Education program on 
"Criminal Law and the Constitution: The Expanding Revolution," July 19, 1968. 
This suggestion does not seem inconsistent with the Court's admonition that good 
faith on the part of the officer is not enough (392 U.S. at 27) nor does it suggest that 
the conduct of the officer should in all cases be regarded as a kind of self-justification. 
Rather, as Justice Schaefer pointed out, the suggestion is merely that the law is equally 
as able to deal with inferences in this situation as it is in the many other civil and 
criminal contexts in which inferences are drawn from conduct. 
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2. Toward Precise Standards 
The preceding discussion is not intended to reopen the pre-Terry 
debate on stop and frisk, but only to suggest that the fears of many 
are unwarranted when they contend that stopping for investigation, 
if permitted, would of necessity be judged by a vague and subjective 
standard. This is not to say that many answers can be found in the 
Terry decision itself; rather, Terry's value lies in the Court's firm 
assertion that police action under this new power will be scrutinized 
as closely as other enforcement activities touched by the Constitu-
tion. Terry is not the end; it is the beginning, and more specific 
limits will later emerge by a process of judicial inclusion and ex-
clusion.168 
Although prognostication about future Supreme Court decisions 
is a hazardous game, I would like to consider briefly how some of these 
specific limits might ultimately be drawn. One reason for such a ven-
ture is to demonstrate that the standards for an investigative stop 
could become just as precise as those that have been developed for 
arrest. Another function of the following inquiry is to explore the 
earlier suggestion that something might be gained from an attempt 
to define the grounds for a stop in terms of evidence that falls short 
of grounds for arrest in some identifiable way. 
Despite claims that the distinction between "reasonable grounds 
to believe" and "reasonable grounds to suspect" is only a "semantic 
quibble,"169 it does seem that separate, distinguishable standards for 
arrest and for stopping could be developed. Both procedures require 
probable cause, but a somewhat different kind of probable cause: for 
arrest the officer must have "reasonable grounds to believe" that 
the person has committed a crime, but for stopping (to use the lan-
guage in Terry instead of the much-maligned New York formula) 
he must "reasonably ... conclude [that is, believe] ... that criminal 
activity may be afoot."170 Since "in dealing with probable cause ... 
we deal with probabilities,"171 the difference between these two for-
mulae may lie in the degree of probability required. 
As to the probability required for an arrest, it may generally be 
stated that it must be more probable than not that the person has 
committed an offense, although this is less certain as to the proba-
168. The evolution of more precise guidelines is illustrated by experience in Cali-
fornia, the state which first expressly recognized the power of police to stop and frisk. 
See cases cited in DETECTION OF CRIME ch. 2. 
169. DeSalvatore v. State, 52 Del. 550, 557, 16!1 A.2d 244, 249 (1960) (emphasis in 
original). 
170. 392 U.S. at l!O. 
171. Brinegar v, United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949). 
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bility that a particular person is the bffender than to the probability 
that a crime has been committed by someone. In the latter situa-
tion, 172 which assumes central importance when there is no doubt 
who the offender is if a crime has been committed, courts ordi-
narily require that criminal conduct be more probable than non-
criminal activity.173 This approach is reflected in those decisions 
which say that there must be "more evidence for [the existence of 
criminal conduct] than against"174 or that the suspect's actions must 
be "inconsistent with any innocent pursuit,''175 and also in the many 
cases where grounds for arrest have been found lacking because the 
conduct of the suspect was equivocal, that is, where the possibility 
of criminal conduct was no greater than the possibility of innocent 
behavior.176 
When it is at least more probable than not that a crime has 
occurred, courts usually hold that a particular person may be arrested 
for that crime only if it is more probable than not that that person 
is the offender; the information must be such that "reasonable men 
would conclude that in all probability" the suspect is the perpe-
trator.177 This, however, cannot be stated as a universal rule, for it 
does not take account of the classic case in which a man is shot in 
the back in a locked room and the two persons present at the time 
accuse each other.178 In such a case, it would seem that both suspects 
172. See ARREST 256-58. 
173. It would be difficult to say that this should always be the case, in light of a 
notion of variable probable cause ,that takes into account the seriousness of the offense, 
On a variation of Justice Jackson's hypothetical, text at note 78 supra, one might ask 
if it is necessary that there be a more than 50% probability when the suspected crime 
is a kidnapping with the child in the hands of the suspect., 
174. E.g., People v. Ingle, 53 Cal. 2d 407,413, 348 P.2d 577,580, 2 Cal. Rptr. 14, 17 
(1960). See also 1 C. fil.EXANDER, THE LAw OF ARREST IN CRIMINAL AND OTHER PROCEED-
INGS 365 (1949). , 
175. E.g., State v. Beadbetter, 210 Wis. 327, 333, 246 N.W. 443, 445 (1933) (concern-
ing statute which allows search by conservation warden on "reason to believe"). Cf. the 
recent dictum of the same court that evidence for arrest need not "be sufficient to prove 
that guilt is more probable than not." Browne v. State, 24 Wis. 2d 491,504, 129 N.W.2d 
175, 180, rehearing denied, 131 N.W.2d 169 (1964). 
176. E.g., People v. Stein, 265 Mich. 610, 251 N.W. 788 (1933). 
177. State v. Phillips, 262 Wis. 303, 307, 55 N.W.2d 384, 386 (1952). 
178. Quite similar is the following illustration from REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 
§ 119, comment j (1965): 
A sees B and C bending over a dead man, D. B and C each accuse the other of 
murdering D. A is not sure that either B or C did the killing, bul: he has a reason-
able suspicion that either B or C killed D. A is privileged to arrest either or both. 
For other hard cases and the commentators' views about them, see ARREsT 259-63. 
The very fact that the right to stop and question is acknowledged may justify some 
limitation in this sort of arrest authority. Courts have said that although an officer 
must act on the information at hand, "where there is an opportunity for inquiry and 
investigation, inquiry and investigation should be made." Filer v. Smith, 96 Mich. 347, 
354, 55 N.W. 999, 1001 (1893). The right to stop and question would provide the op-
portunity for inquiry, and tlihs it might be concluded that arrest of either or both of 
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might be arrested, although this exception is probably a limited 
one and may apply only (as the hypothetical suggests) where the 
offense is a most serious one179 and, perhaps, where it is also clear 
that the actual offender is almost certain to be one of the persons 
arrested.180 But whatever the boundaries of this limited exception, 
the general rule-as repeatedly emphasized by the Supreme Court 
-is that where there are several actual or potential suspects, all of 
them may not be arrested nor may any one be arrested at random.181 
By contrast, when a case involves temporary seizure for investi-
gation, and it is "more releyant to ask whether there is probable 
cause for restraining a suspect than to ask whether there is probable 
cause for believing in the suspect'$ guilt,"182 the more-probable-than-
not test is inapplicable. Rather, as is suggested by the reference in 
Terry to reasonable belief "that criminal activity may be afoot,"183 
it should be sufficient that there is a substantial possibility that a 
crime has been or is about to be committed and that the suspect is 
the person who committed or is planning the offense.184 Consider the 
following possible situations. 
the suspects would be improper unless the process of questioning did not identify one 
of the bystanders as the killer. 
179. "In determining whether such drastic action wonld ever be reasonable, one 
would probably weigh the seriousness of the crime." Foote, Problems of the Protection 
of Human Rights in Criminal Law and Procedure, U.N. Doc. TE 326/1 (40-2) LA, at 
l!6 (1958). 
180. THE REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 178, notes the anomoly of 
holding multiple arrests unlawful "although it is clear at the time of the arrest that 
one of them is guilty and that the guilty one may escape unless both are arrested." 
181. In Wong Sun v. United States, l!71 U.S. 471 (1963), an informant had said that 
an individual named "Blackie Toy,'' the proprietor of a laundry on Leavet)worth Street, 
had sold an ounce of heroin. There were several Chinese laundries on this street, and 
apparently more than one Toy, and thus the arrest of one of them was unlawful be-
cause there was no showing that the officers "had some information of some kind which 
had narrowed the scope of their search to this particular Toy." 371 U.S. at 481. 
In Mallory v. United States, l!54 U.S. 449 (1957), involving a rape by a masked 
Negro, three Negroes who had access to the basement where the rape occurred and 
who fit the general description of the rapist were arrested. Said the Court: 
Presumably, whomever the police arrest they must arrest on "probable cause." It 
is not the function of the police to arrest, as it were, at large and to use an inter-
rogating process at police headquarters in order to determine whom µiey should 
charge before a committing magistrate on "probable cause." 
l!54 U.S. at 456. 
Johnson v. United States, 33l! U.S. IO (1948), was a rather ridiculous extension of 
the principle. Officers smelled burning opium outside a hotel room. The Court held 
that a search warrant could have been obtained on this evidence, but that it was im-
proper to knock on the door and then arrest the petitioner after she was found to be 
alone, since "the arresting officer did not have probable cause to arrest petitioner until 
he had entered her room and found her to be the sole occupant." 333 U.S. at 16. 
182. W. SCHAEFER, THE SUSPECT AND SOCIETY 25 (1967). 
183. l!92 U.S. at l!O (emphasis added). 
184. Others have made similar suggestions. Stern, Stop and Frisk: An Historical 
Answer to a Modern Prqblem, 58 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 532 (l967), states at 536: "Prob-
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a. Known but untested informant. When the police act on the 
basis of information from an informant, the informant usually is able 
to identify the alleged offender with sufficient specificity.185 The cen-
tral problem, then, is whether there is reason for the officer to find 
the information credible. On this issue, courts have typically dis-
tinguished between the informer who has given reliable information 
in the past and the informer who is known but has not established 
his reliability. If the informant has given information to the police 
in the past, and the officer can truthfully say that this information 
was not merely acted upon,186 but that as a result convictions187 or 
at least indictments188 were obtained, and he can also testify specifi-
cally about the manner in which the informant acquired the present 
information,189 then an arrest made solely upon the information 
provided will be upheld.190 In short, under such circumstances it is 
more probable than not that the informant's information is correct. 
By contrast, courts have not held that an arrest may be made 
solely upon the word of a known but untested informant. Rather, in 
such a case it is necessary that there be some corroborating evidence. 
For example, _if the informant says that the suspect committed some 
past crime, the fact that the named person seems to fit the description 
given by the victim would suffice;191 or, if the informant claims that 
able cause is the officer's reasonable belief-the probability under the circumstances. 
The basis for detention under the stop and frisk statutes is reasonable suspicion-the 
possibility under the circumstances. By definition suspicion is just one step removed 
from belief" (emphasis in original). Another commentator has said that the grounds 
for stopping should ordinarily be limited "to situations in which only another detail of 
description or closer proximity or connection to the crime would be needed for probable 
cause [for arrest], or in which only an unequivocal act would be needed to constitute 
an attempt." Recent Statute, supra note 137, at 476 (emphasis in original). 
185. E.g., People v. Durr, 28 Ill. 2d 308, 192 N.E.2d 379 (1963), cert. denied, 376 
U.S. 973 (1964). Occasionally this is not the case, as in People v. Dewson, 150 Cal. App. 
2d 119, 310 P.2d 162 (1957), where a reliable informant said that a Negro known as 
"Bozo," driving a 1953 Oldsmobile "98" convertible with a black top and a light 
colored body was selling narcotics. The court took the view that this information was 
not specific enough for arrest, but that it did justify stopping for investigation a per• 
son fitting this description. The problem in such a case is essentially the same as that 
most frequently encountered when the information comes from a victim or witness. 
See text accompanying note 203 infra. 
186. A statement that arrests followed from the prior information given by this in• 
formant is not sufficient; see, e.g., People v. McClellan, 34 Ill. 2d 572, 218 N.E.2d 97 
(1966). 
187. E.g., People v. Truelock, 35 Ill. 2d 189, 220 N.E.2d 187 (1966); People v. 
Thomas, 76 Ill. App. 2d 42, 221, N.E.2d 800 (1966). 
188. E.g., People v. Miller, 34 Ill. 2d 527, 216 N.E.2d 793 (1966). 
189. E.g., People v. McCray, 33 Ill. 2d 66, 210 N.E.2d 161 (1965), aff d, 386 U.S. 300 
(1967). Cf. Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964) (search warrant). 
190. E.g., People v. Freeman, 34 Ill. 2d 362, 215 N.E.2d 206 (1966). Cf. Aguilar v. 
Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964) (search warrant). 
191. E.g., People v. Ostrand, 35 Ill. 2d 520, 221 N.E.2d 499 (1960). 
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the suspect is in a given area for the purpose of committing a crime, 
observed suspicious conduct will be adequate to sustain the arrest.192 
Mere appearance of the suspect at the time and place predicted, often 
the clincher when a reliable informant is used,193 does not appear to 
be adequate corroboration for arrest.194 But, it is submitted that in 
this kind of case there is such a substantial possibility that the infor-
mant is right that a stopping of the suspect for investigation would 
be proper.195 Or, to put the point another way, since the suspect's 
presence there may be either an innocent but predictable act (and 
thus a matter on which the informant could speak) or an act done 
in furtherance of the scheme alleged by the informant, it is appro-
priate to detain the suspect briefly in an attempt to determine which 
is the case. Such a power to stop and question dovetails neatly with 
the power to arrest, since a lawful arrest could be made if the sus-
pect's presence proves to be suspicious apart from the informant's 
story (as it might turn out to be upon questioning).196 
b. Anonymous informant. When the police receive information 
from an anonymous informant,197 they may not arrest solely upon 
the basis of that information.198 This is true even when the informa-
192. The suspicious conduct may itself be equivocal and thus be insufficient for 
arrest by itself, as where the suspect in a narcotics case was overheard to say, "I have 
the money, do you have the stuff?" People v. Brooks, 32 Ill. 2d 81, 83, 203 N.E.2d 882, 
883 (1965). 
193. See McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300 (1967). 
194. Courts have usually required more than one story to support such an equivocal 
appearance. Appearance has been sufficient corroboration where three informants of 
unknown reliability gave the information, People v. La Bostrie, 14 Ill. 2d 617, 153 
N.E.2d 570 (1958), and where the officer heard the informant place a telephone call to 
the suspect to arrange his appearance for the specific purpose of selling narcotics, 
People v. Jones, 16 Ill. 2d 569, 158 N.E.2d 773 (1959). 
195. Some would be unhappy with such a rule because of the fact that the police 
need not disclose the name of the informant, McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300 (1967), 
which creates the risk (also present in the arrest cases) that the police may create an 
imaginary informant after the fact to justify their earlier action. See Younger, The 
Perjury Routine, 3 CRIM. L. BuLL. 551 (1967). Since real or imagined informants are 
utilized most often in narcotics cases, the limitation suggested earlier that stop and 
frisk not be permitted for this kind of offense, takes on added importance. See text 
accompanying note 126 supra. 
196. Cf. In re Boykin, 39 Ill. 2d 617,237 N.E.2d 460 (1968), where an assistant prin-
cipal of a school told the police that he had anonymous information that a student 
had a gun. It was possible that the informant was not anonymous but that assistant 
principal said so "to avoid future difficulties in the school and the creation of a feud." 
Held proper to search the student for a weapon even if there were no grounds for 
arrest. 
197. That is, the informant remains anonymous to the police, as contrasted to a 
case in which the police know the informer's identity but do not wish to disclose it. 
The police are not required to reveal an informant's identity when the information 
obtained from him only provides the basis for arrest. McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300 
(1967). 
198. The rule has even been applied to such a serious crime as murder. People v. 
Humphreys, 353 Ill. 340, 187 N.E. 446 (193!1). 
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tion is to the effect that the named individual will be in a certain 
place at a certain time for the purpose of committing the crime and 
he does in fact appear;19!! what is needed for arrest is more substantial 
corroboration.2Qo This is because there is less reason to credit infor-
mation received from an anonymous source; the informant simply 
may not want to get involved, or he may be unwilling to identify 
himself because he is fabricating a story for some ulterior motive. 
For this reason, "using anonymous information as a basis for 
intrusive police action is highly dangerous,"201 and the better view 
would be that such information (even with the slight corroboration 
of the suspect's appearance as predicted) does not, as a general propo-
sition, justify a stopping for questioning. That is, the anonymous 
inforI1J.ation ordinarily raises a possibility, but not a substantial 
possibility, of criminal conduct. But, in this context the word "sub-
stantial" takes on special importance; whether the possibility is great 
enough to justify stopping the suspect who appeared as predicted 
may well depend upon the nature of the crime-particularly where 
such action might prevent a serious crime from occurring. No one 
would seriously question the authority of police to detain for investi-
gation an individual who was reported by an anonymous informant 
to be planning to bomb an airplane, ~nd who appears at the airport 
carrying a suitcase. Action on the basis of anonymous information~ 
then, should be allowed only in cases involving the risk of "serious 
personal injury or grave irreparable property damage" and certainly 
should not be underta~en for "the enforcement of sumptuary laws, 
such as gambling, and laws of limited public consequence, such as 
narcotics violations, prostitution, larcenies of the ordinary kind, and 
the like."202 This is not to suggest that anonymous information must 
be ignored in the latter instances; it offers a legitimate basis £pr a 
"stakeout" or other surveillance, but not for a seizure. 
199. E.g., People v. Pitts, 26 Ill. 2d 395, 186 N.E.24 357 (1962): People v. Farren, 24 
Ill. 2d 572, 182 N.E.2d 662 (1962); People v. Malinsky, 15 N.Y.2d 86, 209 N.E.2d 694, 
262 N.Y.S.2d 65 (1965); Pepple v. Coffey, 12 N.Y.2d 443, 191 N.E.2d 263, 240 N.Y.S.2d 
'721 (1963). 
200. Sµch corroboration has been foun4 where the suspect appeared at the time 
and place predicted and the suspect's cozµpanion proved to be involved in the offense 
predicted. People v. Tillman, 1 Ill. 2d 525, 116 N.E.2d 344 (1954). 
201. People v. Taggart, 20 N.Y.2d 335, 343, 229 N.E.2d 581, 586, 283 N.Y.S.2d 1, 9 
(1967). 
202. People v. Taggart, 20 N.Y.2d 335,340,229 N.E.2d 581,584,283 N.Y.S.2d 1, 6. In 
Taggart the anonymous caller stated that a specifically described person was at a certain 
place and that he had a loaded revolver in his pocket. The suspect was found at the 
named location in the midst of a group of children, which the court concluded justified 
a search for the weapon. Justi1=e Fuld, dissenting, agreed that there was a need to act on 
this information, but thought that the police should have patted the suspect down 
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c. Information from victim or witnesses. While informants usu-
ally provide information about ongoing or future criminal conduct, 
the victim of or witness to a crime obviously is giving information 
concerning past criminal conduct. In contrast to the informer cases, 
there is ordinarily no problem concerning the reliability of the per-
son providing the information. Often, as where damage to property 
or injury to a person is apparent, corroboration of the fact that an 
offense has occurred is at hand,203 and even when this is not the case 
the police are entitled to assume the veracity of the alleged victim 
or witness absent special circumstances which should put them on 
guard.204 The problem, except where the offender is a prior acquaint-
ance of the victim or witness, is whether a sufficiently detailed de-
scription can be given to justify the arrest of any one person. 
Sometimes, as where a series of crimes with the same modus 
operandi has been committed in a certain vicinity, the several victims 
or witnesses may together be able to provide a very specific descrip-
tion of the offender. Under such circumstances, a person who fits the 
description and is found in that area may be lawfully arrested, even 
though the encounter takes place sometime after the offense was 
reported.20is In the more usual case, however, the police are called to 
the scene of a just-completed crime and are able to obtain only a 
general description of the offender. Experience has shown that when 
the victim or witness cannot name the offender his apprehension is 
unlikely unless he is immediately found in the area,206 so the police 
instead of immediately looking into his pocket. This is consistent with the view later 
taken by the Supreme Court in Terry. 
The majority in Taggart was also concerned with the possibility that police might 
invent informants after the fact to justify their action (see note 195 supra), and said 
that "the police should be required to make contemporaneous or reasonably prompt 
detailed records of any such communications which should be subject to inspection 
and examination on a suppression hearing on the issue of credibility." Id. at 343, 229 
N.E.2d at 587, 283 N.Y.S.2d at 9. 
203. E.g., Hood v. Brinson, 30 Ill. App. 2d 498, 175 N.E.2d 300 (1961). 
204. E.g., Watkins v. Sullivan, 11 Ill. App. 2d 134, 136 N.E.2d 528 (1956). 
205. Ellis v. United States, 264 F.2d 372 (D.C. Cir. 1959) (rash of daytime house-
breakings in northeast Washington; description of offender indicated that he was a 
brown-skinned Negro, about five feet seven inches tall and 150 pounds, late teens to 
mid-twenties, very neatly dressed, wore topcoat with half-belt and a hat; held, proper 
to arrest man fitting this description who, while observed, approached a house, knocked 
on the door, looked about for a few minutes, and then left); Mercurius v. Rolon, 231 
Cal. App. 2d 859, 41 Cal. Rptr. 789 (1964) (series of burglary-rapes within a five-block 
circle; general description of offender was that he was a male Negro with short hair, 
about six feet tall, and 165-210 pounds, very muscular and strong with large hands, 
from mid-twenties to thirties in age, wore a jacket of a certain fabric with distinct 
cuffs, and always drove from crimes in a car; held, proper to, arrest person fitting this 
description seated iri car two or three blocks from point where most recent offense 
had occurred the day before). 
206. See PRESIDENT'S COMMISS!ON ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF Jus-
TICI!:, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 97 (1967). 
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response in these cases is to broadcast the general description and 
bring as many officers as possible into the area to search for a person 
or persons fitting the description. However, courts have generally 
taken the position-and this is the most striking illustration of the 
"more probable than not" test-that an arrest may not be made 
upon a general description when the circumstances, including the 
lapse of time and size of the area being searched, are such that more 
than one person would likely fit that description.201 
In such a situation, as even many who oppose stop and frisk in 
other contexts would likely admit,208 the police must have some au-
thority to freeze the situation. If it is inherent in the circumstances 
that no one person can be singled out as the probable offender, then 
it should be permissible to detain briefly every person in the area 
who fits the general description. Clearly, only one can be guilty, but 
as to each of the suspects there exists a substantial possibility of 
guilt.209 Common sense, of course, suggests that whether the possi-
207. In People v. Mickelson, 59 Cal. 2d 448, 380 P.2d 658, 30 Cal. Rptr. 18 (1963), 
a supermarket robber was described as being a fairly tall man of large build with dark 
hair who was wearing a red sweater. Twenty minutes later and six blocks from the 
scene of the robbery, a man fitting this description was stopped. The court held that 
the stopping (but not the subsequent search through the car) was proper, but ob-
served that the police officer "did not have probable cause • • • to arrest [the suspect] 
for robbery. There could have been more than one tall white man with dark hair 
wearing a red sweater abroad at night in such a metropolitan area." 59 Cal. 2d at 
454, 388 P.2d at 662, 30 Cal. Rptr. at 22. Similarly, in People v. Gibson, 220 Cal. App. 
2d 75, 33 Cal. Rptr. 775 (1963), a report over the police radio that a robber wore a 
dark felt hat, a leather coat, and dark glasses, was held not to justify arrest of a man 
with a dark hat, dark glasses, and a coat which looked like leather (but was not), who 
had been spotted in a car forty blocks from the scene of the robbery. 
Sometimes, however, a single fact from the victim, together with other circum-
stances, will identify only one person in the area. See People v. Posley, 71 III. App. 2d 
186, 218 N.E.2d 47 (1966) (police called to burglary, girl reported that man in her room 
smelled of shaving lotion; car one block away was only car in area without condensa-
tion on the windshield; smell of saving lotion detected in car; suspect hiding in car 
properly arrested). Also, it is once again important to note that the "more•probable-
than-not" test may not be applicable in the case of a most serious crime; see text ac-
companying note 178 supra. Illustrative of this exception is People v. Schader, 62 Cal. 
2d 716, 401 P .2d 665, 44 Cal. Rptr. 193 (1965), where a policeman was killed during a 
robbery; a radio report that the two robbers were headed east in a late model red 
Cadillac was held to justify the arrest of a man who was apparently alone in such a 
car. The defendant relied upon the Mickelson case, but the court said that this case 
was distinguishable because the crime was murder, relying upon Justice Jackson's dis-
sent in Brinegar, text accompanying note 59 supra. 
208. See, e.g., Schwartz, Stop and Frisk (A. Case Study in Judicial Control of tlle 
Police), 58 J. CRIM. L.C. &: P.S. 443, 456 (1967). 
209. See People v. Mickelson, 59 Cal. 2d 448, 380 P .2d 658, 30 Cal. Rptr. 18 (1963) 
(summarized in note 207 supra); People v. King, 175 Cal. App. 2d 386, 346 P.2d 235 
(1959) (information that robbery was committed by two men in a two-tone green, dark 
and dirty car which rattled and had a loud mufiler, held to be adequate grounds for 
stopping a car fitting this description two miles from the robbery); Wilson v. State, 
186 S.2d 208 (Miss. 1966) (witness saw theft of safe from supermarket and ob-
served four men, one in an unusually long coat, depart in a light-colored Plymouth 
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bility is substantial will depend upon the size of the area in which 
the offender might be found (which in turn depends upon how 
recently the crime was committed and whether the offender fled on 
foot or in a car), the number of persons now in the area, and the 
extent to which the general description affords some basis for selec-
tion. If, for example, a robbery occurred some fifteen minutes earlier 
and the only report is that the robber wore brown shoes, and there 
are several hundred people on the streets in the area, no one would 
seriously suggest that all those with brown shoes should be stopped.210 
d. Calls for assistance. A somewhat different kind of case is pre-
sented when the police find themselves on the scene of what appears 
to be an offense being committed or just completed, and the circum-
stances suggest a need for action even prior to any attempt at ques-
tioning the victim or witnesses about the details. Police on patrol 
duty are occasionally confronted with situations in which they sud-
denly hear a call of "Help!" or "Police!" and then see one or more 
persons leaving the area. Ordinarily, probable cause for arrest will 
be lacking on such facts.211 The call may be a prank or othenvise 
unrelated to any criminal conduct, and, in any event, no one person 
has been identified as the one who is more-probably-than-not guilty. 
Here, as in the previous situation, there probably will be a basis 
for an investigative stop. Once again, the police should be required 
to meet the substantial possibility test, but, while in the previous 
situation a general description utilized to select persons in the vicin-
station wagon; court does not question police detention of three men, one with de-
scribed coat, who were seated in described vehicle). 
210. The real problem of this kind occurs when the victim or witness can say only 
that the offender had brown skin; a common complaint of Negroes is that they are a 
highly visible minority and thus particularly susceptible to this kind of rough selec-
tion. The complaint is a valid one when race does not afford a reasonable basis for 
selection from the many persons in the area, which is often-but not always--the case. 
See Commonwealth v. Hicks, 209 Pa. Super. I, 223 A.2d 873 (1966), where the police 
were told a burglary had been attempted by a Negro with a brown coat and a mus-
tache, and this was held to justify the stopping for investigation of a Negro with a 
light colored coat without a mustache but in need of a shave, who was walking down 
the street some five blocks away. In the absence of some additional data not provided 
in the opinion such as the fact that this incident occurred in a section of Philadelphia 
not frequented by Negroes, or that the streets in the area were otherwise deserted, 
this is an outrageous decision; one of every four persons in Philadelphia is Negro. 
On the other hand, it would be foolish to contend that race alone could never 
provide a basis for a stopping. The question is whether, given the nature of those in 
the suspect population (the characteristics of persons one would expect to find at that 
time in the vicinity of the crime), the one factor of race (or some other single bit of 
information, such as the fact that the offender wore a red shirt) is sufficiently selective. 
A Negro in an exclusive white residential area, a white person in Chinatown, or an 
American Indian in a Negro area might all be stopped if a member of their race had 
just committed an offense in the immediate vicinity. 
211. E.g., People v. Mirbelle, 276 Ill. App. 533 (1934). 
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ity will meet the test, here the requirement may be satisfied even 
without any description because all the suspects will be in immediate 
proximity to a possible crime scene.212 
e. Direct observations. Most police stops for investigation are 
probably the result of direct observations, a particularly difficult 
category because the various fact situations which arise are not all 
of a kind. A few of the most common, however, will provide an ade-
quate basis for analysis. 
Because of the high incidence of property crimes and the fact 
that such crimes are infrequently solved by other meahs,213 most field 
interrogations are undertaken with respect to such crimes.214 The 
typical case is one in which a patrolman sees a person on the street 
tarrying property under circumstances which suggest that the prop-
erty might have been obtained unlawfully. The problem is precisely 
the converse of that present when an account of a crime has been 
received from a victim or witness; here, it is clear that the burglar, 
thief, fence, or what have you, has been caught red-handed if a crime 
has occurred, but the facts may not make it more probable than not 
that a crime has been committed. Since the property provides a 
specific foctis for questioning, a stopping for such investigation is 
certainly appropriate when there is a substantial possibility of crimi-
nality, that is, reason to believe that "criminal activity may be 
afoot."215 Merely unusual conduct-such as sitting in a park in broad 
daylight and dividing up a pile of coins-does not of itself call for 
inquiry,216 but the following actions do justify questioning: (1) car-
rying a large bundle of clothing carelessly wadded together at 9:20 
p.m. while carefully staying in the shadows;217 (2) carrying a new 
212. With regard to calls for assistance, for example, if a policeman standing 
outside an apartment house were to hear a cry for help within, it should be per-
missible for him to stop anyone leaving the apartment house immediately there-
after, "even though it again was perfectly possible that no one present was guilty of 
wrongdoing, and certain that not all -0£ the persons were guilty of the commission of 
a crime." United States v. Bonanno, 180 F. Supp. 71, 79 n.15 (S.D.N.Y. 1960). Similarly, 
when the police hear a cry for help at 4:30 a.m., a person observed running out of a 
nearby alley could properly be stopped. Bell v. United States, 280 F.2d 717 (D.C. Cir. 
1960). , 
The distinction between this section and the one preceding is between what 
is referred to as a "hot" search (at the crime scene) and a "warm" search (in the gen-
eral vicinity of the crime). The third possibility is a "cold" search, not limited in area, 
which of course would require a much more specific description. See PRESIDENT'S COM• 
MISSION ON LAw ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JumCE, TASK FORCE REPORT: 
THE POUCE 58 (1967). 
213. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, 
THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 97 (1967). 
214. DETECTION OF CRIME 28. 
215. 392 U.S. at 30. 
216. People v. Henze, 61 Cal. Rptr. 545 (App. Ct. 1967). 
217. People v. West, 144 Cal. App. 2d 214, 300 P.2d 729 (1956). 
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console-type record player with the store tags still on it, where the 
two men involved were recognized as having prior larceny convic-
tions;218 and (3) carrying a brown carton, which appeared to have 
come from an adjacent railway express terminal, at I: 15 a.m.219 In 
each of these examples, the possibility that the property was ob-
tained by criminal means is so compelling as to call for investigation. 
A second general situation-one which provides another oppor-
tunity to juxtapose the standards for arrest with those required for 
a temporary seizure for investigation-arises when an individual 
is suspected because of his companionship with another who has just 
been lawfully arrested. Assume, for example, that A has just been 
arrested while in the process of committing a crime. While the possi-
bility that his companion, B, may also be arrested is greater than 
would be the case if A were being arrested for an offense committed 
at some time in the past,220 it does not follow that B may always be 
arrested too. The cases tell us that it is necessary to distinguish be-
tween those instances in which there is evidence of a "common de~ 
sign" between A and B,221 on the one hand, and those in which A's 
offense might well have been unknown to B and their "meeting is 
not secretive or in a suspicious hide-out,"222 on the other. In the latter 
case the probabilities are not sufficient to allow the arrest of B, but 
it would seem that the fact of companionship at the time the crime 
was committed223 might well raise a substantial possibility that B 
was involved. This would be particularly true if B were to engage 
in any unusual conduct after the officer made his movie to arrest A.224 
218. Brooks v. United States, 159 A.2d 876 (D.C. Mun. App. 1960). 
219. United States v. Lewis, 362 F.2d 759 (2d Cir. 1966). 
220. If A were arrested for a crime committed in the past, then it would have to 
appear both that the past offense was committed by more than one person and that 
there was some basis for believing that A's present companion had been his accom-
plice. Compare People v. Henneman, 373 Ill. 603, 27 N.E.2d 448 (1940) (unlawful to 
arrest man riding in car with another man who fitted description of person who held 
up gas station the night before) with People v. Derrico, 409 Ill. 453, 100 N.E.2d 607 
(1951) (when man known to have burglarized safe four months previously was properly 
arrested, and one of the weapons found in the car appeared to belong to his com-
panion, the companion could also be arrested for burglary, which was known to in-
volve at least two men). 
221. E.g., People v. West, 15 Ill. 2d 171, 154 N.E.2d 286 (1958); People v. McGowan, 
415 Ill. 375, 114 N.E.2d 407 (1953). 
222. United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581 (1948). 
223. B's companionship with A, even at a later date, might be sufficient. In a case 
such as People v. Henneman, 373 Ill. 603, 27 N.E.2d 448 (1940), where the car was 
stopped so that A could be arrested for armed robbery, B, passenger in the car, has in 
a sense been stopped too, and given the professional and dangerous nature of the 
crime for which A is being arrested, prudence would seem to dictate a frisk of B. 
224. In People v. Bowen, 29 Ill. 2d 349, 194 N.E.2d 316 (1963), two officers lawfully 
arrested A for carrying a concealed weapon. A's companion B (later found to be A's 
husband) then began to depart quickly, but stopped when ordered to do so by one 
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While the preceding five categories do not exhaust all of the 
possible situations in which the police might consider stopping a 
suspect for investigation, they do account for most of the instances 
of such stopping in current practice225 which appear consistent with 
the standard suggested by the Supreme Court in Terry. Without 
regard to whether the Court will ultimately adopt each of the dis-
tinctions suggested above, this discussion does support two im-
portant conclusions: the permissible grounds for a stopping can be 
made just as precise as the grounds for arrest; and, the permissible 
grounds for a stopping can be set forth in objective terms. 
VI. PROTECTIVE SEARCH 
Assuming that grounds for a temporary seizure for investigation 
are present,226 the next question is whether the officer may conduct 
what is commonly called a "frisk" or what might more appropriately 
be described as a "protective search." By hypothesis, it is clearly a 
search and thus within the fourth amendment; it is to be under-
taken for the sole purpose of protecting the officer. As a conse-
quence, it is more limited and thus distinguishable from other 
forms of search, such as search incident to arrest. Protective 
searches, said the Court in Terry, must be reasonable "both at 
their inception and as conducted,"227 and thus separate considera-
tion must be given to these questions: (1) How much evidence of 
what is needed to justify a protective search? (2) What are the con-
stitutional boundaries of a protective search made on sufficient 
evidence? 
A. The Required Amount of Evidence 
Much of the language in the Terry opinion referring to the 
quantum of evidence needed to search is confusing and contradic-
tory. The problem is initially cast in terms of the authority of an 
of the officers. One officer patted B down and found no weapons, but shortly thereafter 
the other officer conducted a more thorough search of B and found a packet of con-
cealed narcotics. The Supreme Court of Illinois took the view that the patting down 
for a weapon was a lawful search of B incident to the arrest of A., but that the second, 
more extensive search of B was improper. This notion that one person may be searched 
for a weapon incident to the arrest of another person is an interesting idea, and cer-
tainiy makes sense in some situations. See note 223 supra. In Bowen, however, it seems 
inapposite, since B was leaving the scene and did not present any danger to the arrest-
ing officers. Since the officers called B back to find out in what way he might be in-
volved with A., a better explanation would be that the officers properly stopped B for 
investigation and frisked him incident to that stop. 
225. The police practices are described in DErECTION OF CluME 19-38. 
226. This discussion is not directed to the question of whether there actually was a 
seizure, which would raise a difficult factual issue. See note 117 supra. 
227. 392 U.S. at 27-28. 
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officer to act for his own protection when he does not have probable 
cause for arrest; but then it is said that "the issue is whether a rea-
sonably prudent man in the circumstances would be warranted in 
the belief that his safety or that of others was in danger."228 An of-
ficer must be allowed to conduct a protective search, says the Court, 
when he "is justified in believing that the individual whose suspi-
cious behavior he is investigating at close range is armed and pres-
ently dangerous,''220 that is, "where he has reason to believe that he 
is dealing with an armed and dangerous individual."230 The con-
duct of Officer McFadden was proper, the Court concludes, because 
"a reasonably prudent man would have been warranted in believing 
petitioner was armed and thus presented a threat to the officer's 
safety."231 
All of this language may seem familiar; it is precisely the lan-
guage which the Court has used time and again to define the prob-
able cause requisite for arrest.232 It thus seems to support the curi-
ous conclusion that if an officer has reasonable grounds to believe 
that a person is carrying a concealed weapon,233 so that he might 
make a lawful arrest, 234 he may instead conduct a protective search 
without arrest if he also has reasonable grounds to believe that the 
person is dangerous. Such a conclusion would hardly be cause for 
celebration in the precinct stations of this country, even though it 
would have two limited benefits: (I) contrary to a number of silly 
228. 392 U.S. at 27 (emphasis added). 
229. 392 U.S. at 24 (emphasis added). 
230. 392 U.S. at 27 (emphasis added). 
231. 392 U.S. at 28 (emphasis added). 
232. E.g., Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98 (1959); Draper v. United States, 358 
U.S. 307 (1959); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949). 
233. Possession of a concealed weapon is an offense in most jurisdictions, although 
definition of the offense varies from state to state. See Brabner &: Smith, Firearm 
Regulation, 1 LAW &: CoNTEMP. PROB. 400 (1934); Eller, Legislation-Control of Fire• 
arms, 35 N.C. L. R.Ev. 149 (1956); McKenna, The Right To Keep and Bear Arms, 
MARQ. L. R.Ev. 138 (1928); Turner, Criminal Law-The Law as to Concealed Deadly 
Weapons, 21 J. CRIM. LAw [now J. CRIM. L.C. &: P.S.] 375 (1957); Note, The Law as to 
Concealed Deadly Weapons, 43 KY. L.J. 523 (1955); Annot., 43 A.L.R.2d 492 (1955). 
Typical is the statute involved in Terry, which provides in part that "no person shall 
carry a pistol, bowie knife, dirk, or other dangerous weapon concealed on or about his 
person." For other illustrative statutes, see MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 5.06, 5.07, app. (Tent. 
Draft No. 13, 1961). 
234. The arrest would at least be constitutional. It seems clear that a state may 
authorize the police to arrest without a warrant for any crime when the officer has 
reasonable grounds for belief, as some have done, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 107-2(c) 
(1965); but in several states misdemeanor arrest without a warrant is limited to 
crimes which occur in the officer's presence. Precisely what "in his presence" means 
has proved troublesome, and it is often unclear whether the officer must be positive 
before arrest that the crime has occurred or whether it is sufficient that he have 
reasonable grounds to believe that the offense is presently occurring. See ARREsT 
2!11-43. 
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decisidns,235 it would now be possible to search for a weapon when 
there are grounds for arrest without first going through the formal-
ities of arrest;236 and (2) it would now be possible to search on prob-
able cause for items usable as weapons which are not (and perhaps 
as a matter of substantive due process could not be237) included in 
a statute prohibiting the carrying of dangerous weapons. 
This, however, is not the conclusion implicit in Terry, in part 
because it would strike habitual readers of Supreme Court cases as 
a most unusual decision. We have become accustomed to opinions 
in which the Court's rhetoric far outruns the holding, and thus it 
is no longer cause for surprise to find, at the very end of an opinion, 
a "we-only-hold" statement in which the Court pulls up short and, 
in effect, converts some earlier strong language into dictum.238 But 
Terry runs the other way; after the reader has had it hammered into 
his head several times that a protective search is permissible only 
when the officer reasonably believes that the suspect is armed and 
dangerous, it finally tomes out that this is not true at all: 
We mereiy hold today that where a police officer observes unusal 
conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his ex-
perience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons 
with whom he is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous; 
where in the course of investigating this behavior he identifies him-
self as a policeman and makes reasonable inquiries; and where 
nothing in the initial stages of the encounter serves to dispel his 
reasonable fear for his own or others' safety, he is entitled for the 
235. See Annot., 89 A.L.R.2d 715 (1963). Thus, it has been said that "if the search 
comes before the arrest, it is clear that the search is invalid." LAW &: TACTICS IN FED-
ERAL CRIMINAL CASES 67 (Shadoan ed. 1964). It has been noted, however, that in most 
of these cases "there were either other reasons for holding the search unreasonable or 
the statement of the rule was dictum." :M:. PAULSEN &: s. KADISH, CRIMINAL LAw AND 
ITS PROCESSES 740 n.i (1962). For a discussion of why search with probable cause should 
be permitted before arrest, see LaFave, Search and Seizure: "The Course of True 
Law .•• Has not .• . Run Smooth," 1966 U. ILL. L.F. 255, 303. 
236. In this regard, it should be noted that Justice Harlan was critical of the 
disposition of the Peters case on arrest-and-search grounds, fu part because the Court 
implied that 
[A]lthough there is no problem about whether the arrest of Peters occurred late 
enough, i.e., after probable cause developed, there might be a problem about 
whether it occurred early enough, i.e., before Peters was searched. This seems to 
me a false problem •.•. If the prosecution shows probable cause to arrest prior to 
a search of a man's person, it has met its total burden. 
392 U.S. at 76-77 (emphasis in original). 
237. See, e.g., People v. Munoz, 9 N.Y.2d 51, 172 N.E.2d 535, 211 N.Y.S.2d 146 
(1961). See also DETECTION OF CRIME where it is stated at 47: 
[O]ccasionally a small knife is found to have a matchstick inserted under the blade 
so that the knife can be opened hurriedly merely by catching the protruding 
blade point on the trouser pocket as the knife is taken out. The effect is the same 
as having a switchblade knife. The fact that the size of the blade would prevent 
prosecution for carrying a concealed weapon is not reflected in the police attitude 
toward these knives. 
238. E.g., Escobedo v. lliinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964). 
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protection of himself and others in the area to conduct a carefully 
limited search of the outer clothing of such persons in an attempt 
to discover weapons which might be used to assault him.239 
Thus, assuming a proper stopping for investigation, a protective 
search is permissible when there is reason to believe that the suspect 
may be armed and dangerous. This has some advantages over the 
New York formulation of a reasonable suspicion that the individual 
is dangerous,240 and would seem to permit use of the substantial 
possibility test in much the same way as in determining whether 
there are grounds for a stop, as discussed earlier. In short, the officer 
would not have to establish that it was more probable than not that 
the suspect was armed, but only that there was a substantial possi-
bility that the suspect possessed items which could be used for an 
attack and that he would so use them. 
As the quoted language makes clear, whether it is proper to 
make a protective search incident to a stopping for investigation is 
a question separate from the isssue of whether it is permissible to 
stop the suspect; not all stops call for a frisk. The police are fre-
quently cautioned to assume that every person encountered may 
be armed,241 which is sound advice if it means only that the officer 
should remain alert in every case; but it cannot mean and has not 
been interpreted by the police to mean that a search for weapons 
may be undertaken in every case.242 It is undoubtedly true, however, 
239. 392 U.S. at 30 (emphasis added). 
240. See note 153 supra. 
241. See, e.g., A. BRISrow, FIELD INTERROGATION 25 (2d eq. 1964); 2 Chicago Police 
Dept., Training Bulletin, No. 7 (Feb. 13, 1961). 
242. Available data, however, do not provide a clear picture as to bow often and 
why frisks are made. It bas been reported that New York City police made searches in 
81.6% of the reported stops [PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND AD-
MINISTRATION OF JusrrCE, TASK FORCE REPORT: THE PouCE 185 (1967)], although on 
another occasion the New York department released figures indicating searches oc-
curred in 75.7% of the stops [Schwartz, supra note 208 at 444 n.63]. By contrast, direct 
observation of police activities in the high crime areas of Boston, Chicago, and Wash-
ington, D.C., disclosed that a search was conducted in about one third of the field 
interrogations. Reiss & Black, Interrogation and the Criminal Process, 374 ANNALS 47 
(1967). In any event, it is clear that frisks are not always made when they might be 
called for. One limited study of the killing and wounding of policemen by guns dis-
closed that in 43% of the shootings which occurred while the officer was checking 
out a suspect in a vehicle, the policeman was shot after the initial contact bad been 
made. Also, more officers were shot while conducting field interrogations than while 
dealing with those known or reasonably believed to be felons. Bristow, Police Officer 
Shootings-A Tactical Evaluation, 54 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 93 (1963). 
Data on the productivity of such searches are also inconclusive. The New York 
figures, which are questionable in many other respects, indicate that weapons were 
found in about 8% of the frisks (Schwartz, supra note 208, at 444 n.63), while the 
President's Commission found that "one out of every five persons frisked was carry-
ing a dangerous weapon-IO percent were carrying guns and another 10 percent 
knives." PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra at 185. 
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that in some cases the right to conduct a protective search must fol-
low directly from the right to stop the suspect. The Court seems to 
take this view in Terry,248 although Justice Harlan's concurring 
opinion proceeds to "make explicit what I think is implicit" in the 
majority opinion, namely, that a protective search may always be 
made when the stopping is to investigate what appears to be a crime 
of violence.244 For other crimes, Harlan later asserts, there must be 
"other circumstances"245 present; in such cases, it would apparently 
take noticeable bulges in the suspect's clothing, movements by the 
suspect toward his pockets, or similar observations to give rise to a 
substantial possibility that the suspect was armed.246 
B. Scope of the Search 
The Court is somewhat more successful in stating what is re-
quired for a protective search to be conducted reasonably. For one 
thing, the Court's emphasis upon the procedures followed by the 
officer in Terry indicates that a two-step process must ordinarily be 
followed: the officer must pat down first and then intrude beneath 
the surface only if he comes upon something which feels like a 
weapon.247 Thus in Sibron the Court says that, even assuming the 
officer had grounds for a search, he exceeded the permissible scope 
of such a search in that he made "no attempt at an initial limited 
exploration for arms" but instead "thrust his hand into Sibron's 
pocket."248 
Justice Harlan, concurring, suggests that because it was otherwise 
clear that the officer's actions in Sibron were improper, there was 
"no need here to resolve the question of whether this frisk exceeded 
243. In finding that the officer had grounds for his search, the Court observes that 
the suspects' actions "were consistent with [his] hypothesis that these men were con-
templating a daylight robbery-which, it is reasonable to assume, would be likely to 
involve the use of weapons." 392 U.S. at 28. 
244. 392 U.S. at 33. 
245. 392 U.S. at 74. 
246. In this context, there may be some truth in the allegation that courts are 
not likely to second-guess the officer's judgment that he thought he might be in 
danger (see text accompanying note 148 supra). This may be another reason for 
giving consideration to the possibility of permitting investigative stops only for 
serious crimes (see text accompanying note 124 supra) where the right to frisk is likely 
to flow directly from the right to stop. 
247. See 392 U.S. at 29-30 where the Court states: 
The scope of the search in this case presents no serious problem in light of these 
standards. Officer McFadden patted down the outer clothing of petitioner and his 
companions. He did not place his hands in their pockets or under the outer 
surface of their garments until he had felt weapons, and then he merely reached 
for and removed the guns. He never did invade Katz's person beyond the outer 
surfaces of his clothes, since he discovered nothing in his pat down which might 
have been a weapon. 
248. 392 U.S. at 65. 
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[permissible] bounds."249 He is apparently troubled because the 
Chief Justice has said that the two-step process must be followed 
even when, as in Sibron, the suspect has thrust his own hand into 
his pocket. Certainly a forceful argument for an exception could be 
made in such a case; there may not be time for a game of pattycake 
in this situation, and anyway the patting would likely be inconclu-
sive if the suspect's hand were over the weapon. 
On the other hand, it is understandable why there might be 
some reluctance to acknowledge such an exception. If some aspect 
of a street encounter is subsequently questioned, it is difficult to re-
construct the events.250 A major virtue of the two-step requirement is 
that the officer will not be able to justify an intrusion beneath the 
surface of the suspect's clothing without first showing that he felt a 
hard object, a matter which often could be subject to later verifica-
tion by showing that there was such an object.251 But if a beneath-
the-surface search may be made without a patting-down when the 
suspect makes some movement toward his pockets, courts will fre-
quently be confronted with the difficult task of determining, on the 
basis of conflicting testimony, whether the suspect actually made 
such a movement. If incriminating evidence is found, it is under-
standable that many suspects would claim falsely that they had not 
made any dangerous moves, and it is less understandable but unfor-
tunately true that some police would claim falsely that the suspect 
had made such motions.252 
The Court also emphasizes in Terry that the protective search 
must be used only where its sole justification-protection of the 
officer and others nearby-applies. Thus, it must be limited in scope 
"to an intrusion reasonably designed to discover guns, knives, clubs, 
or other hidden instruments for the assault of [sic] the police offi-
cer."253 This seems to mean that the search must be limited to those 
places to which the suspect had immediate access, a limitation which 
had not been imposed upon the power to search an arrested person 
and his "immediate presence."254 The Court's formulation, however, 
249. 392 U.S. at 74. 
250. Cf. Goldstein, Administrative Problems in Controlling the Exercise of Police 
.,1uthority, 58 J. CRIM. L.C. &: P.S. 160, 165 (1967). 
251. This is not a foolproof safeguard, however. Cf. Reiss, Police Brutality-
Answers to Key Questions, TRANs-AcnoN, July-Aug. 1968, at IO, 12, describing the 
practice of some police of carrying pistols and knives so that they may be placed at a 
scene should it be necessary to establish a case of self-defense. 
252. See notes 126 and 195 supra as to similar misrepresentations in current 
practice. 
253. 392 U.S. at 29. 
254. See note 76 supra. 
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raises two questions: (1) Is a protective search limited to the person 
of the suspect? (2) How extensive may the patting down of the 
person be? 
In answer to the first question, it may be that some limited ex-
tension of the officer's right to act for his own protection will be 
recognized when unusual circumstances present him with no rea-
sonable alternative. The hard case involves a suspect seated in a ve-
hicle; this has been the circumstance in many police shootings.255 
The police can and do resort to special measures to protect them-
selves under these conditions: asking the suspect to get out of the 
car immediately or making a "flashlight search" of the automo-
bile. 256 However, if the suspect does not respond or if in doing so 
he appears to be reaching for something in the vehicle, prudence 
may dktate an immediate search of so much of the interior of the 
car as is accessible to the suspect. Recognition of an exception under 
these circumstances need not lead to other exceptions, such as au-
thority to search into objects carried by the suspect; in the latter 
situation, there is available the easy alternative of placing the ob-
ject 9ut qf reach of the suspect until the inquiry is completed.257 
As to the permissible extent of the patting down, the Supreme 
Court may have inadvertently suggested that more is permitted 
than is necessary. In making the point that a frisk is more than a 
"petty indignity," the Court describes in some detail the police pro-
cedures for a frisk, which include "[a] thorough search ... of the 
prisoner's arms and armpits, waistline and back, the groin and area 
about the testicles, and entire surface of the legs down to the 
feet."258 Several comment4tors, for the same reason, have supplied 
255. Bristow, Police Officer Shootings-A Tactical Evaluation, 54 J. CRIM. L.C. & 
P.S. 93 (1963). 
256, DETECTION OF CRIME 48-52. 
257. There is no reasonable basis, for example, to follow the outrageous decision 
of People v. Pugach, 15 N.Y.2d 65, 204 N.E.2d 176, 225 N.Y.S.2d 833 H964), which 
approved the search of a closed briefcase held by the suspect while he was being 
questioned in a patrol car surrounded by three policemen. An interesting discussion 
of why the court may have dealt with the case in this way is given in Schwartz, supra 
note 208, at 437-39. The New York statute, which was not the basis of the Pugach 
holding, permits only search of the "person" [N.Y. CODE CRIM PRQC, § 180a (1958)], and 
New York police have been advised that "if the suspect is carrying an object such as 
a handbag, suitcase, sack, etc. which may conceal a weapoµ, the officer should not 
opeii that item, but should see that it i~ placed out of reach of the suspect so that its 
presence will not represent any immediate danger to the officer." New York State 
Combined Council of Law Enforcement Officials, Memorandum Re: The "Stop-and• 
Frisk" and "Knock, Knock" Laws, Jt1ne 1, 1964, reprinted in PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION 
ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISfRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: THE 
POLICE 38, 40 (1967). Compare the ALI MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE 
§ 2.02 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1966), which would also allow search of the suspect's "im• 
mediate surroundings." 
258. 292 U.S. at 17 n.18, quoting Priar & Martin, Searching and Disarming Crimi• 
nals, 45 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 481 (1954). 
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equally distressing descriptions.259 Unfortunately, however, the 
Court and the commentators have failed to Iiote that the procedures 
being described are those used after arrest and before the arrested 
person is taken to the station,260 a situation in which the need is 
quite different than in the context of a field interrogation. 
The limited search permitted by Terry, it is important to re-
member, is to find weapons "for the assault of [sic] the police offi-
cer,"261 not merely to find weapons; thus there is no reason to cover 
every square inch of the suspect's body. The need is only to find im-
plements which could readily be grasped by the suspect during the 
brief face-to-face encounter, not to uncover items which are cleverly 
concealed and which could be brought out only with considerable 
delay and difficulty. By contrast, the on-the-scene search of a person 
who has been arrested and who is to be transported to the station 
(often unwatched in the rear of a police van), is also frequently re-
ferred to as a "frisk,"262 but must be more extensive because the ar-
restee may well have an opportunity to get his hands on a carefully 
concealed weapon. The difference between the two situations is ap-
preciated by the police, who normally pat down only around the 
armpits and pockets during a stopping for irivestigation263 but make 
a more detailed search after arrest.264 
C. The Exclusionary Rule 
Some commentators have suggested that the practice of conduct-
ing protective searches incident to a stopping for investigation ought 
to be dealt with by rather unusual applications of the exclusionary 
rule. One proposal is that nothing, not even a weapon, found in a 
frisk should be admissible in evidence.265 The rationale of this pro-
posal apparently starts with the premise that police will frisk when 
they think they are in danger whatever the law reads, and therefore 
259. See, e.g., Oberman & Finkel, Constitutional Arguments Against "Stop and 
Frisk", 3 CRIM. L. BULL, 441; 462 (1967), and Comment, Stop and Frisk: Dilemma for 
the Courts, 41 S. CAL. L. REv. 161, 167 n.41 (1967), both quoting J. MOYNIHAN, POLICE 
SEARCHING PROCEDURES 7 (1963); Schwartz, supra note 208, at 435-36, quoting from the 
record in People v. Hoffman, 24 App. Div. 2d 497, 261 N.Y.S.2d 651 (1965). 
260. Both Priar & Martin, supra note 258, and J. MOYNAHAN, supra note 259, make 
it absolutely clear that the procedures described are for use when a suspect has been 
placed under arrest. People v. Hoffman, 24 App. Div. 2d 497, 261 N.Y.S.2d 651 (1965), 
involved a case in which the officer frisked prior to taking two suspects to the station. 
261. 392 U.S. at 29. 
262. E.g., DETECTION OF CRL'\!E 123. This has undoubtedly contributed to the 
confusion over what was being discussed in the materials cited in note 260 supra. 
26!!. Pilcher, The Law and Practice in Field Interrogation, 58 J. CRIM. L.C. 8: P.S. 
465, 488 (1967). 
264. DETECTION OF CRIME 141, 144. 
265. W. SCHAEFER, THE SUSPEar .AND SOCIETY 43 (1967); Comment, Selective Deten-
tion and the Exclusionary Rule, 34 U. CHI. L. REv. 158, 166 (1966). 
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it would be best to acknowledge that they may lawfully do so; but, 
so the argument goes, frisking can best be confined to this purpose 
if self-protection is the only benefit to be derived.266 Terry, of course, 
amounts to a rejection of this view, since the Court held that the 
weapon was admissible in evidence. 
A more reasonable theory is that only weapons should be ad• 
missible because only weapons are the proper objects of a protec• 
tive search. 267 This, of course, would be a significant departure from 
existing law; for under what might be called the "serendipity doc-
trine," contraband not sought but discovered during a properly 
limited search may be seized and is admissible in evidence.268 Many 
who would not question the wisdom of this rule in other contexts 
would refuse to apply it to frisks because the dangers of police mis-
use of this power seem to be so substantial that the temptation to 
feign justification for the seizure of other items on stop-and-frisk 
grounds should be removed. 
It is unclear just how great this danger of abuse actually is;269 
therefore, it might be well to reserve judgment on this proposal un-
til we have had more experience under the newly recognized stop-
and-frisk power. It may be that the Supreme Court wished to leave 
266. This would not discourage all searches for purposes other than self-protection, 
however, since many are undertaken without any intent to prosecute. See Schwartz, 
Stop and Frisk (A Case Study in Judicial Control of the Police), 58 J. CRIM. L.C. &: 
P.S. 4!l3, 462 (1967). Cf. the Administration's proposed (but unpassed) Crime Control 
Act which allows the President to authorize the use of electronic surveillance in any 
situation where he feels it is neccessary to protect national security, but forbids introduc-
tion of information obtained through such surveillance as evidence "in any trial, 
hearing, or other proceeding" unless the surveillance was "reasonable." Proposed Crime 
Control Act, H.R. 5037, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. tit. 3, § 2511 (3) (1968), reprinted in !l6 
U.S.L.W. 109, 114 Gune 25, 1968). 
267. Schoenfeld, The "Stop and Frisk" Law Is Unconstitutional, 7 SYRACUSE L. REV. 
627, 640 (1966); Note, Probable Cause Held Not Requisite for Stop and Frisk, 39 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1093, 1098 (1964). See also the remarks of Professor Yale Kamisar and 
Mr. Harris Steinberg, 1966 ALI PROCEEDINGS 140-42, 166-67, proposing such an exclu-
sionary rule for MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § 2.02(5), supra note 22. 
At the oral argument of the Sibron case, Justice Fortas inquired of counsel whether 
a distinction could be drawn between admission of a weapon and admission of, for 
example, narcotics, but counsel for appellant responded that no such distinction could 
be made. 2 CRIM. L. REP. 2213, 2214 (1967). 
268. In Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947), the Supreme Court permitted 
seizure of contraband incident to an arrest unrelated to the presence of that contra-
band. Abel v. United States, !162 U.S. 217, 238 (1960), arguably established the even 
broader proposition that the fruits and instrumentalities of any crime are subject to 
seizure if found in a search for items related to the purpose of the arrest. 
Cf. the situation in which a search is made under the authority of a proper war• 
rant: many courts have interpreted Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192 (1927), as 
barring seizure of any items not named in the warrant. This hardly seems sound, 
because it discourages officers from resorting to search warrants. See LaFave, Search and 
Seizure: "The Course of True Law ••. Has Not ••• Run Smooth," 1966 U. ILL. L.F. 
255, 274-77. 
269. The decided New York cases on stop and frisk are not encouraging. See 
Schwartz, supra note 266, at 44!l. 
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the question of the applicability of the exclusionary rule completely 
open; at least, it is difficult to find any other explanation for the 
Court's otherwise questionable disposition of the Peters case.270 Pe-
ters, it will be recalled, involved the admissibility of burglar's tools. 
Notwithstanding the fact that three state courts had already dealt 
with the case in terms of stop and frisk and that the evidence avail-
able to the officer was no greater than that which the Court had 
found inadequate for arrest on other occasions,271 the Supreme Court 
concluded that the officer had arrested Peters and had done so on 
sufficient evidence. 
VII. FIELD INTERROGATION AND IDENTIFICATION 
A street encounter such as that in Terry, the Court acknowl-
edged, is for the purpose "of investigating possibly criminal behav-
ior,"272 and the usual means of investigation is questioning of the 
suspect, long referred to by police as "field interrogation."278 Expe-
rience has shown that suspects questioned under these circumstances 
rarely make a direct admission of guilt,274 but it is even more unu-
sual for a suspect to offer no response at all.275 Typically, the suspect 
either provides an explanation of his actions which satisfies the of-
ficer, or else gives an account which adds to the prior suspicion and 
thus, in many cases, presents the officer with a situation in which he 
may make a lawful arrest.276 
270. Unless it is that disposition of the case on stop-and-frisk grounds would have 
required consideration of the difficult question of whether it was proper for the officer, 
once he removed the opaque envelope from Peters' pocket, to open the envelope to see 
what was inside. See Schwartz, supra note 266 at 441-42. 
271. Cf. Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98 (1959). Justice Harlan, citing Henry, 
objected to the result in Peters: "I find it hard to believe that if Peters had made 
good his escape and there were no report of a burglary in the neighborhood, this 
Court would hold it proper for a prudent neutral magistrate to issue a warrant for his 
arrest." !192 U.S. at 76. 
272. !192 U.S. at 22. 
27!1, DETECTION OF CRIME 6. 
274. Id. at 65. In Reiss &: Black, supra note 242, at 54, it is reported that in 86% 
of all field interrogations observed in that study no admission was made by the suspect; 
but it is not made clear whether "admission" is intended to mean only a direct admis-
sion of criminal conduct or is meant to include a damaging admission through an 
unsuccessful attempt of the suspect to exonerate himself. 
Judging from the appellate cases, the most frequent admissions of guilt concern 
the suspect's possession of contraband. DETEcrioN OF CRIME 65. It is not surprising 
that this should be so, since the suspect may often believe that the officer is about 
to search him and find the contraband anyway; but it may also be true that some 
of these cases only represent instances in which the policeman has doctored the facts 
in order to justify what was in fact an illegal search. See note 126 supra. 
275. DETECflON OF CRIME 59. In Pilcher, supra note 263, at 475, it is reported that, 
of !100 field interrogations observed in Chicago, in not one instance did the suspect 
refuse to answer any questions. 
276. The suspect's explanation may be found unconvincing because it is incon-
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In other instances, the investigation involves what might be 
called "field identification." Sometimes this involves limited ques-
tioning for the purpose of discovering the name of the suspect. For 
example, an individual may be stopped because he generally resem-
bles a person, known by name, who is wanted for some past crime. 
Or, more commonly, if the suspect's name can be determined but 
nothing else is learned which tends to verify the officer's suspicions 
which led to the stopping, the officer may make a quick check with 
headquarters to determine if there are any outstanding warrants for 
that individual.277 A quite different kind of identification, not re-
quiring any questioning, is involved when the suspect is stopped at 
the scene or in the vicinity of what appears to be a just-completed 
crime. In such a case, it is the practice to hold the suspect briefly so 
that he may be viewed on the spot by those thought to be the vic-
tims or witnesses of the offense.278 
The constitutional limits upon such investigative techniques 
were not in issue in the three recent cases. No attempt at identifica-
tion was made in any of these cases, and only in Peters did the sus-
sistent with prior knowledge of the officer, because it is internally inconsistent, because 
it is inherently incredible, or because it is inconsistent with observable facts or other 
information obtained by the officer immediately thereafter. DEI'ECTION OF CRIME 68-72. 
See, e.g., United States v. Lewis, 362 F.2d 759 (2d Cir. 1966) (man carrying box near 
express terminal late at night said that he found it and that he worked near there, 
then admitted he was not so employed when the officer indicated an intention to 
check); People v. West, 144 Cal. App. 2d 214, 300 P.2d 729 (1956) (man staying within 
shadows carrying large bundle of carelessly wadded clothing claimed that clothes were 
his own and that he had just picked them up from the cleaners; some of garments 
were women's clothes and men's garments not suspect's size); Brooks v. United States, 
159 A.2d 876 (D.C. Mun. App. 1960) (men carrying console record player on street 
after dark explained that it was being taken in for repairs, but when officer asked 
about the store tags still on the record player, they claimed it was given them by a 
stranger, whom they could not describe); Commonwealth v. Lehan, 347 Mass. 197, 196 
N.E.2d 840 (1964) (suspect carrying two large boxes late at night said he had a quarrel 
with his wife and had left with his own belongings, but then said that box contained 
silverware and similar items; officer then checked with the suspect's wife and found they 
had not quarreled). 
277. Police also frequently check to see if the car that the suspect is driving has 
been reported as stolen. DETECTION OF CRIME 82. In a city with modern record-keeping 
equipment, an answer can be obtained in a minute or two. Id. The new National 
Crime Information Center (presently serving 790 police departments in 43 states, the 
District of Columbia, and Canada, with a great many more departments likely to 
become affiliated in the future) serves as a warehouse of facts on 586,000 wanted men, 
stolen cars, missing guns, and hundreds of other items bearing serial numbers, and is 
said to be responsible for 500-600 arrests or recoveries of stolen property each month. 
An officer in a stopping-for-investigation situation could radio his headquarters, where 
a teletype would be immediately sent out and relayed through one of the 62 terminals 
to a huge computer at the center which would supply the requested information 
immediately. Barr, FBI Computer Fingers Criminal in Seconds, Assoc. Press Release, 
Aug. 7, 1968. Brief detention for purposes of a quick records check has been upheld; 
e.g., People v. Anguiano, 198 Cal. App. 2d 426, 18 Cal. Rptr. 132 (1961); People v. 
Stewart, 189 Cal. App. 2d 176, 10 Cal. Rptr. 879 (1961). 
278 DETECTION OF CRIME 83. See People v. Hanamoto, 234 Cal, App. 2d 6, 44 Cal. 
Rptr. 153 (1965). 
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pect give an intelligible response; in the latter case the Court 
avoided comment by holding that a lawful arrest had occurred 
prior to the statement.279 The Court expressly disclaimed any inten-
tion of ruling upon the dimensions of police investigative authority 
at this time,280 and only Justice White, concurring in Terry, appears 
to have been willing to do more. His opinion, to the extent that it 
reflects some dissatisfaction with the majority's treatment of the 
case, seems to say this: It would not have done any harm simply to 
acknowledge that there is a right to question during a stop, for if 
there is no such right then there is no reason to permit a stop; and, 
if that is so there is no reason to allow a protective search, as we have 
done.281 This certainly makes sense, unless stops are permissible 
only to make identification (in which case Terry would make no 
sense) or may be made only on suspicion that the person is armed 
for the purpose of committing a crime (in which case the frisk alone 
would either prove or disprove the officer's suspicions). The latter 
possibility, though not inconsistent with Terry,282 is an unlikely 
one, and thus it seems that the Supreme Court will ultimately have 
to resolve several difficult issues concerning the constitutionality of 
techniques used during a temporary seizure for investigation. In do-
ing so, the Court will find itself in the uncharted territory between 
what is permitted in Terry and what is prohibited by Miranda v. 
Arizona,283 Wong Sun v. United States,284 and United States v. 
Wade.285 
A. Between Terry and Miranda 
Between Terry and Miranda lies the unanswered question of 
whether all or at least some of the fourfold warnings286-which are 
279. In the statement of facts, the Supreme Court does not even acknowledge that 
the officer asked any questions, although it is clear that he did so: "Officer Lasky ap-
prehended defendant . • • and asked him what he was doing in the building." 
People v. Peters, 18 N.Y.2d 238, 241, 219 N.E.2d 595, 597, 273 N.Y.S.2d 217, 219 (1966). 
280. In Terry there is a cautionary footnote asserting that nothing has been de-
cided about the constitutional propriety of seizure for investigation. 392 U.S. at 19 n.16. 
In Sibron and Peters, again by footnotes, the Court says it is not passing on the 
New York law and thus will not speculate upon whether the authority given there 
for the officer to "demand" an explanation involves custodial interrogation, or whether 
it contemplates an obligation to answer or some added power on the part of the 
officer if the suspect refuses to answer. 392 U.S. at 61 n.20 
281. 392 U.S. at 34-35. 
282. In Terry the Court did not discuss the right to stop, apart from the right to 
frisk, thus leaving some room for the contention that a stop should be allowed only 
when the frisk would serve both as a means of protecting the officer and as the only 
necessary investigative technique. 
283. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
284. 371 U.S. 471 (1963). 
285. 388 U.S. 218 (1967). 
286. Since squad cars are not as yet equipped with public defenders [Escobedo v. 
Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 496 (1964) (White, J., dissenting)], it may well be argued that 
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a prereqms1te to at-the-station interrogation-are required in the 
context of a temporary on-the-street seizure for investigation. Such 
a seizure, the Court instructs in Terry, occurs whenever a police 
officer accosts an individual and restrains his freedom to walk 
away,"287 while in Miranda the Court states that the warnings are 
a prerequisite to any questioning that takes place "after a person 
has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of 
action in any significant way."288 The issue, then, if it were framed 
within the structure provided by the Court, is whether one re-
strained in his freedom to walk off during a brief field interrogation 
is deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. 
Few clues to the answer of this sixty-four-dollar question are to 
be found in the sixty-four pages of the Court's opinion in Miranda. 
Perhaps, as has been suggested, this is not surprising: the pre-Mi-
randa controversy had centered on the rights of a suspect at the po-
lice station; the Court had much experience with stationhouse in-
terrogation but none with on-the-street questioning; and all four 
cases decided in Miranda involved interrogation under the "police-
dominated atmosphere" of the stationhouse.289 Much has been 
made, of course, of the Court's observation that "general on-the-
scene questioning as to facts surrounding a crime or other general 
questioning of citizens in the fact-finding process is not affected by 
our holding,"290 and the statement that "in such situations the com-
pelling atmosphere inherent in the process of in-custody interroga-
the two warnings with respect to counsel need not be given and that it is sufficient 
for the officer to tell the suspect only that he has a right to remain silent and that any 
statement he makes may be used against him. 
287. 392 U.S. at 16. 
288. 384 U.S. at 444 (emphasis added). The word "significant" is itself significant, 
as is indicated by the fact that it appeared in only one of the several statements of 
the holding in the Miranda opinion as originally released, but was later inserted as a 
part of all of the various statements of the holding. See Schwartz, supra note 266, at 
459-60 n.187. 
289. Kamisar, "Custodial Interrogation" Within the Meaning of Miranda, in CRIMI· 
NAL LAW AND THE CONSTITUTION-SOURCES AND COMMENTARIES 335 0"• Israel &: Y. 
Kamisar ed. 1968). This article contains a more detailed treatment of many of the 
recent cases raising the question of whether Miranda applies on the streets. 
The following exchange at the oral argument of the Sibron case has been reported: 
The Chief Justice then asked if a police officer detaining a suspect in his car 
could ask questions. Mr. Juviler answered that he could. 
The Chief Justice: "Without giving the Miranda warnings?" 
Mr. Juviler responded that the Miranda warnings would not necessarily have 
to be issued; the Miranda opinion strictly limited the requirements to circum-
stances involving "custodial interrogation." 
The Chief Justice pointed out that such a person would surely have his 
freedom of movement restrained. But, Mr. Juviler answered, the suspect would 
have to be restricted "in a significant way." 
2 CRIM. L. REP. 2213, 2215 (1967). 
290. 384 U.S. at 477. 
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tion is not necessarily present."291 Whether "citizens" includes "sus-
pects" is not made clear, but at least one sharp-eyed reader has 
pointed out that appended to the last-quoted statement is a footnote 
concerning questioning of a suspect.292 Those of a different persua-
sion prefer to place emphasis upon other language from Miranda 
which is directed more toward police questioning generally than 
toward questioning at the station: "there is still a general belief that 
you must answer all questions put to you by a policeman, or at least 
that it will be the worse for you if you do not.''293 
It is difficult to tell which of these or other quotations from Mi-
randa will ultimately prove to have the greatest significance, since 
Miranda gives the fifth amendment new dimensions which, by their 
nature, are far less precise than those which prevailed earlier. Under 
the "old" fifth amendment, the privilege against self-incrimination 
came into play only when there were legal sanctions for remaining 
silent, and it then could be said with confidence that the privilege 
did apply in court but did not apply to police questioning.294 How-
ever, under the Miranda version of the fifth amendment, making it 
"available outside of criminal court proceedings ... to protect per-
sons in all settings in which their freedom of action is curtailed in 
any significant way,"295 there is no litmus-paper test for determining 
what kind or degree of interference with one's freeedom of action 
brings the amendment into play. 
I. The Case Against Warnings on the Street 
If one carefully examines the reasons underlying the Court's 
concern in .l\:f iranda, there is some foundation for the contention 
that the AI iranda warnings should not be required in a street en-
counter setting. This is because the inherent circumstances and the 
oft-used techniques of stationhouse grilling are not-and in most 
instances could not be-a part of field interrogation. Consider the 
following distinctions. (1) When a suspect is questioned at the sta-
tion he has been "swept from familiar surroundings"296 and "thrust 
into an unfamiliar atmosphere"297 where the interrogator has the 
psychological advantage of selecting the locale of the questioning;298 
291. 384 U.S. at 478. 
292. Pilcher, supra note 263, at 486. 
293. 384 U.S. at 468 n.37, quoting P. DEVLIN, THE CRIMINAL PROSECUTION IN 
ENGLAND 32 (1958). 
294. E.g., 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2252 (rev. ed. 1961). 
295. 384 U.S. at 467. 
296. 384 U.S. at 461. 
297. 384 U.S. at 457. 
298. 384 U.S. at 449. 
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when questioned on the street he is neither "swept" nor "thrust" 
but is merely stopped at a place where he has chosen to be and which 
was not selected by the officer.299 (2) One questioned at the station 
has been "cut off from the outside world"800 and is alone with his 
interrogator;301 a person stopped for field interrogation remains in 
the outside world, often but not always in the view of passersby, 
and is frequently in the company of his companions during the 
questioning.302 (3) A suspect at the station is "surrounded by antag-
onistic forces"303 in a "police dominated atmosphere" ;304 the suspect 
detained on the street is confronted by few police-often only one 
and seldom more than two.305 (4) At the station the police may "in-
terrogate steadily and without relent . . . for a spell of several 
hours" ;306 field interrogations seldom extend beyond a few min-
utes. 307 (5) Questioning at the station house may result in "physical 
299. It is most unusual for the officer to require the suspect to move away from the 
place where he was stopped, and in any event the movement is likely to be to another 
place in the same general vicinity. :Moreover, when such moves are made it is usually 
for the purpose of having the suspect viewed by a victim or witness, or so that the 
officer can contact the station and request guidance or information; in these cases 
interrogation is less likely to follow. See DETEcrION OF CRIME 82-84. 
300. 384 U.S. at 445. 
301. 384 U.S. at 449. 
302. One empirical study reported these results: 
In over one-third of the [field] interrogations observed, two or more persons were 
questioned, and in about one-fifth, three or more were questioned. That the field 
interrogation is so often a confrontation between group and group places it some-
what at odds with popular stereotypes of the interrogation as an encounter 
between one or more officers and a lone suspect. 
Reiss & Black, Interrogation and the Criminal Process, 374 ANNALS 47, 52 (1967). 
303. 384 U.S. at 461. 
304. 384 U.S. at 445. 
305. The suspect will be stopped by a lone patrolman or by an officer in a patrol 
car who is likely to be alone, but-particularly in high-crime areas-may be accom-
panied by one additional officer. This fact obviously will influence techniques of 
questioning; for example: "In the absence of other patrol units to lend assistance, 
the classic technique of separating suspects for interrogation is often unavailable to 
officers in a field setting. The support and surveillance given by his fellows may well 
mitigate some of the suspect's vulnerability in such field confrontations." Reiss & 
Black, supra note 302, at 52. 
306. 384 U.S. at 451, quoting C. O'HARE, FUNDAMENTALS OF CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION 
112 (1956). 
307. On the basis of observation of about 300 field interrogations in Chicago, it 
was reported: 
The average length of time a citizen was detained by a field stop was between two 
and three minutes. One person was detained about 20 minutes until the victim 
of an armed robbery arrived and made a negative identification. One driver was 
detained for more than 45 minutes while a name check was being made. This 
delay occurred on a Friday night while there was a computer malfunction; the 
person was arrested when it was reported that his driver's license had been re-
voked. Other than these two instances a detention did not last over five or sb.: 
minutes and, of course, the overwhelming majority were much less than that. 
Pilcher, supra note 263, at 488. 
Another study reports somewhat longer times: 
About one-half of the suspects were detained for less than ten minutes and three-
fourths for less than twenty minutes. Nearly all of these persons were released in 
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brutality";308 this is most unlikely in a street setting.300 (6) Police 
questioning at the station may involve trickery, such as the "Mutt-
and-J eff" routine or confrontation of the suspect with coached or 
false accusers;310 the officer on the street is not in a position to ar-
range such subterfuges.311 (7) The possibility of unrestrained ques-
tioning at the station may influence the police to make wholesale 
arrests in the hope that one of the many suspects questioned will 
confess;312 no comparable risk exists as to street encounters, which 
typically involve an individual or small group involved in suspicious 
activity or a limited number of individuals near the scene of a re-
cently committed crime. These are all differences of some impor-
tance, and they support the view that field interrogation need not 
be governed by the same restraints as station-house questioning. 
It is true, of course, as Professor Kamisar has cautioned,313 that 
we should not mistake the "advocacy" in the Miranda opinion for 
its scope. The Court, by presenting this parade of horribles, cer-
tainly did not mean to say that Miranda applies only when it can be 
shown that one or more of these evils was present. It would be ab-
surd, for example, to contend that the police may question at the 
station without the warnings if they are careful to avoid use of any 
force, tricks, ovenvhelming numbers, or the like.314 But it is quite 
another matter to suggest that this "advocacy" in Miranda may pro-
vide a clue as to whether similar fifth amendment protections are 
required in the context of a quite different kind of police procedure. 
l\firanda should be extended to field interrogations, it is submitted, 
only if there is a "potentiality for compulsion"315 in such encounters. 
the field setting. Over nine-tenths of the suspects were detained less than forty 
minutes; nevertheless, about 5 per cent were detained an hour or more before 
the police made a decision to book or release. 
Reiss &: Black, supra note 302, at 52. These latter statistics are probably not an accu-
rate indication of what is herein referred to as on-the-street or field interrogation, 
since they include instances of questioning on the way to the station and upon 
arrival there. 
308. 384 U.S. at 446. 
309. The various empirical studies-e.g., DETECTION OF CRIME, Pilcher, supra note 
263; and Reiss &: Black, supra note 302-report no instances in which force was used 
in a street encounter to make the suspect talk. Also, force is generally not necessary to 
make the indhidual stop, Pilcher, supra note 263, at 473, and thus it cannot be said 
that suspects are being questioned after having been physically seized. 
!110. 384 U.S. at 452-53. 
311. This is because of the brief length of the inquiry, see note 307 supra, and the 
circumstances of the inquiry, see notes 299, 302, & 305 supra. 
312. 384 U.S. at 482-83 n.53. 
313. Kamisar, supra note 289, at 337. 
314. For one thing, requiring a showing of abusive practices would bring us right 
back to the problem we started with: "A gap in our knowledge as to what in fact 
goes on in the interrogation rooms." 384 U.S. at 448, 
315. 384 U.S. at 457. 
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And in determining whether there is this potentiality, it is quite 
logical to contrast the range of possible police action on the street 
with the available statiorthouse practices condemned in the Miranda 
decision. 
This is not to imply that Miranda can somehow be read as if it 
were limited to station-house questioning of those under formal 
arrest. The Court, "understandably reaching out to protect its 
flanks,"316 provided a broader definition of custodial interrogation 
in order to guard the fifth amendment from ready manipulation 
by the police; Miranda cannot be evaded by using sleight-of-hand 
in the booking process or by moving the "squeal room" out of the 
police station. However, these and similar end runs around the Mi-
randa requirements can be thwarted effectively without extending 
those requirements to street encounters. Instances of field interroga-
tion are readily distinguishable from the various "custodial interro-
gation" situations, including both at-the-station questioning and 
any substantial equivalents arranged by the police. 
2. The Irrelevance of Custody If Miranda Applies on the Street 
If the above view does not prevail, then it would seem that the 
Miranda warnings should be required in all police-suspect street en-
counters involving questioning, without regard to whether the sus-
pect could be said to be "deprived of his freedom of action in any 
significant way." That is, the only distinction to be made is between 
those instances in which a general inquiry (for example, "What 
happened?") is made to witnesses,317 and those in which an individ-
ual is called upon to inculpate or exculpate himself (for example, 
"What are you doing here?" or "Where did you get that prop-
erty?").318 In the latter instances the warnings should be required 
whether or not there is "custody," a "seizure," or an "arrest." This 
is so because there are two very good reasons for not trying to distin-
guish between those cases in which the suspect has been temporarily 
316. Kamisar, supra note 289, at 382. 
317. As indicated in the text following, the "potentiality for compulsion" in an 
on-the-street setting does not seem to be significantly affected by whether or not there 
is custody or whether the restraint is of a particular degree (temporary seizure v. 
arrest). What is important is the fact that questions are being asked by a police officer 
(see the statement from Miranda quoted in the text at note 293 supra), and thus it is 
appropriate to consider the nature of the questions asked in determining whether the 
situation is a suspect-officer confrontation. If it is not, then the Miranda warnings 
are not called for, as a contrary rule "would venerate form over the substance of 
sound relations between police and citizens in a large community • . . • The police 
talk to too many people in the course of a day to make warnings compulsory every 
time they inquire into a situation." Allen v. United States, 390 F.2d 476, 479 (D.C. Cir. 
1968). 
318. But not necessarily "Who are you?" See text accompanying note 345 infra. 
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seized in the Terry sense, and quite similar situations on each side: 
questioning on the street unaccompanied by such a temporary seiz-
ure; and questioning on the street after the incident has developed 
to the point of arrest. First of all, if it is concluded that Miranda ap-
plies even when the seven circumstances listed above319 are not pres-
ent, then the fact that the suspect was in some sense "deprived of his 
freedom of action" becomes insignificant in terms of the "potential-
ity for compulsion";320 the dominant factor then is that questions 
were being put to a suspect by a police officer. Second, any attempt 
to draw distinctions among these three situations would involve po-
lice and reviewing courts with nits that are best left unpicked; there 
is no reasonable and readily identifiable basis by which the distinc-
tions may be made. 
The strength of these two reasons becomes apparent when a crit-
ical examination is made of the various criteria which courts and 
commentators have suggested or adopted for purposes of determin-
ing the reach of Afiranda in on-the-street situations. Assume these 
facts: defendant enters a small clothing store and, when he believes 
the proprietor is not watching, grabs several articles of clothing off 
the counter and runs out of the store. As he leaves, he hears the pro-
prietor call to him to stop and then direct a clerk to call the police. 
Defendant trots down the street carrying the large bundle of cloth-
ing carelessly wadded together, and when he sees a police car ap-
proaching he tries to conceal himself in the shadows (it is eight-
thirty p.m. on a winter evening). The defendant's conduct is ob-
served by the officer, who leaves his car, walks up to the defendant, 
and says, "Just a minute there." The officer asks the defendant 
where he obtained the clothing, and the defendant answers that he 
just picked up the clothing from a cleaning establishment across the 
street. The officer then responds that the cleaners have been closed 
since six p.m., and asks the suspect-after patting him down for a 
weapon-why price tags are hanging from some of the clothes. The 
suspect then says, "I'm the one, I took the clothes from the store." 
At no point did the officer give the Miranda warnings or any vari-
ation thereof. Are any of the suspect's statements admissible? If this 
depends upon whether the suspect was at some point "deprived of 
his freedom of action in any significant way," then it will be neces-
sary to apply one of the following tests. 
(I) There has been such a deprivation when there has been a 
"seizure" under the fourth amendment, and a "seizure" of the sus-
819. See text accompanying notes 296-312 supra. 
820. 384 U.S. at 457. 
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pect at least occurred (to take the language from Terry) when the 
officer "took hold of him and patted down the outer surfaces of his 
clothing."321 This, however, is not a convincing distinction, as there 
is really nothing about the frisk which substantially changes the 
pressures on the suspect to talk; the "potentiality for compulsion" 
has not changed. And, it is somewhat anomalous to say that an offi-
cer may either question without warnings or frisk but that he may 
not do both. Why should only the suspect who might be armed and 
dangerous be cautioned? 
(2) There has been such a deprivation when the officer has 
formed an intention to arrest, that is, to take the person to the sta-
tion. This test, applied by some courts322 and rejected by others,323 
hardly makes sense in terms of the "potentiality for compulsion," 
as the uncommunicated intentions of the officer do not change the 
situation from the suspect's point of view. Also, it would be a most 
difficult test for reviewing courts to apply, as it requires a determi-
nation of the officer's state of mind regarding something he had not 
yet done.324 
(3) There has been such a deprivation when the officer has 
formed an intention to make a temporary seizure, that is, to prevent 
the suspect from leaving if he tries to do so prior to the completion 
of the questioning. This test325 has all the defects of the previous 
one.326 In addition, it is unrealistic because in most instances an 
officer will not think ahead to such a possibility; it is unnecessary to 
do so because suspects being questioned on the street ordinarily do 
not attempt to leave.327 
321. 392 U.S. at 19. 
322. United States v. Gibson, 392 F.2d 373 (4th Cir. 1968) (conclusion that custodial 
interrogation not involved based in part on fact the police "had not formed an inten-
tion to arrest [the suspect]'); State v. Intogna, 101 Ariz. 275, 419 P.2d 59 (1956) (suspect 
questioned as to killing in his front yard; conclusion that this was custodial interroga-
tion based in part on fact "the officer had no intention of letting defendant escape"). 
This is also proposed as one of several appropriate tests in N. SOBEL, THE NEW CON-
FESSION STANDARDS, MIRANDA v. AruzoNA; A LEGAL PERSPECTIVE, A PRACTICAL PERSPECTIVE 
60-61 (1966). 
323. People v. Hazel, 252 Cal. App. 2d 412, 60 Cal. Rptr. 437 (1967); People v. P. 
(Anonymous), 21 N.Y.2d 1, 233 N.E.2d 255, 286 N.Y.S.2d 225 (1967). 
324. N. SOBEL, supra note 322, at 60-61, admits that if the officer testifies at the sup-
pression hearing that the suspect was free to go, then the court must shift to an 
objective test. 
325. The test was applied in People v. Reason, 52 Misc. 2d 425, 276 N.Y.S.2d 
196 (Sup. Ct. 1966), where it was held that defendants questioned about items being 
carried were subjected to custodial interrogation because the officer did not intend to 
release them until the questioning was completed. The test was rejected in Allen v. 
United States, 390 F.2d 476 (D.C. Cir. 1968). 
326. For example, in Windsor v. United States, 389 F.2d 530 (5th Cir. 1968), the 
court said that even the officer's statement to the suspect that he was not being detained 
in any way was not conclusive. 
327. Pilcher, The Law and Practice in Field Interrogation, 58 J. CRIM. L.C. &: P.S. 
465, 475 (1967). 
November 1968] "Street Encounters" and the Constitution 103 
(4) There has been such a deprivation when the investigation 
has "focused" on the suspect, in the sense that the officer has enough 
evidence to make a lawful arrest. Although this test has been applied 
by a number of courts,328 it has no relationship to the "potentiality 
for compulsion" because it does not rest upon the situation as per-
ceived by the suspect. The "focus" approach also has been criticized 
for its logical inconsistencies: 
[W]hile the existence of probable cause may shed light on the pur-
pose of the police to evade-since presumably the more they have on 
the suspect, the more likely that their purpose is to get a confession 
-the dangers to the privilege are only indirectly related to probable 
cause. Furthermore, this application would have the anomalous re-
sult of permitting more coercive techniques to be applied to those 
apparently innocent than to those who are guilty.329 
This notion of "focus," of course, comes from the Escobedo330 case, 
but it was abandoned in J',firanda,331 and for good reason. As the 
Court pointed out in Hoffa v. United States: 
There is no constitutional right to be arrested. The police are not 
required to guess at their peril the precise moment at which they 
have probable cause to arrest a suspect, risking a violation of the 
Fourth Amendment if they act too soon, and a violation of the Sixth 
Amendment if they wait too long. Law enforcement officers are 
under no constitutional duty to call a halt to a criminal investiga-
tion the moment they have the minimum evidence to establish prob-
able cause .... 832 
The same observation could well be made concerning street en-
counters; the police should not be trapped between the fourth and 
fifth amendments. 
(5) There has been such a deprivation when the investigation 
has "focused" on the suspect, in the sense that he is the principal 
suspect with regard to a specific crime.338 Under this approach, the 
stopping of several suspects (obviously not acting in concert) near a 
328. Windsor v. United States, 389 F.2d 530 (5th Cir. 1968); People v. Ceccone, 
67 Cal. Rptr. 499 (1968); People v. Bolinski, 67 Cal. Rptr. 347 (1968); People v. Allen, 
50 Misc. 2d 897, 272 N.Y.S.2d 249 (1966); Commonwealth v. Jefferson, 432 Pa. 541, 226 
A.2d 765 (1967). The test was expressly rejected in People v. P. (Anonymous), 21 N.Y.2d 
I, 233 N.E,2d 255, 286 N.Y.S.2d 225 (1967); State v. Taylor, 437 P.2d 853 (Ore. 1968). 
329. Graham, What Is "Custodial Interrogation"?: California's Anticipatory AP· 
plication of Miranda v. Arizona, 14 UCLA L. REv. 59, 117 (1966). 
330. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964). 
331. On the significance of the curious definition of "focus" in Miranda, see 
Kamisar, supra note 289, at 338-51. 
332. 385 U.S. 293, 310 (1966). 
333. Something along these lines is suggested in Pilcher, supra note 327, at 478. 
Although somewhat ambiguous, the decisions in People v. Glover, 52 Misc. 2d 520, 276 
N.Y.S.2d 461 (Sup. Ct. 1966); People v. Reason, 52 Misc. 2d 425, 276 N.Y.S.2d 196 
(Sup. Ct. 1966), seem to rely in part on "focus" in this sense. 
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crime scene and, perhaps, the stopping of one suspect but not with 
regard to any specific known offense, would be distinguished from 
other cases. The defects in this test are essentially the same as those 
encountered with the previous standard. 
(6) There has been such a deprivation unless the suspect has 
consented to the interview. Determining whether there is consent 
in other contexts (for example, search) is difficult enough, but it 
would be particularly troublesome here. In practice, suspects do 
not ordinarily attempt to leave334 or othen'lise manifest their lack 
of consent. This tendency prompted one empirical study to conclude 
that it was not meaningful to distinguish field interrogations under-
taken with consent from those that took place without consent.335 
(7) There has been such a deprivation if the suspect believes 
that he is under arrest, that is, if he believes that the officer is going 
to take him to the station.336 This test, of course, does bear upon the 
"potentiality for compulsion," as the emphasis is upon the suspect's 
assessment of his predicament. It is questionable, however, if it is 
correct to say that on-the-street questioning becomes more compel-
ling when the suspect thinks the officer has already decided to take 
him to the station house. Just as persuasive is the contention that a 
"false exculpatory statement" is "much more tempting when it still 
seems possible to avoid arrest."337 In any event, it would be wise to 
avoid the formulation of rules to guide the police which speak in 
terms of what someone else is thinking, for such rules would "place 
upon the police the burden of anticipating the frailties or idiosyn-
cracies of every person whom they question."338 
(8) There has been such a deprivation if the suspect believes that 
he is presently detained, in the sense that the officer would not per-
mit him to go until the interview is completed.339 This presents es-
sentially the same problems as the previous test. 
(9) There has been such a deprivation if the suspect reasonably 
334. Pilcher, supra note 327, at 473. 
335. DETECTION OF CRIME 17: 
[I]t is not meaningful in practice to attempt to distinguish between field inter-
rogation with consent and that which takes place without consent. In high-crime 
areas, particularly, persons who stop and answer police questions do so for a 
variety of reasons, including a willingness to cooperate with police, a fear of 
police, a belief that a refusal to cooperate will result in arrest, or a combination 
of all three. 
336. This test was applied in People v. Ceccone, 67 Cal. Rptr. 499 (App. Ct. 1968) 
(alternative ground): it was rejected in People v. P. (Anonymous), 21 N.Y.2d 1, 
233 N.E.2d 255, 286 N.Y.S.2d 225 (1967). 
337. Graham, supra note 329, at 86. 
338. People v. P. (Anonymous), 21 N.Y.2d 1, 9-10, 233 N.E.2d 255, 260, 286 N.Y.S.2d 
225, 233 (1967). 
339. The test apparently was used as an alternative ground of decision in State v. 
Intogna, 101 Ariz. 275, 419 P.2d 57 (1966). 
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believes that he is under arrest, that is, that the officer plans to take 
him to the station.340 In terms of the "potentiality for compulsion," 
this test would do only rough justice, since the person who honestly 
but unreasonably thinks he is under arrest has been subjected to 
precisely the same custodial pressures as the person whose belief in 
this regard is reasonable. It could be argued, of course, that such a 
sacrifice must be made because of the difficulties of proof when a 
subjective test is used; here the question involves the "reasonable 
man," long an object of scrutiny by courts.841 It again seems doubt-
ful, however, whether the suspect who believes (now reasonably) 
that he is under arrest is under any greater compulsion to talk then 
the suspect who thinks he still has an opportunity to talk the officer 
out of deciding to arrest him. Finally, shifting from a subjective to 
objective test still does not put the officer in a position in which he 
can determine whether the suspect has such a belief. Whether the 
suspect has a reasonable belief is to be judged by the facts as they 
reasonably appear to him, which means that under this test the offi-
cer would have to know what the suspect thinks the officer knows in 
order to determine when the warnings must be given.342 In the ear-
lier hypothetical, for example, the suspect might have believed that 
the officer knew about the theft and approached to arrest him, as the 
suspect was aware that the shopkeeper had called the police and 
might have thought that the squad car had appeared in response to 
that call.843 
(10) There has been such a deprivation if the suspect reasonably 
believes that he is presently detained, in the sense that the officer 
would not permit him to go until the interview is finished.344 The 
problems here are basically the same as with the previous test. 
None of these tests, it is submitted, provides a sound basis for 
determining the reach of Miranda in an on-the-street setting. Some 
of them rest upon facts which neither police nor reviewing courts 
340. The test was applied in People v. P. (Anonymous), 21 N.Y.2d 1, 233 N.E.2d 
255, 286 N.Y.S.2d 225 (1967); see Kamisar, supra note 289, at 362. 
341. This is not to suggest that courts would have an easy time under "a 'reasonable 
belief' test." See People v. P. (Anonymous), 21 N.Y.2d 1,233 N.E.2d 255,286 N.Y.S.2d 225 
(1967), where the majority says that the suspect would not have reasonably believed 
he was under arrest, since he did not know that his accomplice was in custody and 
had implicated him; the dissent, on the other hand, says reasonable belief arose 
as soon as the officers asked if he knew the boy who in fact was his accomplice. 
342. For an excellent illustration of this conundrum, see Kamisar, supra note 340, 
at 378 n.6. 
343. Apparently the officer cannot overcome this dilemma by telling the suspect 
that he is not under arrest, because of the possibility that a reasonable man might 
not believe the officer. See Windsor v. United States, 389 F.2d 530 (5th Cir. 1968), 
and the discussion of this case in Kamisar, supra note 340, at 371-72. 
!!44. This approach was used in People v. Hazel, 252 Cal. App. 2d 412, 60 Cal. Rptr. 
437 (1967). 
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could readily determine, while others involve distinctions which 
really do not relate to the "potentiality for compulsion'' involved. 
Thus, one is led to conclude either that Miranda should not apply 
to street encounters at all, or else that Miranda should be applied to 
all such encounters which involve questioning an individual about 
his mm conduct.345 There is no rational middle ground. Once the 
former position is rejected, it must be admitted that whatever com-
pulsion is present in an on-the-street setting stems not from minor 
changes in the nature of the restraint but rather from the fact 
that "there is still a general belief that you must answer all questions 
put to you by a policeman, or at least that it will be the worse for 
you if you do not.''346 
3. The Significance of Refusal To Answer 
If a suspect is properly stopped for purposes of field interroga-
tion, but he refuses to answer any questions, what significance may 
be attached to such a refusal? Justice White, concurring in Terry, 
declared that "refusal to answer furnishes no basis for arrest."347 If 
this means that the individual's refusal to respond, in and of itself, 
does not constitute grounds for arresting him for the crime sus-
pected, it is beyond question that Justice White is correct.348 It is 
345. It has been suggested that "there may be a distinction between eliciting a 
name and address, and seeking an account of a man's behavior. As to the latter, 
there can be no doubt that the privilege can be claimed. One must closely consider, 
however, whether or not a suspect may refuse on constitutional grounds to supply 
his name and address. This inquiry is especially important because identification of 
individuals is apparently the basic justification of a detention." Abrams, Constitu• 
tional Limitations on Detention for Investigation, 52 IowA L. REv. 1093, 1115-16 (1967). 
That author goes on to suggest that Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966), 
supports such a distinction: 
[T]he Court suggested that certain identification techniques, such as fingerprinting 
and photographing, might be valid. A suspect is not likely to be more damaged 
by supplying name and address than by being fingerprinted and photographed, 
all of which may lead the prosecution to valuable testimony. Therefore, judging 
by the Court's action in Schmerber, a suspect possibly would not be permitted 
to refuse to give his name and address to police officers. 
Abrams at 1117. Also relevant to the problem are the more recent cases of United 
States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967), holding that it is not a violation of the defendant's 
privilege against self-incrimination to be required to speak a phrase uttered to the 
victim by a robber, and Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967), holding that there 
was not fifth amendment violation in the taking of a handwriting exemplar. See also 
Clark v. States, 240 A.2d 291 (Md, Ct. App. 1968) holding that it is not a violation 
of Miranda to ask defendant his name, address and place of employment for pur-
poses of booking, when he has been given the warnings but has indicated that he 
wanted to consult with counsel; and that the "fruits" of the answers-location of 
the stolen good as the place of employment-are therefore admissible). 
346. P. DEVLIN, THE CRIMINAL PROSECUTION IN ENGLAND 32 (1958), quoted in Miranda 
v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 468 n.37 (1966). 
347. 392 U.S. at 34-35. 
348. See, e.g., State v, Gibbs, 252 Wis. 227, 31 N,W.2d 143 (1948). 
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also probably unconstitutional to make refusal to answer questions 
put by a police officer a crime.349 But it does not necessarily follow 
that the suspect's refusal must be ignored completely by the officer; 
it might be argued that refusal to answer is one factor which the 
officer may consider, together with the evidence which gave rise to 
his prior suspicion, in determining whether there are grounds for 
an arrest.350 
In the pre-Miranda era, the majority of courts concluded that 
the suspect's refusal to answer could be taken into account in this 
way,351 although a few jurisdictions held that "no adverse inference 
may be drawn" from a refusal to respond.352 Whether Miranda calls 
for a different result remains unclear; as noted above, the applica-
tion of :M.iranda to street encounters is still an open question. If it 
is ultimately determined that Miranda warnings must be given on 
the street, it seems to follow that the officer may attach no signifi-
cance to the suspect's refusal to respond. Where the officer has ad-
vised the suspect that he may remain silent, the suspect's acceptance 
349. See DETEcnoN OF CRIME 62-64; Amsterdam, Federal Constitutional Restrictions 
on the Punishment of Crimes of Status, of General Obnoxiousness, Crimes of Dis-
pleasing Police Officers, and the Like, 3 CRIM. L. BuLL. 205, 226-28 (1967); Schwartz, 
Stop and Frisk (A Case Study in Judicial Control of the Police), 58 J. CRIM. L.C. &: 
P.S. 433, 459 (1967). 
350. Under the Uniform Arrest Act, appearing in INTERSTATE COMMN. ON CRIME, 
INn:RSTATE CRIME CONTROL 86-89 (1942), such refusal is grounds for an additional brief 
detention. Under the MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § 202(6) (Tent. 
Draft No. 1, 1966), refusal to answer is expressly recognized as a proper factor in the 
arrest decision. The N.Y. CODE CRIM. PRoc. § 180a (1958) says only that the officer 
may "demand" such information, but does not indicate what significance is to be 
attached to the suspect's failure to accede to the demand. However, the New York 
police have been advised that "the suspect's refusal to answer shall not be con-
sidered as an element by the officer in determining whether or not there is a basis 
for an arrest." New York State Combined Council of Law Enforcement Officials, 
Memorandum re: The "Stop-and-Frisk" and "Knock, Knock" Laws, June 1964, 
reprinted in PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF 
JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: THE PouCE 38, 40 (1967). The reasoning behind this 
advice is described in Kuh, In-Field Interrogation: Stop, Question, Detention and 
Frisk, 3 CRIM. L. BULL. 597, 613 (1967). 
351. E.g., People v. Simon, 45 Cal. 2d 645, 290 P .2d 531 (1955); People v. Romero, 156 
Cal. App. 2d 48, 318 P.2d 835 (1957); Gisske v. Sanders, 9 Cal. App. 13, 98 P. 43 (1908); 
Baines v. Brady, 122 Cal. App. Supp. 957, 265 P.2d 194 (1953); Dickerson v. United 
States, 120 A.2d 588 (D.C. Mun. Ct. 1965); Harrer v. Montgomery Ward, 124 Mont, 295, 
221 P .2d 428 (1950). 
352. Poulas v. United States, 95 F.2d 412, 413 (9th Cir. 1938). Some courts have 
supported the right of the police to stop and question on the supposition that refusal 
to answer cannot in any way adversely affect the suspect. For example, in United 
States v. Bonanno, 180 F. Supp. 71, 86 n.21 (S.D.N.Y. 1960), the court said: "It must 
be borne in mind that the defendants in this case had a constitutional right to 
remain silent when questioned by police or other investigatory agents or bodies, but 
they chose not to do so. Had they chosen such a course, they would have suffered 
no penalty." See also the similar dicta in Green v. United States, 259 F.2d 180 (D.C. 
Cir. 1958); Brooks v. United States, 159 A.2d 876 (D.C. Mun. Ct. 1960). 
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of this advice cannot be regarded as tending to show anything con-
cerning his possible guilt or innocence.858 
But if the Miranda warnings are neither required nor given, it 
seems appropriate for the investigating officer to take account of the 
suspect's silence when questioned. As one commentator has noted: 
It may be said that a man has . . . the constitutional right . . . to 
refuse to answer incriminating questions, so that his refusal to 
answer is not a circumstance of suspicion. But this would appear 
to be too legalistic a view, for innocent people do in fact help the 
police in their inquiries .... After all, the policeman is not trying 
the guilt of the accused, but is only making an administrative deci-
sion whether to arrest.s54 
This is not to suggest that no innocent person would refuse to re-
spond; some do refuse,355 but common sense suggests that such re-
fusals are more likely when the person questioned is guilty.850 The 
Supreme Court has made it clear that the arrest decision involves a 
common-sense judgment which may take into account facts which 
would not be admissible in evidence: "[i]n dealing with probable 
cause ... we deal with probabilities. These are not technical; they 
are the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which 
reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians act."857 
In practice, very few suspects stopped for field interrogation re-
fuse to respond,358 so that the ultimate resolution of this issue may 
353. Cf. People v. Ellis, 65 Cal. 2d 529, 421 P.2d 393, 55 Cal. Rptr. 385 (1966), 
where officers advised the defendant of his right to remain silent and defendant then 
refused to speak for purposes of a voice identification. This refusal was admitted 
as evidence at trial, but on appeal this was held to be error on the ground that 
even though such a refusal is not covered by the fifth amendment, it was the direct 
result of the police warning that he could remain silent and thus was not an 
indication of guilt. 
The same situation would be present even without the warnings if the suspect 
were to claim the privilege in refusing to say anything. "The express claim of the 
privilege would explain the failure to deny the accusation thus destroying the infer-
ence which would otherwise be raised." Remington, Police Investigation and the 
Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 26 WIS. B. BULL. 7, 64 (Dec. 1953). 
354. Williams, Arrest for Felony at Common Law, 1954 CRIM. L. REv. 408, 413. 
355. DETECTION OF CRIME 60: 
It is probable that innocent persons may sometimes be indignant at the accusa-
tion necessarily implicit in a field interrogation and therefore refuse to cooperate. 
In addition, persons with generally antagonistic attitudes toward the police may 
occasionally decide to defy the police. To such persons, arrest may be preferable 
to cooperating with the police. 
356. Similarly, common sense suggests that one who flees a police officer is more 
likely guilty, though obviously some innocent persons may panic and flee. Courts 
have recognized flight as a factor; see e.g., United States v. One 1951 Cadillac Coupe, 
139 F. Supp. 475 (E.D. Pa. 1956); but cf. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 
483 n.10 (1963), and Broeder, Wong Sun v. United States: A Study in Faith and Hope, 
42 NEB. L. REV. 483, 494 n.40 (1963). 
357. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949). 
358. DETECTION OF CRIHE 59; Pilcher, supra note 327, at 475. 
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be of less than major importance. It has also been suggested that 
there is little to be gained from recognizing refusal to answer as a 
factor, because "an officer who has so little probable cause to make 
an arrest that the refusal of a person to answer his questions will 
swing the decision one way or the other, in all likelihood has a pretty 
weak arrest to begin with."359 It would be a "weak arrest," of course, 
in the sense that no rational prosecutor would go to trial on such 
facts, but to test an arrest in this way inappropriately confuses the 
functions of arrest and charging.360 An arrest sometimes serves as 
the invocation of the criminal process, in that it is a means of gain-
ing control over the person of an individual who is to be prosecuted; 
but it may also serve to facilitate an investigation which would not 
be possible without custody of the suspect. 861 Thus, if a suspect is 
stopped because he resembles a man named X who was responsible 
for a crime, an arrest following that suspect's refusal to indicate 
whether he is or is not X362 is not "weak"--custody of the suspect 
will make identification possible. Similarly, if a suspect is stopped 
because of suspicious activity with respect to property in his posses-
sion863 and he refuses to offer an explanation for his actions, arrest 
is not "weak" in that it provides a lawful basis for seizure of the 
property, which may then be checked against the stolen property 
file. 
B. Between Terry and Wong Sun 
Few Supreme Court decisions have caused as much confusion864 
as that delightful Chinese puzzle, Wong Sun v. United States.365 The 
case arose when federal narcotics agents, without probable cause, 
broke into Blackie Toy's laundry, pursued him into the bedroom 
359. Pilcher, supra note 327, at 475. 
360. See ARREST ch. 15. 
361. The investigative techniques made possible by arrest are discussed in ARREST 
at 308·16. 
362. In terms of the application of Miranda and the requirement of warnings, 
this may be a special case. See note 345 supra. 
363. This is the most common field interrogation situation. DETECTION OF CRIME 28. 
364. See Broeder, supra note 356; Note, Constitutional Law: Probable Cause for 
Arrest Without Warrant, 51 CALIF. L. REv. 637 (1963); Recent Decision, Evidence-
Defendant's Statement Made Immediately After His Illegal Arrest and Narcotics 
Received from a Third Party as a Result of Such a Statement Are Inadmissible into 
Evidence and Will Not Serve To Corroborate a Confession in a Federal Criminal 
Proceeding, 51 GEO. L.J. 838 (1963); Recent Decision, Constitutional Law-Fourth 
Amendment Bans Use of Voluntary Statement Made During Illegal Arrest, 31 GEO. 
WASH, L. REV. 851 (1963); The Supreme Court, 1962 Term, 77 HARV. L. REV. 54, 117 
(1963); Note, Criminal Law-Confessions-Admissibility of Corroborative Evidence, 
42 N.C. L. REv. 219 (1963); Comment, Admissibility of Evidence-the Exclusionary 
Rule Under the Fourth Amendment, 2 WASHBURN L.J. 292 (1963). 
365. 371 U.S. 471 (1963). 
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where his wife and child were sleeping, arrested and handcuffed him, 
and then searched him and his premises, but found no narcotics. Toy 
was then questioned; he denied having sold narcotics but admitted 
knowing one Yee, who he said had done so. The officers subse-
quently apprehended Yee, who surrendered a quantity of narcotics 
to them, saying that he had obtained them from none other than 
Blackie Toy. On these facts the Supreme Court held that Toy's 
statement and the narcotics uncovered thereby could not be admit-
ted into evidence against him. The reasoning of the Court, how-
ever, was far from clear. The Court first indicated that it was 
handling the case as it would a search case because "the policies un-
derlying the exclusionary rule [do not] invite any logical distinction 
between physical and verbal evidence."366 If this is the crux of the 
case, Wong Sun-contrary to the then-existing weight of authority 
at both the state and federal levels367-stands for the proposition 
that confessions or damaging admissions elicited from an illegally 
arrested person are to be excluded in the same way as tangible evi-
dence uncovered following an illegal arrest. But the Court went on 
to say that the oppressive circumstances present made it "unreason-
able to infer that Toy's response was sufficiently an act of free 
will,"368 leaving open the possibility that Wong Sun actually rests 
upon the conclusion that Toy's admission was coerced. 
Despite some early confusion about the applicability of Wong 
Sun-whatever it stands for-to state proceedings,869 it now seems 
clear that Wong Sun is constitutionally grounded and thus binding 
on the states.370 It is of some importance, therefore, to consider the 
possible significance of the case in the context of field interrogations 
and identifications. 
I. Temporary Seizure on Insufficient Evidence 
Assume that a suspect is "seized" on the street for purposes of 
field interrogation, but that the officer has acted on less than suffi-
cient evidence-less evidence than is required to make the seizure 
366. 371 U.S. at 486. 
367. See Kamisar, Illegal Searches or Seizures and Contemporaneous Incriminating 
Statements: A Dialogue on a Neglected Area of Criminal Procedure, 1961 U. ILL. 
L.F. 78. 
368. 371 U.S. at 486. 
369. The confusion was engendered by language in Wong Sun v. United States, 371 
U.S. 471, 486, referring to the need for "deterring lawless conduct by federal officers" 
and "closing the doors of the federal courts" to such evidence (emphasis added). 
Moreover, the Court never cited Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
370. See Traub v. Connecticut, 374 U.S. 493 (1963), in which a remand was granted 
in light of Wong Sun; Herman, The Supreme Court and Restrictions on Police 
Interrogation, 25 Omo ST. L.J. 449, 459 (1964). 
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"reasonable" under the Terry approach, or, as I have suggested, evi-
dence insufficient to meet the special probable cause test which 
should apply here. If required, the Miranda warnings are given; the 
suspect agrees to answer some questions, and proceeds to incriminate 
himself. Should this statement be admissible? Or, if the suspect's 
statement puts the officer "over the top" as to the evidence needed 
for arrest, and physical evidence is found in a search incident to 
that arrest, should such evidence be excluded as the "fruits" of a 
statement made while the suspect was illegally seized? 
In the absence of any indication from the Supreme Court as to 
what it meant in Wong Sun (or what it now wishes the case to 
mean871), it can only be said that the answers will depend upon 
which of the following propositions accurately reflects the Court's 
primary concern in that case: (1) to deter the police from making 
illegal seizures, all evidence gained by such seizures, tangible or in-
tangible, must be excluded from evidence; or (2) to protect suspects 
from having to speak except as "an act of free will," statements (and 
their fruits) given during an unconstitutional seizure of the person 
must be excluded whenever the circumstances of the seizure might 
have deprived the suspect of his freedom to decide whether to speak 
or remain silent. That is, the answers depend upon whether Wong 
Sun is bottomed on the fourth or the fifth amendment. 
The first of these alternatives has considerable appeal. As experi-
ence in the arrest area has shown, a "narrow" exclusionary rule-
that is, one limited only to tangible evidence-restricts the develop-
ment of fourth amendment standards relating to certain situations 
commonly confronted by the police.372 Also, it is clear from pre-
Wong Sun practice that in important cases police were careful about 
the grounds for arrest when the risk was that they might "blow the 
case" by finding physical evidence on grounds insufficient to permit 
admission of that evidence, but not when they simply wanted to 
371. Consider the Court's rewriting of Escobedo in the Miranda decision by stating 
that when it said "focus" in the former case it actually meant "custody," Miranda v. 
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 n.4 (1966), notwithstanding the fact that Escobedo listed 
"focus" and "custody" side by side as separate elements. 
872. Cf. ARREsr 495.95; 
Until the recent case of Wong Sun v. United States, only physical evidence found 
incident to an arrest could be challenged. Therefore, only crimes involving 
physical evidence, such as narcotics, were likely to raise the issue of the lawful-
ness of the arrest. As a consequence there is a profusion of cases on the question 
of when information from a narcotics informant is sufficient to justify an arrest .. 
But there is little guidance on such questions as when, if ever, an officer can 
arrest one or more than one member of a group of suspects each with physical 
characteristics fitting the description given by an eyewitness, or when an officer 
can make a felony arrest on the basis of suspicious conduct which he observes. 
These questions, seldom considered, confront law eufQ:rcement officers. daily_ 
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bring a suspect in for questioning.873 Thus, exclusion of all state• 
ments made after a temporary seizure on insufficient evidence would 
have nvo advantages: it would lead to a more complete development 
of case law on when such stoppings are permissible; and it would 
result in some deterrence of such fourth amendment violations when 
the police are motivated primarily by a desire to obtain statements 
from suspects.374 One major disadvantage of this approach, however, 
would be that whenever a court found that evidence to support a 
temporary seizure was lacking, it would then have to determine 
whether the street encounter in question involved a "seizure" or was 
merely an instance of a citizen consenting to a delay in his journey 
while responding to police inquiries. As noted earlier, there is good 
reason to save courts from this difficult task.375 
The argument against the above-stated alternative, of course, is 
simply that the search cases and confession-admission cases are not 
of a kind. As one court declared well before Wong Sun: 
[T]here is lacking the essential connection between the illegal deten-
tion and the voluntary statements made during that detention that 
there is between the illegal search and the evidence obtained there-
by .... When questioned by arresting officers a suspect may remain 
silent or make only such statements as serve his interest; the victim 
of an illegal search, however, has no opportunity to select the items 
to be taken by the rummaging officer.376 
That language clearly has a pre-Miranda flavor to it, for at the heart 
of Miranda lies the notion that a suspect in custody does not neces-
sarily have the choice to "remain silent or make only such state-
ments as serve his interest." But, keeping this fact in mind, it may 
well be that if Wong Sun is actually based on the "act of free 
will" point, then that decision may have in effect been superseded 
373 . .ARREsr 430-33. 
374. Under this view of Wong Sun, even if the Miranda warnings were required 
and given, so that there arguably is no room for a compulsion argument, the 
suspect's statement would be excluded to effectuate the ban against illegal seizures. 
375. See note 117 supra and text accompanying note 335 supra. 
376. Rogers v. Superior Court of Alameda County, 46 Cal. 2d 3, 10-11, 291 P.2d 
929, 933-34 (1955). Analysis along these lines is not uncommon in the cases holding 
that Wong Sun does not mean that an illegal arrest renders inadmissible a statement 
,obtained some time later at the station. See, e.g., Rogers v. United States, 330 F.2d 
.535 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 916 (1964); Hollingsworth v. United States, 321 
F.2d 342 (10th Cir. 1963); United States v. Burke, 215 F. Supp. 508 (D. Mass. 1963), 
.afj'd, 328 F.2d 399 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 849 (1964), rehearing denied, 380 
U.S. 927 (1965); State v. Lavallee, 104 N.H. 443, 189 A.2d 475 (1963); State v. Jackson, 
43 N.J. 148, 203 A.2d I (1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 982 (1965). Contra, United States 
v. Sims, 231 F. Supp. 251 (D. Md. 1964); People v. Robinson, 13 N.Y.2d 296, 196 
NE.2d 261, 246 N.Y.S.2d 623 (1963). 
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by Miranda. That is, if Wong Sun stands for the proposition that 
there is sometimes a "potentiality for compulsion" in police custody 
and that therefore statements obtained by illegal custody must be 
excluded, it may now have given way to the broader rule in Miranda, 
which recognizes this potentiality without regard to whether the 
custody complies with the fourth amendment. 
If Wong Sun should now be interpreted in this manner, so that 
it is more of a fifth amendment case than a fourth amendment case, 
it would take its place with Escobedo as a false start on the problem 
finally resolved in Miranda. Under this theory, the only questions to 
be answered when a temporary seizure for investigation is made on 
insufficient evidence are whether the Miranda warnings are re-
quired in this context and, if so, whether they were given. Assuming 
that they are required and were given, there would be no occasion 
to apply Wong Sun since the suspect's freedom of choice would have 
been restored by the warnings; that is, the "taint" of the illegal seiz-
ure would be "dissipated" by the warnings.377 Or, assuming that the 
Court takes the view that the warnings are not required during 
street encounters because there is no "potentiality for compulsion," 
consistency again would require the conclusion that Wong Sun (un-
der its second interpretation) has no application. 
Whether Wong Sun rests upon the fourth amendment or the 
fifth amendment will also be important in those cases where the il-
legal temporary seizure for investigation bears fruit apart from the 
suspect's statements or physical evidence obtained as a consequence 
of his statements. Assume, for example, that a suspect is seized on 
insufficient evidence, immediately thereafter viewed by the victim 
of a crime just committed in the area, and identified as the perpe-
trator. Apart from the problems which would exist even if the seiz-
ure had been lawful,378 there is the question of whether the identifi-
cation (and, indeed, any subsequent identification in court by the 
victim) is the inadmissible fruit of a fourth amendment violation. 
Obviously this situation is more like a search incident to an unlaw-
ful seizure than a statement incident to unlawful custody, since the 
suspect cannot prevent the temporary seizure for investigation from 
bearing this particular fruit; thus Wong Sun may have greater vi-
tality here. It would not necessarily follow, of course, that the vie-
377. There would remain, of course, cases in which it might be argued that 
Wong Sun applies even though .Miranda does not, as where a statement is volun-
teered following an illegal seizure. 
378. Discussed in the next subsection; see text accompanying note 385 infra. 
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tim could not make an in-court identification; the issue, as in the 
more recent lineup cases, would be whether such identification was 
"not tainted ... but ... of independent origin."379 
2. "Fruits" of Failure To Give the Miranda Warnings 
If it is ultimately decided that the Miranda warnings must be 
given prior to on-the-street questioning, the following situation will 
sometimes arise: a police officer stops a suspect for purposes of in-
vestigation, having ample evidence for doing so. However, he pro-
ceeds to question the suspect without first giving him the Miranda 
warnings, and the suspect then makes certain damaging admissions. 
Taking account of these admissions, together with the evidence 
which caused the officer to stop the suspect in the first place, it is 
clear that the probable cause standard for arrest has been satisfied, 
and the officer places the suspect under arrest. A search of the sus-
pect incident to that arrest yields certain physical evidence. Is that 
evidence inadmissible on the theory that it is the "fruit" of a fail-
ure to comply with the fifth amendment requirements of Miranda? 
While the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine is well estab-
lished in cases involving fourth amendment violations,380 the tradi-
tional rule with regard to confessions and admissions has been that 
physical evidence is admissible even though found as the result of 
an inadmissible statement.381 Although such a rule may have made 
some sense during the time when the primary concern was with con-
fessions that were not trustworthy, it is clearly "constitutionally 
indefensible"382 now that statements of defendants are excluded for 
other reasons. Indeed, Wong Sun amounts to a rejection of the tra-
ditional rule if it is interpreted as a fifth amendment case: Toy's 
statement was excluded because it was not "an act of free will," and 
the narcotics uncovered by using his statement were also held to be 
inadmissible. Since the Miranda warnings are intended to ensure 
that a suspect is not compelled "to speak where he would not other-
wise do so freely,"383 it seems clear, as some courts have recently 
held, that physical evidence which is the "fruit" of a failure to give 
the Miranda warnings must be excluded.384 
379. Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 272 (1967). Cf. People v. Stoner, 65 Cal. 
2d 595, 422 P.2d 585, 55 Cal. Rptr. 897 (1967). 
380. Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920). 
381. 3 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 856-59 (3d ed. 1940). 
382. People v. Ditson, 57 Cal. 2d 415, 439, 369 P.2d 714, 727, 20 Cal. Rptr. 165, 178 
(1962). 
383. 384 U.S. at 467. 
384. This is implicit in Miranda, where it is said that unless "such warnings and 
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C. Between Terry and Wade and Its Companions 
It is also necessary to take account of the implications of the 
Court's three recent decisions dealing with certain police practices 
£or the identification of suspects. United States v. Wade385 concerned 
a lineup conducted by federal agents and consisting of the defen-
dant and five or six other prisoners; notice of the procedure was 
not given to Wade's attorney, although Wade had already been in-
dicted and counsel had been appointed. The Court held that "for 
Wade the post-indictment lineup was a critical stage of the prosecu-
tion at which he was 'as much entitled to such aid [ of counsel] ... 
as at the trial itself.' "386 The proper procedure, according to the 
Court, is to notify both the prisoner and his counsel of the impend-
ing lineup; and, even after such notice, the lineup should be held 
only when counsel is present, unless the defendant has made an in-
telligent waiver. In the companion case of Gilbert v. California, 387 
the same standard was imposed upon a state lineup, and the Court 
ruled that "the admission of . . . in-court identifications without 
first determining that they were not tainted by the illegal lineup but 
were of independent origin was constitutional error.''388 
The third case in this series is Stovall v. Denno,389 where it was 
held that the Wade doctrine would not be applied retroactively. 
This holding made it necessary £or the Court to consider the defen-
dant's other claim, namely, that the pretrial identification in this 
case was conducted in such a manner as to violate due process. Sto-
vall had been arrested on the basis of evidence found at the scene of 
a double stabbing, and was taken to the surviving victim's hospital 
room, where he was identified as the assailant. No lineup was at-
tempted; the defendant was the only Negro in the room at the time 
waiver are demonstrated by the prosecution at trial, no evidence obtained as a result 
of interrogation can be used against him," 384 U.S. at 479 (emphasis added). 
See Dowlut v. State, 235 N.E.2d 173 (Ind. 1968) (fruit of poisonous tree doctrine 
held applicable to Miranda violation, and weapon suppressed); State v. Taylor, 
421 S.W.2d 310 (Mo. 1967) (doctrine held applicable to .Miranda violation, but 
weapon admitted on ground it came from an independent source); People v. Soto, 
285 N.Y.S.2d 166 (1967) (same). As the latter two cases illustrate, courts sometimes 
have to stretch quite far to find that the physical evidence has an independent 
source when the defendant has given a confession telling where the evidence could 
be found. Such a finding, however, would seem most unlikely where the failure to 
give the Miranda warnings results in arrest and the arrest in turn results in the 
immediate finding of physical evidence on the defendant's person. 
385. 388 U.S. 218 (1967). 
386. 388 U.S. at 237. 
!187. !188 U.S. 263 (1967). 
388. 388 U.S. at 272. 
389. 388 U.S. 293 (1967). 
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and was handcuffed to a police officer; the victim was merely 
asked if the defendant "was the man." Before the Supreme Court, 
Stovall claimed that "the confrontation conducted in this case was 
so unnecessarily suggestive and conducive to irreparable mistaken 
identification that he was denied due process of law."390 The Court 
noted that the practice of showing suspects without a lineup has 
been widely condemned, but held that due process was not violated, 
considering the "totality of the circumstances," because an imme-
diate hospital confrontation between the suspect and the badly 
wounded victim was imperative. 
It is important to consider the possible impact of these decisions 
upon one kind of "field identification," that which involves tempo-
rary seizure of a suspect to take him to a nearby crime scene or to 
hold him on the spot so that he can be viewed by one or more victims 
or witnesses. This form of investigation is undertaken when the 
police are conducting a "hot" or "warm" search391 at or near the 
scene of a crime, and thus is not involved in a numerical majority of 
temporary seizures for investigation. In terms of results, however, it 
is probably true that such stops constitute a very significant police 
practice. 
I. The Due Process Issue 
In a field identification situation, it is obviously unlikely that 
the suspect will be viewed in anything resembling a lineup. Although 
in some instances the police may stop two or more suspects while 
acting on a general description and searching the area immediately 
adjacent to the scene of a just-completed crime,392 in the usual field 
identification case there will be but one suspect. Frequently, either 
a single suspect is stopped on the basis of a description too general 
to justify an arrest, or a single person is stopped because he is leaving 
the scene from which a call for police assistance has been received. 
Stovall indicates that in such a nonlineup situation the "totality of 
the circumstances" must be considered in determining whether the 
identification violates due process. 
One of the circumstances to be considered is the exigency of the 
particular situation, as reflected by the Court's emphasis in Stovall on 
the fact that the victim was seriously injured and might have died 
390. 388 U.S. at 301-02. 
391. See note 212 supra. 
392. There are other possibilities which are equally unusual, such as police 
taking both a suspect and his companion to the crime scene, e.g., State v. Sears, 182 
Neb. 384, 155 N.W.2d 332 (1967). 
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without either implicating or clearing Stovall if the identification 
had been delayed. While this kind of need can seldom be shown in 
a field identification situation, there is a substantial need for the 
police promptly to check out suspects at the crime scene. As the data 
gathered by the President's Crime Commission make clear, a crime 
committed by a person not known by name to the victims or wit-
nesses is unlikely to be cleared up by arrest of the offender unless he 
is apprehended in the immediate vicinity soon after the crime.393 
And, as the Supreme Court has recently indicated, the need for police 
"swiftly to determine whether they were on the right track" is 
"hardly less compelling than that which we found to justify the 'one-
man lineup' " in Stovall.894 
To put the matter another way, Stovall does not condemn all non-
lineup identifications, but only those which are "unnecessarily sug-
gestive."305 The Court, while expressing a preference for carefully 
conducted lineup identifications, seems to have recognized that the 
more suggestive one-man identification may sometimes be a neces-
sary police procedure.306 This obviously is so when the police have 
grounds for a temporary investigative seizure but not grounds for a 
to-the-station arrest. A full lineup-attended by the victims, wit-
nesses, the suspected offender, and his attorney-which displays sev-
eral other persons bearing some resemblance to the suspect can hardly 
be arranged within time limits that would pass muster for a "tempo-
rary" seizure. If any attempt is to be made to identify the suspect as 
the offender or to clear him, it must be done by other means.397 
393. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, 
TASK FORCE REPORT: THE POLICE 58 (1967) (emphasis added): 
In the survey, there were 1,905 crimes examined, of which 482 (25 percent) re-
sulted in arrests or other clearances. Of these, 70 percent involved arrests, 90 per-
cent of which were made by the patrol force. More than half of the arrests were 
made within eight hours of the crime, many at or near the crime scene, and 
almost two-thirds of the arrests were made within the first week after the crime. 
If a suspect is neither known to the victim nor arrested at the scene of the crime, 
the chances of ever arresting him are very slim. Of the 482 cleared cases, 63 percent 
involved "named suspects." In the 1,556 cases without named suspects, only 181 
(or 12 percent) were solved later by arrest. 
See also INsrrruTE FOR DEFENSE ANALYSIS, A REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION 
ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: SCIENCE 
AND TECHNOLOGY ch. 2, App. B (1967). 
394. Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 385 (1968). 
395. Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 302 (1967). 
396. Similarly, in Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377 (1968) the Court noted 
that there was no suggestion that the identification by photograph was "unnecessary,'' 
and emphasized that it was necessary in that the evidence against the suspects was 
inconclusive. 
397. This is not to suggest that a reviewing court should condemn a crime-scene 
identification on a finding that the officer did have grounds to arrest; as the Court 
pointed out in Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 310 (1966), "The police are not 
required to guess at their peril the precise moment at which they have probable 
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There are, to be sure, risks involved in having a suspect viewed 
outside a lineup.398 However, these risks are far less when witnesses 
can see a suspect minutes after they have seen the offender. The abil-
ity to remember details drops off sharply in the first few hours after 
an event occurs;399 thus, a "factor which has a substantial effect upon 
the reliability of an identification is the amount of time which elapsed 
between crime and identification."400 Indeed, a nonlineup identi-
fication which occurs shortly after the crime is probably more re-
liable than the most carefully conducted lineup identification days, 
weeks, or months later.401 It is not surprising, therefore, that the 
Supreme Court has concluded that there is little chance of mistake 
when the identification is made by witnesses only a day after the 
crime, "while their memories were still fresh."402 
It may be argued that a crime-scene identification is suggestive in 
the sense that if a person is brought to the scene by police shortly 
after the crime the witnesses may be willing to assume that the police 
have apprehended the right man. The fact that the police have found 
the suspect in the immediate area may have some such impact; but 
this situation may be less suggestive than police presentation of an 
individual at some later date, when the witness might assume that 
the police "certainly would not have brought him here if he were 
not the right man."403 In the latter case, the witness might assume that 
police investigation in the interim had established the guilt of that 
individual-an assumption which is less likely when the suspect is 
produced minutes after the crime. Also, many of the suggestive pro-
cedures which may be a part of a lineup at the police station simply 
cannot be arranged during a crime-scene identification.404 
For all of these reasons, it is appropriate to conclude that the 
cause to arrest a suspect." See text accompanying note 328 supra for the related 
point of why this should not be the test for when the Miranda warnings are required. 
398. See P. WALL, EYE-WITNESS IDENTIFICATION IN CRIMINAL CASES 27-40 (1965). 
399. M. BROWN, LEGAL PSYCHOLOGY 88-89 (1926); H. BURTT, LEGAL PSYCHOLOGY 
54-55 (1931). 
400. P. WALL, supra note 398, at 127. 
401. Consider the case of State v. Reeves, 20 Utah 434, 439 P.2d 288 (1968). Wit-
nesses to a theft identified the thief on the scene immediately after his apprehension, 
and the identification was beyond question in that the suspect had been found by 
the police in the immediate area with the stolen items in his possession. Four months 
later, these same witnesses picked someone else out of a lineup containing the thief. 
402. Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 385 (1968). In Biggers v. Tennessee, 
390 U.S. 404 (1968), an equally divided Court affirming, Justice Douglas noted in 
dissent this language from Simmons, and then contrasted the instant case, where 
the victim in a nonlineup identification "confronted petitioner seven months after 
the rape, and the sharpness of her recall was being severely tested." 390 U.S. at 407. 
403. H. GROSS, CRIMINAL PSYCHOLOGY 37 (1911). 
404. In United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 233-34 (1967), the Court listed the 
following suggestive procedures: everyone in lineup known to witness except for 
suspect; participants in the lineup grossly dissimilar; only suspect required to wear 
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requirements of due process may be met in a field identification of 
a person temporarily seized for purposes of such investigation 
promptly after the commission of a crime. Several recent cases sup-
port this conclusion.405 
2. The Right to Counsel Issue 
The question of whether the right to counsel requirements con-
tained in Wade and Gilbert apply to field identifications depends, as 
have earlier right to counsel issues,406 upon when that right attaches. 
This is not to say, of course, that the right to counsel "begins" for 
all purposes at the same time; during the short life of Escobedo, for 
example, it was never seriously suggested that the coincidence of 
focus and custody marked the point at which counsel had to be pro-
distinctive clothing; witness told by police that they have caught the culprit; suspect 
pointed out to witness before or during lineup; participants in lineup asked to try 
on clothing which fits only suspect; wholesale identification of defendant as perpe-
trator of several different crimes. 
405. In these cases, it often appears that the suspect was actually under arrest, 
although in many instances it would seem that the situation should be character• 
ized as a temporary "seizure" in the sense of the Terry case. In most of them, the 
suspect had been detained for a very brief period of time and the circumstances sug-
gest that the purpose of the detention was to permit a viewing by the witness, with 
a to-the-station arrest to follow only if the witness identified the suspect as the 
offender. None of these cases involved a lineup. See Hanks v. United States, 388 F.2d 
171 (10th Cir. 1968) (victim of postal robbery brought to postal inspector's office 
after suspect's arrest; held no due process violation); United States v. Quarles, 387 
F.2d 551 (4th Cir. 1967) (FBI agents brought suspect, apparently not then under 
arrest, to bank where robbery occurred, procedure upheld without discussion of 
due process point); Commonwealth v. Bumpus, 238 N.E.2d 343, 346 (Mass. 1968) 
(suspect found nearby brought back to scene of burglary about half hour 
after crime, held no due process violation; court noted that victim, "while the 
events were very fresh in his mind ..• was probably in a better position to have a 
clear recollection of the intruder than at any later time"); Harris v. State, 206 S.2d 
829 (Miss. 1968) (suspect brought to scene of window-peeking the day following 
crime; court stated that this fact affected only the weight of the identification, no 
discussion of due process point); State v. Keeney, 425 S.W.2d 85 (Mo. 1968) (suspect 
stopped two blocks away from scene of crime minutes after robbery of store; no 
due process violation in bringing suspect to store, especially since "the lapse of time 
between observation, description, arrest, and identification is insignificant'); State v. 
Sears, 182 Neb. 384, 155 N.W .2d 332 (1967) (a few hours after burglary, owner of 
car identified as used in crime and his companion brought to scene of crime for 
viewing; held no due process violation); People v. Rodriguez, 288 N.Y.S.2d 853 (1968) 
(identification at police station twenty minutes after robbery, held no due process 
violation). 
In the Bumpus case, the court had this to say about a stopping for investigation 
situation: 
If Greenberg [the victim] had pursued the intruder and the intruder had been 
stopped by a policeman during the pursuit and then had been shown at close 
range to Greenberg, it would have been a wholly reasonable confrontation, which 
hardly could have been avoided. The field confrontation which in fact took place 
seems to us to be of much the same type. 
238 N.E.2d at 346-47. 
406. Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964); White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 
59 (1963); Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52 (1961). 
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vided to facilitate preparation for trial. The purpose of the Wade-
Gilbert right to counsel is to "assure a meaningful confrontation at 
trial"407 by making it possible for counsel "to reconstruct at trial 
any unfairness that occurred at the lineup" and thus "attack the 
credibility of the witness' courtroom identification."408 This being 
so, it would seem that the fact that those two cases involved post-
indictment lineups is not significant, and they would seem to "apply 
whenever lineups are conducted."409 Yet, there obviously must be 
some limits, and even though the right of cross-examination would 
be bolstered if counsel were able to be present at every prior witness-
suspect confrontation, it is inherently impossible to extend the rule 
that far.410 
In groping for the yet undefined limits on the Wade-Gilbert 
right to counsel, one court recently held that the right begins only 
at the "accusatory stage,"411 relying upon "the Court's repeated use 
of the term 'accused' and its reference ... to Escobedo v. Illinois."412 
This, however, does not seem consistent with the above-stated ratio-
nale of Wade; moreover it ignores the fact that in Gilbert the Court 
suppressed testimony given at the penalty stage of the trial by eight 
witnesses concerning their lineup identification of the defendant 
as the perpetrator of other robberies. Insofar as can be determined, 
Gilbert had not yet been indicted for these other crimes, although it 
might be said that he had become the "accused" as to theses crimes 
if "accused" does not mean "formally charged"413 but only-as in 
Escobedo-that the investigation "had begun to focus" upon him.414 
407. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 236 (1967). 
408. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 232 (1967). Thus, the Court said that 
there would be no right to counsel at a lineup if procedures were adopted "which 
eliminate the risks of abuse and unintentional suggestion at lineup proceedings and 
the impediments to meaningful confrontation at trial." 388 U.S. at 239. 
409. L. HALL & Y. KAMISAR, MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 87 (2d ed., 1967 Supp.). 
As noted in United States v. Davis, 3 BNA CRIM. L. RPTR. 3221 (2d Cir. July 31, 1968), 
there is language in the recent Supreme Court cases which "outrun their facts," 
such as the assertion in Wade that the Court must "scrutinize any pretrial confronta• 
tion of the accused to determine whether the presence of his counsel is necessary 
to preserve the defendant's basic right to a fair trial," 388 U.S. at 227, and the 
statement in Stovall that "we have, therefore, concluded that the confrontation is a 
'critical stage,' and that counsel is required at all confrontations,'' 388 U.S. at 298. 
410. It would be helpful, for example, if counsel could be present at the time of 
the crime and thus more effectively cross-examine the witnesses as to their ability 
to observe the features of the offender. 
411. United States v. Davis, 3 BNA CRIM. L. RPTR. 3221 (2d Cir. July 31, 1968). 
This issue has been faced by few courts to date, as most cases in which the defendant 
has raised a Wade argument have been disposed of on the nonretroactivity ground. 
See, e.g., United States v. Quarles, 387 F.2d 551 (4th Cir. 1967); State v. Sears, 182 Neb. 
384, 155 N.W.2d 332 (1967). 
412. United States v. Davis, 3 BNA CRIM. L. RPTR. 3221, 3223 (2d Cir. July 31, 1968). 
413. This was the interpretation given to "accused" by four members of the 
Court in the pre-Escobedo case of Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959). 
414. Clearly the investigation had begun to focus on Gilbert; six days before the 
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However, the now-discredited "focus" test has no more appeal here 
than in other contexts.415 If the right to counsel during iden-
tification comes into bloom at the time of "focus," then a defendant, 
by showing that he could have been arrested, could challenge the 
most cautious of police identification procedures, such as arranging 
to have the suspect viewed "on the streets, entering or leaving his 
home or place of business, at places of amusement, or at any other 
place where he is not entitled to privacy."416 Likewise, it would 
also mean that an officer could not confidently take a suspect a brief 
distance to the scene of a just-completed crime for identification un-
less he were certain that he did not have grounds for arrest, which 
again would have the unfortunate result of requiring police "to 
guess at their peril the precise moment at which they have probable 
cause to arrest."417 
Another possibility is that the Wade-Gilbert right to counsel 
commences at the time the suspect is taken into custody. One court 
has rejected the view that "the mere fact of custody ... automatically 
triggers the Sixth Amendment right to counsel" and has concluded 
that "the fact of custody adds little of Sixth Amendment rele-
vance" ;418 this makes particularly good sense if custody is taken to 
include a Terry type of seizure. A contrary view would mean that 
street encounters for purposes of identification would be improper 
"unless police cars are equipped with public defenders."419 As a 
federal court recently said of a hypothetical case in which a man 
running away from the scene of an assault was collared by an officer 
who asked the victim and the bystanders whether the man was the 
perpetrator: 
It is hard to believe the Court meant to prevent an officer from mak-
ing such a routine, uncontrived inquiry and to require that the 
lineup he had admitted committing the other crimes. Gilbert v. United States, 366 
F.2d 923, 946 n.26 (1966), cert. denied, 388 U.S. 922 (1967). 
415. See text accompanying note 328 supra. 
416. Rigney v. Hendrick, 355 F.2d 710, 712 (3d Cir. 1965). Illustrative is United 
States v. Quarles, 387 F.2d 551 (4th Cir. 1967), where FBI agents took employees of a 
robbed bank to one of the suspect's place of employment, where they picked the suspect 
out of a group of employees lounging in the area. 
417. Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 310 (1966). 
418. United States v. Davis, 3 BNA CRIM, L. RPTR. 3221, 3222 {2d Cir. July 31, 1968). 
But cf. Rivers v. United States, 37 U.S.L.W. 2183 (5th Cir. Sept. 16, 1968), where the 
court held that failure to provide counsel for (or to obtain a waiver of the right to 
counsel from) a suspect who was apprehended, placed under arrest, and immediately 
brought before the victim for identification barred use of the victim's identification 
as evidence in a federal criminal trial. The fifth circuit apparently noted that the record 
did not reveal thH an emergency existed or that the police feared that the victim was 
dying as in Stovall. 
419, Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 496 (1964) Gustice White, dissenting). 
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victim and the bystanders be carted off to a police station, held on 
the spot until counsel could be provided, or dismissed until a lineup 
attended by counsel could be arranged at some later time.420 
The notion that Wade and Gilbert do not apply to such field 
identifications, it is submitted, does not do violence to the reasoning 
in those cases. The risks in field identification, for the most part, are 
inherent in that particular procedure and identical in almost every 
case. Only one suspect is viewed, and it is apparent to all parties that 
it was possible for the suspect to have committed the crime because 
he was in the area. The presence of counsel at the identification is 
not necessary to establish these points at trial. By contrast, there are 
an infinite number of variations in the manner in which a station-
house lineup might be conducted, and counsel's knowledge of pre-
cisely what occurred is of great value in making possible a meaning-
ful cross-examination at trial.421 Most of the suggestive procedures 
listed in Wade simply could not occur in the context of a field iden-
tification.422 Moreover, a suspect in a lineup is seldom in a position 
to detect such suggestive procedures423 and thus needs counsel to 
act as his eyes and ears, but a similar dilemma is unlikely in a field 
identification. 
VIII. CONCLUSIONS 
"Street encounters," the Chief Justice noted in Terry, "are in-
credibly rich in diversity."424 To this might be added the observation 
that the fourth, fifth, and sixth amendment issues presented by such 
encounters are likewise "rich in diversity." And, as reflected in a 
number of recent state and federal cases, the solutions tendered for 
these issues are also diverse; the authority of the police to make on-
the-street investigations has sometimes been limited by such impon-
derables as the undisclosed intentions of the officer and the undis-
closed assumptions of the suspect, or by such dubious factors as 
whether the officer could have required the suspect to submit to more 
than a street encounter. 
420. United States v. Davis, 8 BNA CRIM. L. RFrn. 3221, 3222 (2d Cir. July 31, 1968). 
421. Of course, the presence of a lawyer at a stationhouse lineup also serves as a 
deterrent against suggestive police tactics. 
422. See the list of abuses of the lineup procedure in note 404 supra. The only 
one of these "suggestive procedures" which might occur at a field identification is a 
police statement that they have caught the culprit. 
423. See United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 230-31 n.13 (1967) where the Court 
stated: 
An additional impediment to the detection of such influences by participants, 
including the suspect, is the physical conditions often surrounding the conduct 
of the lineup. In many, lights shine on the stage in such a way that the suspect 
cannot see the witness •••. In some a one-way mirror is used and what is said 
on the witness' side cannot be heard. 
424. 392 U.S. at 13. 
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All street encounters, despite their diversity, have in common 
the fact that they are less of an intrusion on the suspect than what 
has traditionally been referred to as an "arrest"-an actual taking to 
the station for purposes of investigation or prosecution. In terms of 
the fourth amendment, the seizure is a lesser invasion of personal 
security, as emphasized in Terry. In terms of the fifth amendment, 
the "potentiality for compulsion" does not approach that which per-
vades stationhouse questioning. And, in terms of the Wade-Gilbert 
sixth amendment right and the Stovall due process protection, crime-
scene identifications are not attended by the risks of a one-man sta-
tion-house showup or a lineup conducted long after the event. 
Because this is so, such efforts at crime prevention and detec-
tion425 should be encouraged rather than discouraged through "a 
grudging or negative attitude by reviewing courts."426 Until police 
and judges are replaced by computers, the contours of permissible 
police action should not be drawn by resort to highly complex 
formulae or largely unascertainable facts. Specifically, attempts to 
resurrect the "focus" test for various purposes should be resisted 
strenuously; the fact that the officer underestimated the amount of 
evidence at hand or thoughtfully elected a lesser form of intrusion 
upon the suspect should not be decisive. After all, "there is no 
constitutional right to be arrested."427 
If the courts do take a positive attitude toward permitting street 
encounters, Terry and its companions may mark the beginning of a 
rational assessment of a highly important but long-ignored aspect of 
police work. These cases, it may be hoped, will prompt the following 
developments. 
First: Terry paves the way for courts and Ia-wyers to see street 
encounters for what they are-a unique and distinct form of police 
activity which should not be judged as something indistinguishable 
from other police practices. The police have long viewed their on-
the-street actions in this way, and it is time for the law to do likewise. 
For too many years, instances of what in fact were temporary seizures 
for investigation have come before trial and appellate courts, but the 
issues involved were argued and decided solely in terms of whether 
there was a lawful arrest.428 
Second: It is time for rethinking of what constitutes probable 
425. Obviously the use of somewhat similar actions for purposes of harassment 
should be distinguished. See section IV supra. 
426. United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 108 (1965). 
427. Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 310 (1966). 
428. See Remington, The Law Relating to "On the Street" Detention, Questioning 
and Frisking of Suspected Persons and Police Arrest Privileges in General, 51 J. CRIM. 
L.C. &: P .S. 386, 390 (1960). 
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cause for arrest. Because of the long-standing judicial practice of 
classifying a variety of police conduct as arrests, there has been a 
tendency to water down the requirements for arrest in order to 
justify what were in fact only stops for investigation. Now that it 
is clear that such temporary seizures may be authorized without 
calling them arrests, a reconsideration of the grounds for a taking 
to the station are in order.429 
Third: Police authority to investigate suspicious activity should 
be conferred in terms of the power to make a temporary seizure; 
concomitantly, the courts should become more vigilant in striking 
down other investigative techniques which are more offensive. These 
include the use of broad and vague crimes of vagrancy and the like 
which permit arrest, prosecution, and conviction merely for being 
suspicious, 430 and such subterfuges as arrests for insignificant traffic 
violations in order to investigate, search, or harrass.431 Recognition 
of police authority to detain suspects briefly in suspicious circum-
stances should make it somewhat easier to uncover many of these 
other techniques.432 
Fourth: It is imperative that police agencies take the initiative 
in developing sound policies to ensure that this newly recognized 
authority concerning street encounters is exercised with restraint. 
Unfortunately, the police have not done so in the past,433 but 
rather have often proved to be their own worst enemies by push-
ing every uncertainty or ambiguity in their power to its outer limits. 
The result heretofore has been that the courts ultimately slam the 
door on the police-sometimes a bit too hard-and they are then 
caught within strict restraints that are essentially of their own 
429. Experience has shown, however, that such a reappraisal will not necessarily 
result from recognition of the police power to stop for investigation. See Schwartz, 
Stop and Frisk (A Case Study of Judicial Control of the Police), 58 J. CRIM. L.C. 8e 
P.S. 433, 450-51 (1967). 
430. See note 133 supra. 
431. See, e.g., Taglavore v. United States, 291 F.2d 262 (9th Cir. 1961) (vice squad 
investigator observed man suspected of being a narcotics seller commit two minor 
traffic violations-failure to signal for a tum and faulty lights-and obtained an 
arrest warrant for these offenses; the suspect was then arrested and a search incident 
to arrest uncovered narcotics); People v. Watkins, 19 Ill. 2d 11, 166 N.E.2d 433 (1960) 
(officers assigned to gambling detail followed man suspected of being a policy "bag-
man" and arrested him for parking too close to a crosswalk; search of his person 
incident to the arrest uncovered policy slips). 
432. For example, it has been suggested that the common subterfuge of arresting 
a suspicious person and then justifying it by finding a description of a wanted 
criminal which comes close to fitting the suspect (see .ARREsr 296-97) could now be 
more easily detected because the right to stop for investigation would call for the 
officer to give the suspect an opportunity to identify himself. Younger, Stop and 
Frisk: "Tell It Like It Is", 58 J. CRIM. L.C. 8e P.S. 293, 295 (1966). 
433. Some think it is unlikely that they will do so in the future. See Schwartz, 
supra note 429, at 449. 
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making.434 The intentional ambiguity in Terry would make it quite 
simple for the Supreme Court to give that decision a most narrow 
interpretation should the facts of subsequent cases suggest such a 
course; thus the warning of the President's Crime Commission still 
rings true: 
The continuation of field interrogation as a police investigative 
technique depends upon a police willingness to develop policies 
which carefully distinguish field interrogation from clearly illegal 
street practices and to take administrative steps to demonstrate that 
a proper field interrogation program can be carried out without it 
leading also to indiscriminate stopping and searching of persons on 
the street. As yet, police have failed to make this kind of demonstra-
tion, and thus today field interrogation as a police investigative tech-
nique remains in jeopardy:m 
Fifth: Legislatures should also become involved in the entire 
matter of police-citizen street confrontations. It is true, of course, 
that the Court has made it clear that the fourth amendment is not 
subject to "verbal manipulation,"436 and thus there is little to be 
gained from enactment of a mere carbon copy of the New York stop-
and-frisk law. But there are other matters which are quite appro-
priate for legislation. For one thing, as to Terry-type seizures, there 
are a number of issues which are unlikely to reach the courts and 
which are even more unlikely to be resolved as a matter of consti-
tutional law. Examples of these issues include whether force 
may be used for such a temporary seizure;437 whether a citizen 
may resist an unlawful seizure of this kind;438 and whether police 
434. Courts are undoubtedly influenced by their assumptions as to how police 
will respond to legal requirements. If there is confidence that the police will stay 
well within defined limits, their powers may be stated broadly. Cf. P. DEVLIN, THE 
CRIMINAL PROSECUTION IN ENGLAND 16 (1958): "We like to grant large powers so as 
to prevent any legal quibble about their extent, but we expect the holders of them 
to act fairly and reasonably and well within them." On the other hand, if it is 
thought that the police will exceed the limits regularly, the tendency is to impose 
severe and perhaps unrealistic limitations. "Among the opponents of the amendment 
[broadening the powers of police in Japan] there seems to have been this feeling: 
Allow the police seven miles and they will go nine miles; therefore, if we want to 
keep them at seven miles, better give them six miles." Abe, Police Detention and 
Arrest Privileges Under Foreign Law-Japan, 51 J. Cru:1r. L.C. 8.: P.S. 429, 433 (1960). 
435. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, 
TASK FORCE REPORT: THE POLICE 23 (1967). But, in PRESIDENT'S COM!IUSSION ON LAW 
ENFORCEMENT AND AollllNISTRATION OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE 
Soc1ETY 103 (1967), the Commission has praise for the efforts of the New York State 
Combined Council of Law Enforcement Officials in giving the police practical guid-
ance on the implementation of the New York stop-and-frisk law. 
436. See text accompanying note 66 supra. 
437. Although occasions where force is needed are rare, see Pilcher, The Law and 
Practice of Field Interrogation, 58 J. CRIM. L.C. 8.: P.S. 465, 473 (1967), it is obvious 
that the police deserve guidance on this point. For one view, see l\IoDEL CODE OF 
PRE-ARRAIGNl\lENT PROCEDURE § 2.02 (Tent. Draft No. I, 1966). 
438. This issue should probably be dealt with in the same terms as whether an 
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should be permitted or required to maintain records on all tempo-
rary seizures.439 And perhaps even more important, legislation is 
needed to deal with those street encounters which are unrelated to 
a desire to prosecute for crime. In Terry there is the healthy admis-
sion that courts cannot effectively deter such actions because their 
only weapon is the exclusionary rule,440 and this admission is ac-
companied by a plea for "the employment of other remedies than 
the exclusionary rule to curtail abuses for which that sanction may 
prove inappropriate."441 Clearly, there is a need for laws which 
create other means to control the police, new channels for citizen 
complaints about police misconduct, and realistic remedies for indi-
viduals dealt with unfairly by the police. 
Hopefully, Terry, Sibron, and Peters will give impetus to devel-
opments such as these. But it is clear that they will not just happen, 
nor can the Supreme Court alone make them happen. What is 
needed here, indeed, what is needed for the larger task of striking 
a fair balance between all individual and societal interests, is 
the high resolve of political officials, law-makers and law-imple-
menters, to take affirmative steps to protect and enlarge the liberties 
of those they govern .... [N]ow is the opportune time for congress-
men and aldermen, and for cabinet members and mayors and police 
commissioners ... to begin to view their official obligations in more 
spacious terms. They must see it as their responsibility to exercise 
the liberating, as well as the regulating, powers of the charters they 
work under. Fidelity to the supreme law of the land requires no 
less.442 
unlawful arrest may be resisted. While some states take the position that such force 
is privileged, e.g., City of Monroe v. Ducas, 203 La. 971, 14 S.2d 781 (1943), the better 
view is that fourth amendment issues should not be fought out on the street and 
that the individual illegally seized should submit and then resort to available legal 
remedies. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04{2)(a)(i) (Proposed Official Draft, 1962). 
439. See DETECTION OF CRIME ch. 5, and note the ALI proposal, supra note 22. 
The keeping of such records has been opposed by some as a threat to the reputations 
of innocent persons, but insufficient attention has been given to the potential use 
of such records as a means of control over the patrolman's actions. DETECTION OF 
CRIME 80; Pilcher, supra note 3, at 478-79. 
440. 392 U.S. at 13-14: 
Doubtless some police "field interrogation" conduct violates the Fourth Amend• 
ment. But a stem refusal by this Court to condone such activity does not neces-
sarily render it responsive to the exclusionary rule. Regardless of how effective 
the rule may be where obtaining convictions is an important objective of the 
police, it is powerless to deter invasions of constitutionally guaranteed rights 
where the police either have no interest in prosecuting or are willing to forego 
successful prosecution in the interest of serving some other goal. 
441. 392 U.S. at 15. 
442. Pollack, To Secure the Individual Rights of Many, in LAW IN A CHANGING 
AMERICA 43, 55 (G. lIAzARD ed. 1968). 
